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sue of Oslo Files contains a collection of contributions from the conference. The 
anthology comes in four parts. 
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aspects of the geopolitical developments in the High North after the Cold War. 
Part two follows with three national perspectives on developments in the Arctic: 
the Norwegian, the Icelandic and that of the United States. The third and most 
extensive part presents research and practice within the areas of jurisdiction, 
transport, resources and security in the High North. 
Finally, General Sverre Diesen, the Norwegian Chief of Defence and initia-
tor of the conference, presents his perspectives on military implications for the 
Arctic – now emerging from the frost.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic region used to be marked by rivalry between the two Cold War 
blocs. After 1990, the region experienced a thaw, both politically and climati-
cally, and the countries of the region gradually rediscovered earlier patterns of 
cross-border cooperation. Today, the region is about to take on new signifi-
cance. High energy prices and technological advances have made it possible to 
exploit petroleum resources in hitherto inaccessible areas, and the melting of the 
polar ice cap could open new maritime transportation routes. At the same time, 
the region contains some of the world’s richest fishing resources. Environmental 
experts fear the effects of both petroleum drilling and growing maritime traffic 
in a vulnerable area.
There are still a number of unresolved sovereignty issues in the Arctic. 
Several delimitation lines between maritime zones remain undecided. The north-
ernmost extension of the continental shelves has not yet been settled and some 
observers talk of a race towards the North Pole. There are also unresolved is-
sues of sovereign rights pertaining to the regulation of fisheries. The Norwegian 
Fishery Protection Zone around the Spitsbergen archipelago has remained con-
troversial. Even in areas where sovereign rights are well established, the littoral 
states are faced with extensive illegal, unreported and unregulated and fishing 
(IUU).
Although the military tension of the Cold War area belongs to the past, 
the area does pose security challenges. It contains some of the most important 
military bases of the Russian Federation, which has become more self-assertive 
and forward-leaning. Norway and Canada have recently placed new emphasis 
on military presence in the High North. Iceland faces new challenges due to the 
US decision to close down the bases there.
All these challenges formed the background for an international conference 
held in Tromsø, Norway, 25–26 September 2007. More than 200 participants 
from all of the states bordering on the Arctic met to discuss recent developments 
in the region with an emphasis on security issues. The contributors included 
politicians, civil servants, scholars and military commanders.
The conference was initiated by the Norwegian Chief of Defence, General 
Sverre Diesen, and organized by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. 
Senior Fellow Dr Kjetil Skogrand was responsible for organizing the conference 
together with Research Fellow Lene Kristoffersen. People from my own institute 
and from the secretariat of the Norwegian Chief of Defence rendered valuable 
support in the practical organization of the venue. I would like to thank all of 
them for a most successful conference.
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This volume contains some of the contributions from the conference. In 
some cases they have been revised and updated to take account of recent devel-
opments. Let me thank Senior Fellow, Dr Paal Sigurd Hilde, and Anna Therese 
Klingstedt, editor of our publications, for reviewing the papers and deciding the 
style of the final anthology.
I hope that the contributions will serve as a useful update of the present 
challenges in the Arctic, seen from an international security perspective.
Oslo, May 2008
Rolf Tamnes
Professor
Director of the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
Part I: Setting the scene
ThE ARCTIC IN A GEO-STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
by Dr Kjetil Skogrand, Senior Fellow, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
In this article I shall discuss challenges in the Arctic Region in our time with 
an emphasis on security. Perhaps I should start by defining what region I am 
dealing with. I shall discuss the circumpolar region, the region surrounding the 
North Pole. But how far south should we go? If we take the weather charts of 
an average television network in the United States or in Continental Europe as 
a starting point, I shall be concerned with the areas above the northern limits of 
such charts. This would leave us roughly with Northern Scandinavia, Northern 
Russia, Alaska, Northern Canada, Greenland and Iceland, the seas surrounding 
these areas and the Arctic Basin itself. 
PERSPECTIVES FROm ThE COLD WAR
During the Cold War, the Arctic had a strategic value as a transit area between 
the heartlands of the two superpowers. The shortest distance for missiles or 
strategic bombers went across the Arctic. Northern waters were also the op-
erating area for large naval forces and surface ships, some of them bearing 
nuclear weapons, patrolled regularly. Hidden under the surface were strategic 
submarines. Moreover, strategic transport routes between the United States and 
Europe went across the North Atlantic. The region was an important area for 
intelligence collection and early warning. Numerous radar stations and instal-
lations for signals intelligence were located in the region. Security in a military 
sense was the dominating feature of the Arctic during the Cold War. The region 
was frozen, not only climatically, but politically.
During the Cold War, the area was not unimportant in terms of resources. 
Indeed, Arctic waters have been important fishing grounds for centuries. From 
the 1970s factory trawlers grew in number, with the result that Arctic fish stocks 
were placed under increasing pressure. Fishery issues cut across the Cold War 
divide and it even proved impossible to prevent several harsh fisheries conflicts 
between Western bloc countries. On a more positive note, Russia and Norway 
were able to establish a successful system for negotiating quotas through the 
Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission in the mid-1970s.
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It was also well known during the Cold War that the seabed in the Arc-
tic could contain hydrocarbons. However, only in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska were 
offshore installations established, and this took place only towards the end of 
the Cold War. In the rest of the Arctic, costs and technological challenges made 
exploiting offshore resources unfeasible. From a geo-strategic perspective, how-
ever, resources played a rather limited role in the Arctic during the Cold War.
ENERGy
Today, the picture is very different. Resources, primarily oil and gas, are the 
main drivers of the region in a geo-strategic sense. Energy has re-emerged as a 
major issue in international politics. Economic growth in Asia, particularly in 
India and China, has contributed to a growing demand of fossil fuels. Attempts 
to develop other energy forms cannot prevent hydrocarbons from remaining the 
dominant source of energy for the next generation.
Energy security has become a new catchphrase in industrial economies. 
Partly this is about securing stable and predictable supplies of hydrocarbons. 
For some countries, this has led to a quest for diversification – buying oil and gas 
from several producers instead of relying on one major supplier, or on suppliers 
from one region only. Another increasingly important aspect of energy security 
is the physical security of installations: platforms, harbours, refineries and pipe-
lines. Such infrastructure is vulnerable to terrorist attacks – the scourge of our 
time. Issues related to energy security are currently being discussed in NATO.
One reason for the concerns of net importers is that the majority of the 
known reserves of hydrocarbons are to be found in politically unstable regions 
– notably the Middle East. There are probably substantial reserves of hydrocar-
bons in the Arctic. In the European Arctic, there are huge fields in the Barents 
Sea (Snow White, Shtokman), as well as in the Pechora and Kara seas. High en-
ergy prices and technological advances make it possible to exploit these fields.
The Arctic is politically stable, surrounded by states with robust govern-
mental systems and there are relatively harmonious relations between these 
states. Even the most difficult unsolved questions in the Arctic pale compared 
to the formidable challenges facing other oil-rich regions in the world. This is 
why the Arctic now stands out as one of the most attractive energy provinces in 
a global context.
There is of course one country in the region where the jury is still out when 
in comes to stability and predictability – Russia. Socially and politically, Russia 
is more stable than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union. The politi-
cal chaos of the Yeltsin years is history and the economy is robust with a high 
growth rate due to high energy prices. In sum, the economic and political recov-
ery of Russia is nothing less than remarkable but there are also many sources of 
concern. The government displays authoritarian tendencies and deficiencies in 
terms of human rights and freedom of speech. The legal system is selective and 
inadequate, also in the commercial field. In the Russian energy sector there is 
a new emphasis on national control. Foreign investments are not secure, as the 
Sakhalin case has demonstrated.
Another source of concern is Russia’s renewed self-assertiveness in pursu-
ing its national interests. True, no one should be surprised that the Russians are 
spending some of their growing revenues on rebuilding their armed forces after 
years of decay. No one should be shocked because Russia is once again present-
ing its views more clearly on the international stage. But it is more troubling 
that Russia seems to be using energy as a means to exert foreign-policy pressure. 
Thus, to some countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, energy security is pri-
marily about avoiding too much reliance on Russian energy supplies.
FIShERIES
Although hardly a resource of primary geo-strategic importance, the total value 
of Arctic fishing is greater than many people realize. Approximately ten per cent 
of the world’s catch of white fish is harvested in the Arctic, and the overall value 
amounts to several billion US dollars. And the potential for conflict over fisher-
ies issues should not be underestimated. Several Arctic states have demonstrated 
their willingness to use coercive measures to ensure that fisheries regulations are 
respected.
Uncontrolled, unregulated and illegal fishing is a major challenge. Esti-
mates have indicated that 100,000 tonnes of fish is illegally caught annually in 
the Barents Sea alone. That amounts to a quarter of the total catch permitted. Il-
legal fishing could lead to fish stocks being overexploited and severely depleted, 
with the result that legal fishing may have to be reduced or even stopped. This 
would deprive many of the region’s coastal populations of their livelihood.
During the last year or so, there have been positive reports that illegal fish-
ing on the European side of the Arctic is being reduced due to more effective 
control and cooperation. Cooperation between Norway and Russia has been 
strengthened. Around the North East Atlantic Sea Basin a system for checking 
the landing of all frozen fish is being introduced. Despite this, overfishing re-
mains a serious challenge.
CLImATE ChANGE
Reports such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment and that from UN Inter-
national Panel on Climate Change have shown that the climate in the Arctic is 
changing much faster than in other parts of the world. Not only in a political 
sense is the region emerging from the frost. What impact might climate change 
have on international relations in the Arctic in the decades to come? There are a 
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number of reasons why climate change will add to the geo-strategic complexity 
of the region.
First, new transport routes might be opened, initially only during the sum-
mer season, then possibly throughout the year. Admittedly, the possibilities for 
trans-Arctic shipping in the future are highly uncertain, but the ice seems to be 
melting faster than previously assumed. Some routes that are inaccessible today 
might be opened in our lifetime. If new sea transportation routes can be utilized, 
this will give rise to a number of challenges pertaining to jurisdiction, regulation 
and security etc.
Second, it might become easier, and thus more economically feasible, to 
exploit energy and mineral resources in Arctic areas that have so far been inac-
cessible. This will place remaining jurisdictional conflicts in a new perspective.
Third, fish stocks might start to migrate even faster than today. Moreover, 
new areas might open up for fishing as the sea-ice retreats. Even at present, the 
negotiations of quotas between states are rather complicated. Dramatic shifts in 
the distribution of major fish stocks will no doubt add to these difficulties.
Other environmental issues might also move higher up on the regional 
agenda in the coming years. The establishment of new offshore installations and 
the growing number of oil tankers increase the risk of accidents. The territory of 
neighbouring countries can be affected – pollution knows no borders. Thus, the 
issue of international regulations and environmental standards can be expected 
to become more important. Norway has initiated a dialogue with Russia on 
common environmental standards for the Barents Sea. 
The aim of such standards should not be to prohibit legitimate economic 
activity. Rather, the intention should be to ensure sustainability: fisheries, tour-
ism, the oil and gas industry and sea transportation should be able to coexist 
without threatening one another. Surveillance, search and rescue capabilities 
and protective measures in the event of oil spills are obvious areas for coopera-
tion between the Arctic neighbours.
JURISDICTION
There are several unsolved issues of jurisdiction in the Arctic: some delimitation 
lines between maritime zones remain undecided and the sovereignty of one small 
island has not been clarified. The northernmost extension of the continental 
shelves is being assessed by a commission of experts, based on data provided by 
the countries surrounding the Arctic Basin. This will probably lead to the need 
for further negotiations about delimitation. Another issue on the European side 
of the Arctic is the interpretation of the Spitzbergen Treaty regarding both the 
status of the fisheries protection zone and the status of the seabed off the coast 
of the islands. Then we have the legal challenges posed by possible new sea 
transportation routes.
It could be useful to remind ourselves that conflicting sovereignty claims 
are by no means unknown in other parts of the world, including areas with oil 
and gas resources. In some of these areas of contested territorial claims, rela-
tions between the neighbouring states are somewhat more strained than in the 
Arctic Region – consider, for instance, the Middle East, the Caspian Region or 
the South China Sea.
Seen from this perspective, if it is possible to resolve territorial disputes in 
an orderly manner anywhere in the world, it should be in the Arctic. It is in fact 
slightly embarrassing that such agreements have proven so difficult to reach. A 
heavy responsibility lies with the Arctic states: how are we to be seen as promot-
ing world order and global stability if we are not able to agree amongst our-
selves on issues that, on the whole, seem rather less complicated than those of 
other regions? When it comes to overlapping claims, the region obviously needs 
less flag-waving and more wise statesmanship. 
SECURITy
This brings me to the final issue – the significance of military force in the Arctic 
today. When the Cold War ended almost two decades ago, the Arctic quickly 
lost much of its former status as an area of high geo-strategic significance in a 
military sense. Russia’s military capacity was decimated. NATO’s detailed emer-
gency plans and reinforcement schemes for the European High North fell into 
oblivion.
Nonetheless, some of the traits from distant times are still relevant. The 
Kola Peninsula has remained an important base area for Russian forces, includ-
ing its nuclear deterrent. The Arctic region has also remained the operating area 
of nuclear submarines from other countries. They may be fewer, they may be 
primarily of symbolic value and we may not see them, but they are still there. 
Some issues from the Cold War have reappeared, but in a different way. The 
Arctic is one of the possible transit regions for missiles launched from sites in 
other parts of the world, such as the Middle East or North Korea. The planned 
missile defence system of the United States will cover the Arctic, and there will 
be installations for instance on Greenland.
New security challenges have gained importance. The rise of international 
terrorism has made it necessary to strengthen the protection of commercial in-
frastructure of strategic importance. Such installations, particularly those at sea, 
need robust protection that only military forces can provide.
Then there is the issue of surveillance. There is still a need to be constantly 
updated on the activities in the huge areas in the North. The military sector sup-
plies most of the intelligence data by satellites, radar stations, naval vessels on 
patrol and maritime surveillance aircraft. The original intention of intelligence 
and surveillance in the Arctic during the Cold War was of course to keep an eye 
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
132/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
number of reasons why climate change will add to the geo-strategic complexity 
of the region.
First, new transport routes might be opened, initially only during the sum-
mer season, then possibly throughout the year. Admittedly, the possibilities for 
trans-Arctic shipping in the future are highly uncertain, but the ice seems to be 
melting faster than previously assumed. Some routes that are inaccessible today 
might be opened in our lifetime. If new sea transportation routes can be utilized, 
this will give rise to a number of challenges pertaining to jurisdiction, regulation 
and security etc.
Second, it might become easier, and thus more economically feasible, to 
exploit energy and mineral resources in Arctic areas that have so far been inac-
cessible. This will place remaining jurisdictional conflicts in a new perspective.
Third, fish stocks might start to migrate even faster than today. Moreover, 
new areas might open up for fishing as the sea-ice retreats. Even at present, the 
negotiations of quotas between states are rather complicated. Dramatic shifts in 
the distribution of major fish stocks will no doubt add to these difficulties.
Other environmental issues might also move higher up on the regional 
agenda in the coming years. The establishment of new offshore installations and 
the growing number of oil tankers increase the risk of accidents. The territory of 
neighbouring countries can be affected – pollution knows no borders. Thus, the 
issue of international regulations and environmental standards can be expected 
to become more important. Norway has initiated a dialogue with Russia on 
common environmental standards for the Barents Sea. 
The aim of such standards should not be to prohibit legitimate economic 
activity. Rather, the intention should be to ensure sustainability: fisheries, tour-
ism, the oil and gas industry and sea transportation should be able to coexist 
without threatening one another. Surveillance, search and rescue capabilities 
and protective measures in the event of oil spills are obvious areas for coopera-
tion between the Arctic neighbours.
JURISDICTION
There are several unsolved issues of jurisdiction in the Arctic: some delimitation 
lines between maritime zones remain undecided and the sovereignty of one small 
island has not been clarified. The northernmost extension of the continental 
shelves is being assessed by a commission of experts, based on data provided by 
the countries surrounding the Arctic Basin. This will probably lead to the need 
for further negotiations about delimitation. Another issue on the European side 
of the Arctic is the interpretation of the Spitzbergen Treaty regarding both the 
status of the fisheries protection zone and the status of the seabed off the coast 
of the islands. Then we have the legal challenges posed by possible new sea 
transportation routes.
It could be useful to remind ourselves that conflicting sovereignty claims 
are by no means unknown in other parts of the world, including areas with oil 
and gas resources. In some of these areas of contested territorial claims, rela-
tions between the neighbouring states are somewhat more strained than in the 
Arctic Region – consider, for instance, the Middle East, the Caspian Region or 
the South China Sea.
Seen from this perspective, if it is possible to resolve territorial disputes in 
an orderly manner anywhere in the world, it should be in the Arctic. It is in fact 
slightly embarrassing that such agreements have proven so difficult to reach. A 
heavy responsibility lies with the Arctic states: how are we to be seen as promot-
ing world order and global stability if we are not able to agree amongst our-
selves on issues that, on the whole, seem rather less complicated than those of 
other regions? When it comes to overlapping claims, the region obviously needs 
less flag-waving and more wise statesmanship. 
SECURITy
This brings me to the final issue – the significance of military force in the Arctic 
today. When the Cold War ended almost two decades ago, the Arctic quickly 
lost much of its former status as an area of high geo-strategic significance in a 
military sense. Russia’s military capacity was decimated. NATO’s detailed emer-
gency plans and reinforcement schemes for the European High North fell into 
oblivion.
Nonetheless, some of the traits from distant times are still relevant. The 
Kola Peninsula has remained an important base area for Russian forces, includ-
ing its nuclear deterrent. The Arctic region has also remained the operating area 
of nuclear submarines from other countries. They may be fewer, they may be 
primarily of symbolic value and we may not see them, but they are still there. 
Some issues from the Cold War have reappeared, but in a different way. The 
Arctic is one of the possible transit regions for missiles launched from sites in 
other parts of the world, such as the Middle East or North Korea. The planned 
missile defence system of the United States will cover the Arctic, and there will 
be installations for instance on Greenland.
New security challenges have gained importance. The rise of international 
terrorism has made it necessary to strengthen the protection of commercial in-
frastructure of strategic importance. Such installations, particularly those at sea, 
need robust protection that only military forces can provide.
Then there is the issue of surveillance. There is still a need to be constantly 
updated on the activities in the huge areas in the North. The military sector sup-
plies most of the intelligence data by satellites, radar stations, naval vessels on 
patrol and maritime surveillance aircraft. The original intention of intelligence 
and surveillance in the Arctic during the Cold War was of course to keep an eye 
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty
14 2/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
on the military activities of the other states in the region. This is still important. 
However, the expansion of civilian activities in the region has increased the need 
for surveillance. An updated surveillance picture is needed to counter illegal 
fishing, detect ships in trouble, follow drifting oil slicks and conduct search and 
rescue operations.
Lately, the Arctic has attracted more interest in a geo-strategic sense due 
to reasons that I have discussed in this presentation. There seems to be a grow-
ing interest among the Arctic states to underscore their strategic interests in the 
region through a military presence. One reason is that a military presence still 
serves as a symbol of sovereignty or jurisdiction. The Arctic states will patrol 
their maritime zones to demonstrate their willingness to exercise their sovereign 
rights, and deter anyone who might want to challenge those rights. Possible epi-
sodes can then be handled quickly before they escalate. Another reason is that 
the growing volume of sea traffic in the Arctic and the problem of illegal fishing 
demand a greater law-enforcement capacity and search and rescue capabilities. 
Such duties are often performed by naval and coast guard units – the latter are 
an integral part of the navy in some Arctic countries. The growing sea traffic is 
one of the reasons why Iceland has voiced concern over the withdrawal of the 
US aircraft stationed on the island.
It would, however, be an exaggeration to claim that the Arctic is once again 
becoming a military focal point. The United States retains a substantial military 
presence in Alaska, but current US military activities in the Arctic are still very 
modest compared to during the Cold War, particularly in the Arctic areas bor-
dering on Europe. Canada and Norway have both signalled that their northern 
regions will be given more attention in military terms.
More importantly, Russia is about to expand its military activities in 
the Arctic. The region now serves as a showroom of Russia’s rebuilt military 
strength. Thus, Russia has recently taken up Arctic exercise patterns associated 
with the past – such as long distance flights with strategic bombers. Moreover, 
northern waters, particularly the Barents and White seas, are important testing 
grounds for Russian maritime weapons systems.
This by no means indicates that a new Cold War is about to start in the 
Arctic. The expanded Russian activity should instead be viewed as a sign of nor-
malization. We had grown used to a Russia that no longer possessed the means 
to project military power in the form of large-scale exercises. Now we have to 
learn how to live with a strong and assertive Russia with a larger military capac-
ity.
However, there is still reason to believe that the growing Russian presence 
will have implications for the level of activity in the region of the other Arctic 
nations – at least when it comes to intelligence and surveillance. It will also be 
interesting to see whether the Russian activities will lead to greater attention on 
the Arctic in NATO when it comes to contingency planning in relation to crisis 
management in the region. Today the Arctic is hardly on the agenda at all in the 
Alliance.
A somewhat expanded level of military attention in the region compared 
to the last decade does not have to lead to a higher level of tension, let alone 
conflict. The states bordering on the Arctic need no explanation for why they 
have military forces in the region – this is our neighbourhood. At the same time, 
all parties should acknowledge that there is no reason to militarize the Arctic 
further. There are no issues in the Arctic that can be solved by showing off force. 
It should also be remembered that military forces can also serve as a tool for 
confidence building and cooperation through visits, common exercises and joint 
patrolling. We have seen some examples of this, for instance between Norway 
and Russia. There could be a lot more.
CONCLUDING REmARKS
In this presentation, I have described how the geo-strategic significance of the 
Arctic has changed since the Cold War. The region used to be strategically im-
portant due to its location between the two Cold War blocs. Today the region is 
characterized by new opportunities due to the increased potential for extracting 
hydrocarbons. This forms the background for an increased geo-strategic interest 
in the region.
Let me conclude by emphasizing the need for stronger multilateral coop-
eration in the Arctic region. New legal frameworks should be negotiated to 
tackle an expansion in sea transportation. Common environmental standards 
are needed to deal with an expansion in oil and gas installations. Relevant infor-
mation on civilian activities from surveillance systems should be exchanged and 
search and rescue capabilities coordinated. The fight against illegal, unregulated 
fishing also requires close contact between Arctic neighbours. Only by finding 
common solutions can the great potential of the Arctic be released.
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The Arctic region
Part II 
National perspectives on the Arctic
Arctic chAllenges – the fine Art of deAling 
with chAnge
by Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, Norwegian Minister of Defence
The top of the world deserves to be where we have placed it: at the top of the 
political agenda. The Government has, as some of you hopefully are aware, 
made the High North’s challenges and opportunities our top priority. I have 
been asked to discuss the challenges we face in the High North. Let me introduce 
this landscape by citing a few lines by the Norwegian poet Rolf Jacobsen. His 
gripping poem North has not only acquired the status of an unofficial regional 
anthem on this side of the Arctic Circle, it has also become a literary point of 
reference for what lies ahead. And this is Rolf Jacobsen’s advice, as he points 
out the direction for us.
Walk into the wind. Climb mountains.
Look to the north.
More often.
This country is long.
Most of it is north.
Most of Norway is north. And I would argue that the present government is 
convincingly doing exactly what Rolf Jacobsen encouraged: we are looking 
more often to the north. As a matter of fact, we are not only looking more often 
to the north, we are talking more about the north, we are travelling more in the 
north and, most importantly: we are doing more in the north. 
For people living further south, I would presume that the natural question 
to ask is why. Why have we moved the High North centre-stage and made it a 
strategic priority? The answer is, in one word, change. And hence, this is the 
challenge we have embarked on: the fine art of dealing with change in the High 
North.
Fig. 1: Map showing the Arctic region defined as the area where the average temperature for the 
warmest month is below 10°C.
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ChANGES IN ThE hIGh NORTh
I would like to point out three areas where we are observing changes with far-
reaching consequences: energy, climate and security policy.
First, let me address an area which has become one of the main driving 
forces behind the changes we are witnessing in the High North: energy. 
Oil and gas are already produced in the Barents Sea and the Pechora Sea. 
In a world where energy supply and energy security are becoming important se-
curity policy issues, it is not surprising to see growing interest in the High North 
as an emerging energy province.
According to the US Geological Survey, as much as a quarter of the world’s 
undiscovered oil and gas resources may be located in the Arctic. In a compara-
tive perspective one might argue that energy has replaced strategic nuclear deter-
rence as the main source of interest in this region.
We have turned a new page: the first tankers filled with liquefied natural 
gas from the Snow White field – the world’s northernmost LNG project – have 
left the processing plant outside Hammerfest.
Discoveries of new oil and gas reserves are opening up new future perspec-
tives for the entire circumpolar Arctic. The strategic importance of the High 
North will increase. And there will be business opportunities for all of us. This 
is all well and good. Good business. More energy. Nice neighbours. New per-
spectives.
This leads me, however, to the second fundamental change we are observ-
ing in the High North, and that is a development we witness with dismay. I am 
of course thinking of climate change. It seems that we human beings have to see 
something before we believe in it. Friends of the High North, we are seeing it 
now, the shocking rate at which the Arctic ice is melting. In May 2006 I had, 
for the first time, the opportunity to see a polar bear in the wild. I had invited 
my Nordic colleagues to Spitzbergen, and as we were flying above the snow and 
ice between Longyearbyen and Ny-Ålesund, the sight of a polar bear running 
beneath attracted our attention. It was a sight of extraordinary natural beauty, 
one of those once-in-a-lifetime experiences you’ll never forget. But at the same 
time, it was a sight that filled me with worry and contemplation. Where can 
these beautiful animals thrive and find food when their habitat is being dramati-
cally reduced? In only six days this month, from 3 to 9 September, 180,000 km2 
of Arctic ice disappeared. That is more than half the size of Norway. It is almost 
twice the size of Iceland or the Kola Peninsula. In six days.
My point is that as we are trying to mobilize the international commu-
nity into ways of reducing greenhouse emissions, we must at the same time 
prepare for the possible consequences of climate change. We must both change 
our policy and adapt to the consequences. In the High North global warming 
may provide access to natural resources that until now have been inaccessible. 
New sea lines will shorten long distance routes considerably. The way we trade 
with Asia may be significantly altered if hitherto inaccessible routes, such as the 
Northeast Passage, open to commercial shipping. Canadians now face similar 
possibilities brought about by the opening of the Northwest Passage, and I am 
looking forward to hearing the Canadian perspectives on this later on today. Im-
portant fisheries might be relocated as the fish move to find their favoured food 
and temperature. Old inhabitants may have to move. New players will perhaps 
enter the field. New partners will emerge. Exciting opportunities will present 
themselves. Yet competition and potential conflicts may be lurking in a future 
that is suddenly not that distant any longer.
I shall now turn from energy and climate issues to security and de-
fence policy. For these Norwegian policy fields, the changing politi-
cal scene both internationally and locally in the Arctic acts as a compass.  
Fig. 2: Norway and the maritime boundaries in the High North.
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A predictable security policy framework will be of paramount strategic impor-
tance as we: 
face potential new trade routes that may alter the way we do business with 
the East; 
witness dire climate changes that affect everything we know; and 
watch Norway’s largest neighbour change before our eyes. 
These issues concern both the individual states that border on the Northern 
seas, as well as our international partners, including NATO and the UN. As the 
ice melts and poses dilemmas we cannot ignore, our ability to deal effectively 
with change and formulate a security policy that firmly draws up guidelines that 
embody both opportunities and challenges, will be crucial. 
As far as Russia is concerned, the end of the Cold War may by now be 
perceived as a cliché by some, a worn-out phrase. Perhaps we should more aptly 
talk about the end of “the end of the Cold War”. Regardless of perceptions, 
our relation with Russia and our past history remain issues we cannot ignore. 
Norway and Russia have lived in peace for a thousand years. In this new era, we 
are rediscovering patterns of trade and relations that date back centuries.
Norwegians again travel, do business and marry on the Russian side, and 
vice versa. In 1990, around 3,000 people crossed the border close to Kirkenes. 
Now that number has climbed above 100,000. The figures tell their own sto-
ries of increased relations and contact. And these are good news. We want the 
Norwegian-Russian border to be a bridge, not a barrier. 
If we look at the security and defence policy, here too the overall picture 
is one of improved cooperation and new opportunities. Our relationship with 
Russia is basically good. We remain committed to strengthening our partnership 
with Russia, both bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia Council. 
New opportunities will come, after the long awaited Russian ratification of 
the SOFA-agreement with NATO. This agreement opens up for new confidence-
building measures between Russia and NATO nations, such as joint exercises 
on Russian territory.
We note that the Russian defence budget is growing. We know that north-
western Russia is still an area of strategic importance and that Russia maintains 
a considerable military presence in this region. We have observed that Russian 
strategic bombers are back outside our coastline and other places. We do not 
conceive of the modernization of the Russian armed forces as a threat to Nor-
way. At the same time Russia today is a country in transition, richer than before 
and more self-confident on the international stage. There are reasons to be con-
cerned about some of the trends. We cannot foresee where these developments 
are taking us. Therefore we are following them actively.
1.
2.
3.
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ presence in the High North, the coast guard 
included, will be maintained at a high level. The purpose is to secure sovereignty 
and exercise authority, as well as effective crisis management.
PRESENCE AND PREDICTAbILITy
Energy, climate change and security policy are the main factors that are trans-
forming the Arctic stage. A new, challenging scene is emerging in front of our 
eyes. Confronted with this literal sea of change, how shall we manoeuvre when 
we move from something we know, to a new situation which we know is un-
known?
When we dispatch our personnel to international operations, we always 
send with them some rules of engagement. These rules are strict guidelines for 
their conduct in a specific situation.
We have no rules of engagement in the strict military sense here in the High 
North. But we have a number of important principles that guide our policy of 
engagement in this region. One of these principles on which our High North 
policy is based, is that we must be informed. At all times. We must know what 
is going on in our territory and our neighbourhood. The intelligence officer 
can assure us that moving foreign military warplanes and naval ships are on a 
harmless mission. The coast guard will check that the trawlers’ logbooks are in 
order. The international researchers in Ny-Ålesund are in an excellent position 
to provide us with an early warning when winds of change are blowing and ice 
is melting. Correct, relevant and updated knowledge is the key to wise decisions 
and is vital to our security as well as all other aspects of policymaking.
To secure that we are well-informed, we must be there. Presence - on land, 
at sea and in the air - is therefore a second principle. But presence is a prereq-
uisite not only for collecting information. We have to be physically on the spot 
to safeguard national sovereignty and exercise authority. A coastal state that 
takes its responsibilities seriously must vigilantly carry out inspection and other 
control activities appropriately in our zones of jurisdiction. This requires a 24/7 
presence in the maritime areas – we must always be ready with qualified person-
nel and high-quality capabilities. 
A third principle is predictability. I think this is of especially great impor-
tance in times of change. This does not mean that we are not able to adapt to a 
changing environment. This means that we shall be transparent and clear, and 
inform each other about potential changes. Consistent behaviour builds stabil-
ity and reduces the possibility of misunderstandings and unwelcome surprises. 
Captains on trawlers shall be in no doubt that if they are in the wrong place, 
or fish too much, or take on board undersized fish, they risk being arrested and 
prosecuted. Predictability on the fishing banks is good for the honest fisherman 
and it improves our chances of preserving important fishing stocks for future 
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A predictable security policy framework will be of paramount strategic impor-
tance as we: 
face potential new trade routes that may alter the way we do business with 
the East; 
witness dire climate changes that affect everything we know; and 
watch Norway’s largest neighbour change before our eyes. 
These issues concern both the individual states that border on the Northern 
seas, as well as our international partners, including NATO and the UN. As the 
ice melts and poses dilemmas we cannot ignore, our ability to deal effectively 
with change and formulate a security policy that firmly draws up guidelines that 
embody both opportunities and challenges, will be crucial. 
As far as Russia is concerned, the end of the Cold War may by now be 
perceived as a cliché by some, a worn-out phrase. Perhaps we should more aptly 
talk about the end of “the end of the Cold War”. Regardless of perceptions, 
our relation with Russia and our past history remain issues we cannot ignore. 
Norway and Russia have lived in peace for a thousand years. In this new era, we 
are rediscovering patterns of trade and relations that date back centuries.
Norwegians again travel, do business and marry on the Russian side, and 
vice versa. In 1990, around 3,000 people crossed the border close to Kirkenes. 
Now that number has climbed above 100,000. The figures tell their own sto-
ries of increased relations and contact. And these are good news. We want the 
Norwegian-Russian border to be a bridge, not a barrier. 
If we look at the security and defence policy, here too the overall picture 
is one of improved cooperation and new opportunities. Our relationship with 
Russia is basically good. We remain committed to strengthening our partnership 
with Russia, both bilaterally and through the NATO-Russia Council. 
New opportunities will come, after the long awaited Russian ratification of 
the SOFA-agreement with NATO. This agreement opens up for new confidence-
building measures between Russia and NATO nations, such as joint exercises 
on Russian territory.
We note that the Russian defence budget is growing. We know that north-
western Russia is still an area of strategic importance and that Russia maintains 
a considerable military presence in this region. We have observed that Russian 
strategic bombers are back outside our coastline and other places. We do not 
conceive of the modernization of the Russian armed forces as a threat to Nor-
way. At the same time Russia today is a country in transition, richer than before 
and more self-confident on the international stage. There are reasons to be con-
cerned about some of the trends. We cannot foresee where these developments 
are taking us. Therefore we are following them actively.
1.
2.
3.
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ presence in the High North, the coast guard 
included, will be maintained at a high level. The purpose is to secure sovereignty 
and exercise authority, as well as effective crisis management.
PRESENCE AND PREDICTAbILITy
Energy, climate change and security policy are the main factors that are trans-
forming the Arctic stage. A new, challenging scene is emerging in front of our 
eyes. Confronted with this literal sea of change, how shall we manoeuvre when 
we move from something we know, to a new situation which we know is un-
known?
When we dispatch our personnel to international operations, we always 
send with them some rules of engagement. These rules are strict guidelines for 
their conduct in a specific situation.
We have no rules of engagement in the strict military sense here in the High 
North. But we have a number of important principles that guide our policy of 
engagement in this region. One of these principles on which our High North 
policy is based, is that we must be informed. At all times. We must know what 
is going on in our territory and our neighbourhood. The intelligence officer 
can assure us that moving foreign military warplanes and naval ships are on a 
harmless mission. The coast guard will check that the trawlers’ logbooks are in 
order. The international researchers in Ny-Ålesund are in an excellent position 
to provide us with an early warning when winds of change are blowing and ice 
is melting. Correct, relevant and updated knowledge is the key to wise decisions 
and is vital to our security as well as all other aspects of policymaking.
To secure that we are well-informed, we must be there. Presence - on land, 
at sea and in the air - is therefore a second principle. But presence is a prereq-
uisite not only for collecting information. We have to be physically on the spot 
to safeguard national sovereignty and exercise authority. A coastal state that 
takes its responsibilities seriously must vigilantly carry out inspection and other 
control activities appropriately in our zones of jurisdiction. This requires a 24/7 
presence in the maritime areas – we must always be ready with qualified person-
nel and high-quality capabilities. 
A third principle is predictability. I think this is of especially great impor-
tance in times of change. This does not mean that we are not able to adapt to a 
changing environment. This means that we shall be transparent and clear, and 
inform each other about potential changes. Consistent behaviour builds stabil-
ity and reduces the possibility of misunderstandings and unwelcome surprises. 
Captains on trawlers shall be in no doubt that if they are in the wrong place, 
or fish too much, or take on board undersized fish, they risk being arrested and 
prosecuted. Predictability on the fishing banks is good for the honest fisherman 
and it improves our chances of preserving important fishing stocks for future 
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generations. This is a principle that includes everyone and leaves no one out, 
and we expect the same from our neighbours and partners as we expect from 
ourselves: to contribute to the preservation of this vast and important area.
A fourth principle that guides our policy of engagement in the High North 
is respect for international law. If we all play by the rules laid down by the Unit-
ed Nations and other international bodies, I am convinced that we can preserve 
stability and a peaceful environment here in years to come. It is no secret that 
some of the energy-producing areas in the world are prone to tension and con-
flict. Let us show the world that the circumpolar nations can cooperate and find 
common ground also when it comes to the management of natural resources.
The fifth and last principle I shall mention is sustainability. Hard work is 
of paramount importance if we are to succeed and achieve our goal of delivering 
planet Earth to our children and grandchildren in better shape than it was a gen-
eration or two ago. We have a responsibility to our descendants - and the strug-
gling polar bears. Let us think sustainability in all that we do in the High North. 
We have no right to reduce the quality of life on Earth for future generations.
Knowledge, presence, predictability, international law and sustainability. 
If we can agree upon these principles as a guide for our activities in the High 
North, chances are good that the new chapter we are about to write about this 
region will have a happy ending. This requires that we make history of disagree-
ments, and make new history – one of cooperation and stability that will pro-
duce a future with prosperity and wellbeing for man and all other living things. 
Challenges will be turned into opportunities. This is a tall order. To succeed, 
we – the governments – need assistance from the highly qualified actors on this 
scene. As the region is emerging from the frost, we need your knowledge and 
your advice.
WILL COOPERATION OR RIVALRy DOmINATE ThE WAy AhEAD? 
It goes without saying, but I will say it anyway: we can only tackle the challenges 
emerging from the changing Arctic together. We all share the responsibility for 
securing that the High North remains a peaceful and beautiful place to live. We 
have to cooperate.
Let us not forget the advice from the poet Rolf Jacobsen. When turning our 
attention to the north in search of more knowledge and a deeper understanding, 
we shall not shy away from – if necessary – walking into the wind or climbing 
mountains. The issue is well worth the trouble. And let us, together, handle the 
Arctic challenges in such a way that we like what we see when we in the coming 
years turn our heads more often to the High North. 
DéJà-VU AT ThE NORTh POLE. PERSPECTIVES ON 
JURISDICTION AND mILITARy PRESENCE
by Björn Bjarnason, Icelandic Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs
I shall relate how Iceland has proceeded to secure its maritime zones via agree-
ments with other states and draw some lessons from this for the Arctic. I shall 
also touch on changes in security matters in Iceland and the measures taken by 
the Icelandic authorities in response to these new circumstances.
Between the autumn of 1975 and the spring of 1976, Iceland fought its 
third and last Cod War with Britain. This was the result of Iceland extending 
its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. Peace was achieved thanks to 
Norway’s intercession and an agreement was signed in Oslo on 1 June 1976. 
Norway placed great importance on peace between its neighbouring countries 
and allies within NATO in the North Atlantic, and Knut Frydenlund, Norway’s 
foreign minister, interceded once Iceland had cut off its diplomatic relations with 
Britain to protest against the actions of British war ships in the Icelandic zone.
After control over the 200 miles had been secured, joint lines of delimita-
tion between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, Britain, Greenland and Jan Mayen 
needed to be determined.
 
ThE DELImITATION PROCESS
Of the distance of 290 nautical miles between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Iceland 
demanded a zone of 200 miles. The Norwegian government protested against 
this claim and was of the opinion that a median line should be applicable to the 
delimitation between Jan Mayen and Iceland. Under favourable circumstances, 
capelin may be caught in the area north of Iceland in the direction of Jan May-
en, and both Norwegian and Icelandic ships fish in that area. The two states 
disagreed on the rights of their ships to fish in the area until an agreement on 
the issue was reached in May 1980. Norway acknowledged Iceland’s 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone in relation to Jan Mayen and Iceland acknowledged 
Norway’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone around Jan Mayen. The agreement 
also provided Iceland with special rights to fish from migrating stocks in the 
Jan Mayen zone and this provision has proved practical, for example as re-
gards fishing from the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Stock. Furthermore, the fish-
ing agreement included provisions on the settlement of the dispute between the 
states over control of the continental shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen. A 
Conciliation Committee, comprising three members, was established, chaired by 
Elliot L. Richardson, who was then the head of the US delegation at the United 
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generations. This is a principle that includes everyone and leaves no one out, 
and we expect the same from our neighbours and partners as we expect from 
ourselves: to contribute to the preservation of this vast and important area.
A fourth principle that guides our policy of engagement in the High North 
is respect for international law. If we all play by the rules laid down by the Unit-
ed Nations and other international bodies, I am convinced that we can preserve 
stability and a peaceful environment here in years to come. It is no secret that 
some of the energy-producing areas in the world are prone to tension and con-
flict. Let us show the world that the circumpolar nations can cooperate and find 
common ground also when it comes to the management of natural resources.
The fifth and last principle I shall mention is sustainability. Hard work is 
of paramount importance if we are to succeed and achieve our goal of delivering 
planet Earth to our children and grandchildren in better shape than it was a gen-
eration or two ago. We have a responsibility to our descendants - and the strug-
gling polar bears. Let us think sustainability in all that we do in the High North. 
We have no right to reduce the quality of life on Earth for future generations.
Knowledge, presence, predictability, international law and sustainability. 
If we can agree upon these principles as a guide for our activities in the High 
North, chances are good that the new chapter we are about to write about this 
region will have a happy ending. This requires that we make history of disagree-
ments, and make new history – one of cooperation and stability that will pro-
duce a future with prosperity and wellbeing for man and all other living things. 
Challenges will be turned into opportunities. This is a tall order. To succeed, 
we – the governments – need assistance from the highly qualified actors on this 
scene. As the region is emerging from the frost, we need your knowledge and 
your advice.
WILL COOPERATION OR RIVALRy DOmINATE ThE WAy AhEAD? 
It goes without saying, but I will say it anyway: we can only tackle the challenges 
emerging from the changing Arctic together. We all share the responsibility for 
securing that the High North remains a peaceful and beautiful place to live. We 
have to cooperate.
Let us not forget the advice from the poet Rolf Jacobsen. When turning our 
attention to the north in search of more knowledge and a deeper understanding, 
we shall not shy away from – if necessary – walking into the wind or climbing 
mountains. The issue is well worth the trouble. And let us, together, handle the 
Arctic challenges in such a way that we like what we see when we in the coming 
years turn our heads more often to the High North. 
DéJà-VU AT ThE NORTh POLE. PERSPECTIVES ON 
JURISDICTION AND mILITARy PRESENCE
by Björn Bjarnason, Icelandic Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs
I shall relate how Iceland has proceeded to secure its maritime zones via agree-
ments with other states and draw some lessons from this for the Arctic. I shall 
also touch on changes in security matters in Iceland and the measures taken by 
the Icelandic authorities in response to these new circumstances.
Between the autumn of 1975 and the spring of 1976, Iceland fought its 
third and last Cod War with Britain. This was the result of Iceland extending 
its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles. Peace was achieved thanks to 
Norway’s intercession and an agreement was signed in Oslo on 1 June 1976. 
Norway placed great importance on peace between its neighbouring countries 
and allies within NATO in the North Atlantic, and Knut Frydenlund, Norway’s 
foreign minister, interceded once Iceland had cut off its diplomatic relations with 
Britain to protest against the actions of British war ships in the Icelandic zone.
After control over the 200 miles had been secured, joint lines of delimita-
tion between Iceland and the Faroe Islands, Britain, Greenland and Jan Mayen 
needed to be determined.
 
ThE DELImITATION PROCESS
Of the distance of 290 nautical miles between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Iceland 
demanded a zone of 200 miles. The Norwegian government protested against 
this claim and was of the opinion that a median line should be applicable to the 
delimitation between Jan Mayen and Iceland. Under favourable circumstances, 
capelin may be caught in the area north of Iceland in the direction of Jan May-
en, and both Norwegian and Icelandic ships fish in that area. The two states 
disagreed on the rights of their ships to fish in the area until an agreement on 
the issue was reached in May 1980. Norway acknowledged Iceland’s 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone in relation to Jan Mayen and Iceland acknowledged 
Norway’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone around Jan Mayen. The agreement 
also provided Iceland with special rights to fish from migrating stocks in the 
Jan Mayen zone and this provision has proved practical, for example as re-
gards fishing from the Atlanto-Scandian Herring Stock. Furthermore, the fish-
ing agreement included provisions on the settlement of the dispute between the 
states over control of the continental shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen. A 
Conciliation Committee, comprising three members, was established, chaired by 
Elliot L. Richardson, who was then the head of the US delegation at the United 
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Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the two other members being re-
nowned experts in the field of the law of the sea, Ambassador Hans G. Andersen 
of Iceland and Ambassador Jens Evensen of Norway.
When considering the division of the continental shelf between two coun-
tries, it may be relevant whether individual parts of the continental shelf can 
be regarded as a “natural prolongation” of the territory of either country. Ge-
oscientists working for the Conciliation Committee studied in particular the 
geomorphology and the geological structure of the so-called Jan Mayen Ridge 
between Iceland and Jan Mayen. In their opinion, the northern part of the ridge 
is a prolongation, in the geomorphological sense, of the continental shelf of Jan 
Mayen but not of Iceland. On the other hand, they stated that the ridge itself 
was a prolongation neither of Jan Mayen nor Iceland as regards the geological 
structure. The scientists were of the opinion that there were not great prospects 
of finding oil in the area, although this would have to be properly determined 
through more detailed research. The Conciliation Committee was not of course 
a court but had the task of submitting proposals to the governments of Iceland 
and Norway on an accessible and reasonable solution to the dispute. The Com-
mittee investigated thoroughly any international practice and court rulings 
which could give it guidance in the course of its work. Following this examina-
tion, the Committee proposed that the limits of the continental shelf would be 
the same as those of the exclusive economic zone.
Further, the proposal included that an area of 45,000 km2 on the Jan May-
en Ridge, with the best probability for finding oil, would be jointly exploited 
by Iceland and Norway. Around one quarter of the joint area was on Iceland’s 
side of the delimitation line and about three quarters north of it. Iceland would 
hold 25 per cent of the natural resources in the Norwegian part of the area and 
Norway 25 per cent in the Icelandic part. The first phase of any research in the 
whole area would be funded by Norway. The Norwegian and Icelandic parlia-
ments agreed to this conclusion and relations have remained good in the Jan 
Mayen area ever since the agreement came into force 2 June 1982.
ICELANDIC OIL ExPLORATION AT JAN mAyEN
Although scientists considered it rather improbable 27 years ago that oil would 
attract people to the area between Jan Mayen and Iceland, things have changed. 
In March 2007, the Icelandic government issued a report with a proposal to 
start oil exploration in the so-called Dragon Area, which is located at the Jan 
Mayen Ridge on the Icelandic continental shelf. The area is about 42,700 km2 
and thereof around 13,000 km2 fall within the area covered by the Jan Mayen 
agreement. The government has decided to allocate funds to studying in more 
detail the climate and other natural circumstances in the area.
The Icelandic authorities hold enforcement and management powers in 
the area which falls within their jurisdiction. There Icelandic legislation applies, 
Icelandic oil policy and Icelandic provisions on the monitoring of the activities, 
security measures and environmental protection. On the other hand, it has to be 
clear whether Norway intends to utilize its right to participate in the explora-
tion and exploitation of the Icelandic part of the area covered by the Jan Mayen 
agreement. Should this be the case, it has to be stated in the licence tender that 
Norway has rights to up to a quarter of any licence granted. Representatives of 
the states have already started consultations on these issues.
For Iceland, the most pressing issue was the delimitation of Jan Mayen 
so that any doubts regarding jurisdiction following the extension to 200 miles 
might be dispelled. In 1997, an agreement was reached on maritime delimitation 
with regards to Greenland. The Danish government had made a reservation on 
behalf of Greenland in 1975 concerning base points on islands north of Iceland. 
In the summer of 1996, Danish capelin fishing vessels started fishing in a dis-
puted area north of one of the islands, Kolbeinsey, but in the spirit of strength-
ening good relations between the neighbouring countries, that is Iceland, on the 
one hand, and Denmark and Greenland, on the other hand, an effort was made 
to reach an agreement on the line of delimitation. The agreement, which was 
signed on 11 November 1997 and covers both the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf, provided for the island Grímsey hav-
ing full effect in the delimitation and Iceland, therefore, acquired the whole area 
affected by the island, around 1,500 km2. In addition, Iceland acquired 30 per 
cent of the area affected by Kolbeinsey, around 3,000 km2 of an area, amounting 
to approximately 10,000 km2.
Simultaneously, an agreement was concluded between Iceland, Denmark/
Greenland and Norway on the delimitation of a small triangular maritime area 
between Iceland, Greenland and Jan Mayen where their jurisdictions overlapped. 
The legal status of this area was complex as each party had full rights and ju-
risdiction vis-à-vis one of the other two parties and no rights or jurisdiction vis-
à-vis the other. In the agreement, the area was divided into three parts, whereof 
Iceland acquired 35 per cent, Denmark/Greenland 35 per cent and Norway 30 
per cent, and thereby the aforementioned legal uncertainty was eliminated.
A disputed maritime zone was on the boundaries of the Icelandic exclusive 
economic zone and the British fisheries jurisdiction, which had a base point on 
the rock of Rockall. In the summer of 1997, the United Kingdom ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the government then de-
clared that it would withdraw its claim to a 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction from 
Rockall, as the claim was not compatible with the provision of the Convention 
stipulating that rocks, unable to sustain human habitation or an economic life 
of their own, shall not have any exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
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Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the two other members being re-
nowned experts in the field of the law of the sea, Ambassador Hans G. Andersen 
of Iceland and Ambassador Jens Evensen of Norway.
When considering the division of the continental shelf between two coun-
tries, it may be relevant whether individual parts of the continental shelf can 
be regarded as a “natural prolongation” of the territory of either country. Ge-
oscientists working for the Conciliation Committee studied in particular the 
geomorphology and the geological structure of the so-called Jan Mayen Ridge 
between Iceland and Jan Mayen. In their opinion, the northern part of the ridge 
is a prolongation, in the geomorphological sense, of the continental shelf of Jan 
Mayen but not of Iceland. On the other hand, they stated that the ridge itself 
was a prolongation neither of Jan Mayen nor Iceland as regards the geological 
structure. The scientists were of the opinion that there were not great prospects 
of finding oil in the area, although this would have to be properly determined 
through more detailed research. The Conciliation Committee was not of course 
a court but had the task of submitting proposals to the governments of Iceland 
and Norway on an accessible and reasonable solution to the dispute. The Com-
mittee investigated thoroughly any international practice and court rulings 
which could give it guidance in the course of its work. Following this examina-
tion, the Committee proposed that the limits of the continental shelf would be 
the same as those of the exclusive economic zone.
Further, the proposal included that an area of 45,000 km2 on the Jan May-
en Ridge, with the best probability for finding oil, would be jointly exploited 
by Iceland and Norway. Around one quarter of the joint area was on Iceland’s 
side of the delimitation line and about three quarters north of it. Iceland would 
hold 25 per cent of the natural resources in the Norwegian part of the area and 
Norway 25 per cent in the Icelandic part. The first phase of any research in the 
whole area would be funded by Norway. The Norwegian and Icelandic parlia-
ments agreed to this conclusion and relations have remained good in the Jan 
Mayen area ever since the agreement came into force 2 June 1982.
ICELANDIC OIL ExPLORATION AT JAN mAyEN
Although scientists considered it rather improbable 27 years ago that oil would 
attract people to the area between Jan Mayen and Iceland, things have changed. 
In March 2007, the Icelandic government issued a report with a proposal to 
start oil exploration in the so-called Dragon Area, which is located at the Jan 
Mayen Ridge on the Icelandic continental shelf. The area is about 42,700 km2 
and thereof around 13,000 km2 fall within the area covered by the Jan Mayen 
agreement. The government has decided to allocate funds to studying in more 
detail the climate and other natural circumstances in the area.
The Icelandic authorities hold enforcement and management powers in 
the area which falls within their jurisdiction. There Icelandic legislation applies, 
Icelandic oil policy and Icelandic provisions on the monitoring of the activities, 
security measures and environmental protection. On the other hand, it has to be 
clear whether Norway intends to utilize its right to participate in the explora-
tion and exploitation of the Icelandic part of the area covered by the Jan Mayen 
agreement. Should this be the case, it has to be stated in the licence tender that 
Norway has rights to up to a quarter of any licence granted. Representatives of 
the states have already started consultations on these issues.
For Iceland, the most pressing issue was the delimitation of Jan Mayen 
so that any doubts regarding jurisdiction following the extension to 200 miles 
might be dispelled. In 1997, an agreement was reached on maritime delimitation 
with regards to Greenland. The Danish government had made a reservation on 
behalf of Greenland in 1975 concerning base points on islands north of Iceland. 
In the summer of 1996, Danish capelin fishing vessels started fishing in a dis-
puted area north of one of the islands, Kolbeinsey, but in the spirit of strength-
ening good relations between the neighbouring countries, that is Iceland, on the 
one hand, and Denmark and Greenland, on the other hand, an effort was made 
to reach an agreement on the line of delimitation. The agreement, which was 
signed on 11 November 1997 and covers both the delimitation of the exclusive 
economic zone and the continental shelf, provided for the island Grímsey hav-
ing full effect in the delimitation and Iceland, therefore, acquired the whole area 
affected by the island, around 1,500 km2. In addition, Iceland acquired 30 per 
cent of the area affected by Kolbeinsey, around 3,000 km2 of an area, amounting 
to approximately 10,000 km2.
Simultaneously, an agreement was concluded between Iceland, Denmark/
Greenland and Norway on the delimitation of a small triangular maritime area 
between Iceland, Greenland and Jan Mayen where their jurisdictions overlapped. 
The legal status of this area was complex as each party had full rights and ju-
risdiction vis-à-vis one of the other two parties and no rights or jurisdiction vis-
à-vis the other. In the agreement, the area was divided into three parts, whereof 
Iceland acquired 35 per cent, Denmark/Greenland 35 per cent and Norway 30 
per cent, and thereby the aforementioned legal uncertainty was eliminated.
A disputed maritime zone was on the boundaries of the Icelandic exclusive 
economic zone and the British fisheries jurisdiction, which had a base point on 
the rock of Rockall. In the summer of 1997, the United Kingdom ratified the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the government then de-
clared that it would withdraw its claim to a 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction from 
Rockall, as the claim was not compatible with the provision of the Convention 
stipulating that rocks, unable to sustain human habitation or an economic life 
of their own, shall not have any exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 
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Consequently, relevant changes were made to the British fisheries zone and thus 
the dispute over the delimitation of the Icelandic exclusive economic zone to the 
south was settled.
Finally, in February 2007, an agreement was concluded on the delimitation 
of a disputed maritime area of 3,700 km2 between Iceland and the Faroe Islands. 
The dispute came about when Icelandic authorities drew a median line between 
Hvalbakur, an island off the east coast of Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, while 
Denmark, on behalf of the Faroe Islands, drew a median line between the main-
lands of both countries, ignoring Hvalbakur. Iceland acquired 50 per cent of the 
southern part of the disputed area, which will be open to fishing by vessels from 
both countries, and 60 per cent of the northern part of the area. Through this 
agreement with the Faroe Islands, Iceland formally concluded the delimitation 
of its exclusive economic zone in relation to the zones of its neighbouring coun-
tries, 22 years after Iceland became the first western country to ratify the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985.
ThE LAW OF ThE SEA CONVENTION
As is well known, the Convention is the only comprehensive international agree-
ment in the field of the law of the sea and applies not only to the sea itself but 
also to the seabed and the air space above. The Law of the Sea Convention 
contains provisions on all uses of the ocean, such as navigation, fishing and 
theexploitation of oil and gas. Amongst the obligations undertaken by Iceland 
through its ratification of this remarkable Convention was to comply with Ar-
ticle 76 on the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles. This includes presenting a submission on the limits of the 
continental shelf to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Conti-
nental Shelf (CLCS) before the prescribed deadline in May 2009. 
Preparation of the submission commenced in 2000 and is still ongoing. 
This work entails the most extensive research of the continental shelf around 
the country ever undertaken. The 200-mile exclusive economic zone of Iceland 
comprises around 750,000 km2. On the other hand, Iceland claims continental 
shelf beyond this limit comprising around 1 million km2, based on the provi-
sions of the Law of the Sea Convention. This includes three areas: one in the 
so-called Herring Loophole in the Norwegian Sea, one on the Reykjanes Ridge 
south-west of Iceland and one in the Hatton Rockall Area to the south.
Only Iceland claims continental shelf on the Reykjanes Ridge. However, 
Denmark, on behalf of the Faroe Islands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, as 
well as Iceland, has claimed rights to the continental shelf in the Hatton Rockall 
Area. Iceland has emphasized that the parties should reach an agreement on the 
division of the Hatton Rockall Area before presenting a joint submission to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In 2001, Icelandic authori-
ties initiated quadrilateral consultations between the parties concerned on this 
issue and those consultations have since been continued on a regular basis. Al-
though the aforementioned deadline to present a submission to the Commission 
does not apply to disputed areas such as the Hatton Rockall Area, Iceland wants 
to contribute to a prompt solution of this issue. 
In September 2006, the foreign ministers of Denmark, Norway and Iceland, 
as well as the Lagman, the prime minister, of the Faroe Islands, signed an agree-
ment on the division of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the 
area between Iceland, the Faroe Islands, mainland Norway and Jan Mayen in 
the southern part of the Herring Loophole. This agreement was the result of 
extremely positive and constructive negotiations between these countries which 
lasted only a few months. Iceland acquired 29,000 km2, the Faroe Islands 27,000 
and Norway 55,500 km2 of the area in question.
This division of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is condi-
tional upon each party successfully demonstrating its right to its negotiated part 
of the continental shelf in its submission to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf. The Icelandic part lies entirely within 60 miles from the 
so-called foot of the continental slope north-east of the country and belongs, 
therefore, without a doubt, to its continental shelf pursuant to the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. Pursuant to its rules of procedure, the Commission does 
not have the authority to deal with submissions from individual states regarding 
disputed continental-shelf areas, unless all parties to the dispute have consented 
to it. One part of the agreement between Iceland, Norway and Denmark/Faroe 
Islands is the mutual consent of the countries with regard to the presentation of 
their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
As far as I can gather, this is the only agreement on the division of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 miles that has been concluded between more than 
two states. The agreement may set a certain precedence and serve as guidance in 
settling disputes of this type and is, at the same time, a textbook example of how 
to settle disputes between neighbouring countries peacefully.
RESOLVING mARITImE zONES DISPUTES
The reason for relating the struggle of Iceland for its maritime zones in such 
detail is that it shows how disputes, which may be imminent with regard to the 
control of maritime zones in the Arctic Ocean, may be solved.
In the first place, neighbouring countries, two or more, need to solve any 
disagreement about the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones and con-
tinental shelves within 200 nautical miles, including the baselines used for cal-
culating these zones. Had Iceland and Norway been unable to reach an agree-
ment on the delimitation of the maritime area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 
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Consequently, relevant changes were made to the British fisheries zone and thus 
the dispute over the delimitation of the Icelandic exclusive economic zone to the 
south was settled.
Finally, in February 2007, an agreement was concluded on the delimitation 
of a disputed maritime area of 3,700 km2 between Iceland and the Faroe Islands. 
The dispute came about when Icelandic authorities drew a median line between 
Hvalbakur, an island off the east coast of Iceland, and the Faroe Islands, while 
Denmark, on behalf of the Faroe Islands, drew a median line between the main-
lands of both countries, ignoring Hvalbakur. Iceland acquired 50 per cent of the 
southern part of the disputed area, which will be open to fishing by vessels from 
both countries, and 60 per cent of the northern part of the area. Through this 
agreement with the Faroe Islands, Iceland formally concluded the delimitation 
of its exclusive economic zone in relation to the zones of its neighbouring coun-
tries, 22 years after Iceland became the first western country to ratify the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985.
ThE LAW OF ThE SEA CONVENTION
As is well known, the Convention is the only comprehensive international agree-
ment in the field of the law of the sea and applies not only to the sea itself but 
also to the seabed and the air space above. The Law of the Sea Convention 
contains provisions on all uses of the ocean, such as navigation, fishing and 
theexploitation of oil and gas. Amongst the obligations undertaken by Iceland 
through its ratification of this remarkable Convention was to comply with Ar-
ticle 76 on the determination of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles. This includes presenting a submission on the limits of the 
continental shelf to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Conti-
nental Shelf (CLCS) before the prescribed deadline in May 2009. 
Preparation of the submission commenced in 2000 and is still ongoing. 
This work entails the most extensive research of the continental shelf around 
the country ever undertaken. The 200-mile exclusive economic zone of Iceland 
comprises around 750,000 km2. On the other hand, Iceland claims continental 
shelf beyond this limit comprising around 1 million km2, based on the provi-
sions of the Law of the Sea Convention. This includes three areas: one in the 
so-called Herring Loophole in the Norwegian Sea, one on the Reykjanes Ridge 
south-west of Iceland and one in the Hatton Rockall Area to the south.
Only Iceland claims continental shelf on the Reykjanes Ridge. However, 
Denmark, on behalf of the Faroe Islands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, as 
well as Iceland, has claimed rights to the continental shelf in the Hatton Rockall 
Area. Iceland has emphasized that the parties should reach an agreement on the 
division of the Hatton Rockall Area before presenting a joint submission to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In 2001, Icelandic authori-
ties initiated quadrilateral consultations between the parties concerned on this 
issue and those consultations have since been continued on a regular basis. Al-
though the aforementioned deadline to present a submission to the Commission 
does not apply to disputed areas such as the Hatton Rockall Area, Iceland wants 
to contribute to a prompt solution of this issue. 
In September 2006, the foreign ministers of Denmark, Norway and Iceland, 
as well as the Lagman, the prime minister, of the Faroe Islands, signed an agree-
ment on the division of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in the 
area between Iceland, the Faroe Islands, mainland Norway and Jan Mayen in 
the southern part of the Herring Loophole. This agreement was the result of 
extremely positive and constructive negotiations between these countries which 
lasted only a few months. Iceland acquired 29,000 km2, the Faroe Islands 27,000 
and Norway 55,500 km2 of the area in question.
This division of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is condi-
tional upon each party successfully demonstrating its right to its negotiated part 
of the continental shelf in its submission to the Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf. The Icelandic part lies entirely within 60 miles from the 
so-called foot of the continental slope north-east of the country and belongs, 
therefore, without a doubt, to its continental shelf pursuant to the Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. Pursuant to its rules of procedure, the Commission does 
not have the authority to deal with submissions from individual states regarding 
disputed continental-shelf areas, unless all parties to the dispute have consented 
to it. One part of the agreement between Iceland, Norway and Denmark/Faroe 
Islands is the mutual consent of the countries with regard to the presentation of 
their submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
As far as I can gather, this is the only agreement on the division of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 miles that has been concluded between more than 
two states. The agreement may set a certain precedence and serve as guidance in 
settling disputes of this type and is, at the same time, a textbook example of how 
to settle disputes between neighbouring countries peacefully.
RESOLVING mARITImE zONES DISPUTES
The reason for relating the struggle of Iceland for its maritime zones in such 
detail is that it shows how disputes, which may be imminent with regard to the 
control of maritime zones in the Arctic Ocean, may be solved.
In the first place, neighbouring countries, two or more, need to solve any 
disagreement about the delimitation of their exclusive economic zones and con-
tinental shelves within 200 nautical miles, including the baselines used for cal-
culating these zones. Had Iceland and Norway been unable to reach an agree-
ment on the delimitation of the maritime area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 
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the dispute would have prevented any negotiations with regard to other related 
areas.
In the second place, the states need to reach an agreement on the division 
of the continental shelf in disputed areas beyond 200 nautical miles. Such an 
agreement may either entail a complete division or some kind of a joint exploi-
tation area.
In the third place, neighbouring states need to present their submissions, 
or a joint submission, regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
On the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, the states may then 
determine the outer limits, i.e. the limits between the continental shelf and the 
international seabed area beyond, in a final and binding manner.
ICELAND’S SECURITy INTERESTS IN ThE ARCTIC
Due to its geographical position, Iceland has a great interest in activities in the 
Arctic. Climate changes will lead to further exploitation of natural resources in 
that area and accordingly increased arctic shipping, not to mention the impact 
of the potential opening of the North East passage to the Pacific Ocean. All of 
this will have a great effect on the geopolitical position of Iceland.
The westernmost gate from the Arctic into the North Atlantic is the Davis 
Strait between Canada and Greenland, about 340 km wide. The Denmark Strait 
between Greenland and Iceland is 286 km wide. The third and widest gate is the 
one between Iceland and Norway, about 800 km wide. This gate is divided into 
two main sea lanes by the Faroe Isles – one to the east to the European Conti-
nent and the UK, the other to North America.
During World War II, US convoys sailed north of the conflict area in the 
Atlantic, through the Denmark Strait, making stopovers in Iceland on their way 
to Murmansk, Russia. During the Cold War, tension between east and west 
escalated in the North Atlantic and the GIUK gap turned into the front line of 
NATO as regards the expansion of the Soviet fleet, and a sophisticated radar 
system was set up in Iceland in the eighties to monitor the flights of Soviet bomb-
ers into the North Atlantic, the number of journeys peaking in 1985.
Taking note of the oil and gas exploitation in the Barents Sea and the in-
creased transport of oil by sea from Western Siberia, it is estimated that in 2015 
a total of 500 tankers of 100,000 tons each will pass Iceland annually headed 
in each direction.
At the time of the Cold War, the military importance of Iceland increased 
in direct relation to the tension between east and west in the North Atlantic and 
culminated around the middle of the eighties. Icelandic authorities showed great 
consideration for the requests of the United States and NATO regarding military 
preparedness at the Keflavík Naval Air Station, wherefrom both submarine and 
air surveillance was conducted with the most advanced technology available 
at the time. Debates about the US Defence Force staying were very prominent 
in Icelandic politics during those years. Those of us who supported the active 
participation of Iceland in the joint defence of the NATO states enjoyed exten-
sive and successful cooperation with Norwegian experts and authorities during 
those years, and I recall participation in many conferences in Norway on ways 
to enhance security in the North Atlantic.
It is in a sense remarkable how long it took the US Government to make 
a decision with regard to its military relations with Iceland after the Cold War, 
and how in the end the departure from Iceland of the entire force was unilater-
ally manoeuvered in the autumn of 2006. Despite the military departure from 
Iceland, the US still secures the defence of Iceland on the basis of the defence 
agreement from 1951. 
In August 2007, US authorities deployed fighter planes, as well as AWACS 
planes, for a military exercise in Iceland, which included the participation of 
the Norwegian Air Force. At the same time, the Special Operations Unit of the 
National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police exercised alongside special task 
forces of the militaries in Norway, Denmark and Latvia; in addition, Danish 
warships and the Icelandic Coast Guard participated in the exercise. Some 24 
hours after the military exercise ended in Iceland, President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia declared that Russian bombers would resume flying over the North At-
lantic, and in the early hours of 17 August, Russian military aircraft flew from 
the Kola Peninsula and headed south across the Atlantic, for example along the 
Denmark Strait and north by the east coast of Iceland.
In security matters, Iceland depends on contributions from civil law en-
forcement institutions that are also reliable cooperative partners with our neigh-
bouring countries. A military-to-military relationship is not an option for Ice-
land as we have no armed forces.
towArds A north AtlAntic coAst forum?
It has been my task as Minister of Justice to restructure the police and the Coast 
Guard to take on new responsibilities. Decisions have been made to purchase a 
new fixed-wing coast guard aircraft and to build a new 4000-tonne patrol vessel, 
both scheduled to be operational in 2009. A collaboration agreement between 
the governments of Iceland and Norway aims for a joint Norwegian-Icelandic 
tender of specially designed long-range search and rescue helicopters – two to 
three of them for the Icelandic Coast Guard. Furthermore, reorganization of the 
civil defence administration is underway through the strengthening of its politi-
cal aspect, with the operations command being moved to a single operations 
centre providing access to all response units.
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the dispute would have prevented any negotiations with regard to other related 
areas.
In the second place, the states need to reach an agreement on the division 
of the continental shelf in disputed areas beyond 200 nautical miles. Such an 
agreement may either entail a complete division or some kind of a joint exploi-
tation area.
In the third place, neighbouring states need to present their submissions, 
or a joint submission, regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. 
On the basis of the recommendations of the Commission, the states may then 
determine the outer limits, i.e. the limits between the continental shelf and the 
international seabed area beyond, in a final and binding manner.
ICELAND’S SECURITy INTERESTS IN ThE ARCTIC
Due to its geographical position, Iceland has a great interest in activities in the 
Arctic. Climate changes will lead to further exploitation of natural resources in 
that area and accordingly increased arctic shipping, not to mention the impact 
of the potential opening of the North East passage to the Pacific Ocean. All of 
this will have a great effect on the geopolitical position of Iceland.
The westernmost gate from the Arctic into the North Atlantic is the Davis 
Strait between Canada and Greenland, about 340 km wide. The Denmark Strait 
between Greenland and Iceland is 286 km wide. The third and widest gate is the 
one between Iceland and Norway, about 800 km wide. This gate is divided into 
two main sea lanes by the Faroe Isles – one to the east to the European Conti-
nent and the UK, the other to North America.
During World War II, US convoys sailed north of the conflict area in the 
Atlantic, through the Denmark Strait, making stopovers in Iceland on their way 
to Murmansk, Russia. During the Cold War, tension between east and west 
escalated in the North Atlantic and the GIUK gap turned into the front line of 
NATO as regards the expansion of the Soviet fleet, and a sophisticated radar 
system was set up in Iceland in the eighties to monitor the flights of Soviet bomb-
ers into the North Atlantic, the number of journeys peaking in 1985.
Taking note of the oil and gas exploitation in the Barents Sea and the in-
creased transport of oil by sea from Western Siberia, it is estimated that in 2015 
a total of 500 tankers of 100,000 tons each will pass Iceland annually headed 
in each direction.
At the time of the Cold War, the military importance of Iceland increased 
in direct relation to the tension between east and west in the North Atlantic and 
culminated around the middle of the eighties. Icelandic authorities showed great 
consideration for the requests of the United States and NATO regarding military 
preparedness at the Keflavík Naval Air Station, wherefrom both submarine and 
air surveillance was conducted with the most advanced technology available 
at the time. Debates about the US Defence Force staying were very prominent 
in Icelandic politics during those years. Those of us who supported the active 
participation of Iceland in the joint defence of the NATO states enjoyed exten-
sive and successful cooperation with Norwegian experts and authorities during 
those years, and I recall participation in many conferences in Norway on ways 
to enhance security in the North Atlantic.
It is in a sense remarkable how long it took the US Government to make 
a decision with regard to its military relations with Iceland after the Cold War, 
and how in the end the departure from Iceland of the entire force was unilater-
ally manoeuvered in the autumn of 2006. Despite the military departure from 
Iceland, the US still secures the defence of Iceland on the basis of the defence 
agreement from 1951. 
In August 2007, US authorities deployed fighter planes, as well as AWACS 
planes, for a military exercise in Iceland, which included the participation of 
the Norwegian Air Force. At the same time, the Special Operations Unit of the 
National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police exercised alongside special task 
forces of the militaries in Norway, Denmark and Latvia; in addition, Danish 
warships and the Icelandic Coast Guard participated in the exercise. Some 24 
hours after the military exercise ended in Iceland, President Vladimir Putin of 
Russia declared that Russian bombers would resume flying over the North At-
lantic, and in the early hours of 17 August, Russian military aircraft flew from 
the Kola Peninsula and headed south across the Atlantic, for example along the 
Denmark Strait and north by the east coast of Iceland.
In security matters, Iceland depends on contributions from civil law en-
forcement institutions that are also reliable cooperative partners with our neigh-
bouring countries. A military-to-military relationship is not an option for Ice-
land as we have no armed forces.
towArds A north AtlAntic coAst forum?
It has been my task as Minister of Justice to restructure the police and the Coast 
Guard to take on new responsibilities. Decisions have been made to purchase a 
new fixed-wing coast guard aircraft and to build a new 4000-tonne patrol vessel, 
both scheduled to be operational in 2009. A collaboration agreement between 
the governments of Iceland and Norway aims for a joint Norwegian-Icelandic 
tender of specially designed long-range search and rescue helicopters – two to 
three of them for the Icelandic Coast Guard. Furthermore, reorganization of the 
civil defence administration is underway through the strengthening of its politi-
cal aspect, with the operations command being moved to a single operations 
centre providing access to all response units.
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It is important to strengthen the cooperation of the countries adjacent to the 
western part of the GIUK gap, i.e. the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, to 
ensure, as far as possible, the safety of maritime navigation in that area. Iceland 
and Denmark have reached an agreement on close cooperation in these fields 
signed by me on behalf of Iceland and Søren Gade, the minister of Defence, on 
behalf of Denmark. In the near future, Iceland will, furthermore, accede to the 
convention of Britain, the US and Canada concerning search and rescue in the 
North Atlantic. In fact, I believe it to be very desirable to establish a multilateral 
North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, a new maritime security and safety organi-
zation in the North Atlantic and in the Arctic. A Forum which would provide 
a framework for North Atlantic coast guards to interact and cooperate. This 
might lead to all kinds of innovations in a regional context, such as a standing 
coast guard force in the North Atlantic and in the Arctic, with member nations 
providing vessels and crews.
New and completely altered circumstances call for new methods in which 
civil security bodies play an important role. Iceland aims to strengthen these 
bodies and establish close cooperation in their fields of operation to achieve our 
common goal, which is to create the best possible circumstances for the peaceful 
exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic.
EmERGING FROm ThE FROST: ThE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
by Claudia A. McMurray, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State
The Arctic is one of the last and most extensive areas of wilderness, a vast ice-
covered area with complex and fragile ecosystems that are teeming with life 
– from fish, whales, and seals, to caribou, polar bears, and birds – that will be 
affected by any changes in the Arctic’s delicate environmental balance. In the 
early autumn of 2007, The New York Times and other media reported that the 
cap of floating sea-ice on the Arctic Ocean had shrunk by more than one mil-
lion square miles – or six times the size of California. This study, conducted by 
the National Snow and Ice Center in Colorado, reflects many studies that show 
greater warming in the Arctic than in the rest of the world. Although the pat-
terns of melting are still not fully understood, the study’s authors indicate that 
“you can’t dismiss this as natural variability.” As we gain a greater understand-
ing of how warming and the human footprint may affect the environment and 
ecosystems in the Arctic, it is also clear that these changes – the loss of ice and 
the opening of previously inaccessible areas – also provide new opportunities for 
energy exploration in the region.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
These opportunities come at a time when the nations of the world are con-
fronting the challenge of securing sufficient, affordable, and reliable supplies of 
energy for their populations, while sustaining the current high rate of global eco-
nomic growth, expanding access to energy in the developing world, and meeting 
climate change and other environmental goals. 
In the United States we believe that through international cooperation we 
can develop and implement a wide portfolio of near, medium, and long-term 
measures to successfully meet this challenge. We believe that international en-
gagement on the energy issues is not only critical to U.S. energy security, but to 
that of every nation. 
And we believe that energy security is no zero-sum game, but that in fact, 
no nation’s energy security can be had at the expense of any other. President 
Bush has presented a vision for energy security that begins at home, with actions 
the United States must take domestically. This vision also guides our interna-
tional energy policy.
Our policy focuses on a diversity of energy sources and the wise manage-
ment of energy demand. For example, a centerpiece of the President’s plan is 
to reduce America’s gasoline usage by 20 percent in 10 years. To achieve this, 
the United States is working to diversify the fuels we use to power our cars and 
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It is important to strengthen the cooperation of the countries adjacent to the 
western part of the GIUK gap, i.e. the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, to 
ensure, as far as possible, the safety of maritime navigation in that area. Iceland 
and Denmark have reached an agreement on close cooperation in these fields 
signed by me on behalf of Iceland and Søren Gade, the minister of Defence, on 
behalf of Denmark. In the near future, Iceland will, furthermore, accede to the 
convention of Britain, the US and Canada concerning search and rescue in the 
North Atlantic. In fact, I believe it to be very desirable to establish a multilateral 
North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, a new maritime security and safety organi-
zation in the North Atlantic and in the Arctic. A Forum which would provide 
a framework for North Atlantic coast guards to interact and cooperate. This 
might lead to all kinds of innovations in a regional context, such as a standing 
coast guard force in the North Atlantic and in the Arctic, with member nations 
providing vessels and crews.
New and completely altered circumstances call for new methods in which 
civil security bodies play an important role. Iceland aims to strengthen these 
bodies and establish close cooperation in their fields of operation to achieve our 
common goal, which is to create the best possible circumstances for the peaceful 
exploitation of natural resources in the Arctic.
EmERGING FROm ThE FROST: ThE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
by Claudia A. McMurray, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State
The Arctic is one of the last and most extensive areas of wilderness, a vast ice-
covered area with complex and fragile ecosystems that are teeming with life 
– from fish, whales, and seals, to caribou, polar bears, and birds – that will be 
affected by any changes in the Arctic’s delicate environmental balance. In the 
early autumn of 2007, The New York Times and other media reported that the 
cap of floating sea-ice on the Arctic Ocean had shrunk by more than one mil-
lion square miles – or six times the size of California. This study, conducted by 
the National Snow and Ice Center in Colorado, reflects many studies that show 
greater warming in the Arctic than in the rest of the world. Although the pat-
terns of melting are still not fully understood, the study’s authors indicate that 
“you can’t dismiss this as natural variability.” As we gain a greater understand-
ing of how warming and the human footprint may affect the environment and 
ecosystems in the Arctic, it is also clear that these changes – the loss of ice and 
the opening of previously inaccessible areas – also provide new opportunities for 
energy exploration in the region.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
These opportunities come at a time when the nations of the world are con-
fronting the challenge of securing sufficient, affordable, and reliable supplies of 
energy for their populations, while sustaining the current high rate of global eco-
nomic growth, expanding access to energy in the developing world, and meeting 
climate change and other environmental goals. 
In the United States we believe that through international cooperation we 
can develop and implement a wide portfolio of near, medium, and long-term 
measures to successfully meet this challenge. We believe that international en-
gagement on the energy issues is not only critical to U.S. energy security, but to 
that of every nation. 
And we believe that energy security is no zero-sum game, but that in fact, 
no nation’s energy security can be had at the expense of any other. President 
Bush has presented a vision for energy security that begins at home, with actions 
the United States must take domestically. This vision also guides our interna-
tional energy policy.
Our policy focuses on a diversity of energy sources and the wise manage-
ment of energy demand. For example, a centerpiece of the President’s plan is 
to reduce America’s gasoline usage by 20 percent in 10 years. To achieve this, 
the United States is working to diversify the fuels we use to power our cars and 
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trucks by increasing the use of renewable biofuel, in the form of ethanol, and by 
using energy more wisely by setting higher standards for automotive efficiency.
We are moving forward on battery research for plug-in hybrid vehicles 
that can be powered by electricity from a wall socket, instead of gasoline. We 
are conducting research on hydrogen-powered vehicles that emit pure water 
instead of exhaust fumes. We are taking steps to make sure these technologies 
reach the market. And we’re setting new mandatory fuel standards that require 
35 billion gallons (830 million barrels) of renewable and alternative fuels by the 
year 2017.
The President’s plan calls for the United States to double the size of our 
strategic petroleum reserves and increase our production of domestic oil supply 
in environmentally sensitive ways. We think doing so will reduce, over time, our 
nation’s dependency on oil imports and increase our energy security. 
The United States’ international energy security strategy seeks to promote 
abroad the President’s vision for energy security at home. It supports:
a greater diversity of energy sources, like alternative fuels (including biofu-
els) and clean coal; 
energy efficiency and conservation through technology, international part-
nerships, and market pricing;
a diversity of secure and reliable energy supply routes, and; 
a diversity of energy suppliers working in an open, competitive, and trans-
parent energy marketplace. 
ChALLENGES
The world community faces an unprecedented set of challenges in global en-
ergy that makes our energy security objectives more difficult to achieve. These 
include: 
tight global supply and demand balances; 
geopolitical challenges in major oil production centers; 
exploding global economic growth driving greater energy use; and
our shared concern over the global environment. 
Global energy markets are being shaped and strained by unprecedented eco-
nomic growth in Asia. Demand for natural gas, oil and coal is expected to rise 
faster in East and South Asia than in any other region in the world. If the fore-
cast growth rate of 3.0 percent annually is maintained, oil demand in the region 
will roughly double by 2025. Many of the world’s major oil-producing regions 
are also locations of geopolitical tension, and possibilities exist of unexpected 
disruptions in supply. Instability in producing countries is the greatest challenge 
we face, and this adds a significant premium to world oil prices. Concurrently, 
we are faced with the rise of what is often called resource nationalism, involving 
consumer countries attempting to “lock up” upstream assets in the pursuit of a 
false notion of energy security, and involving producer countries rejecting much 
needed foreign investment and expertise in the face of declining production lev-
els. Roughly two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas reserves are in countries that 
provide limited access or are completely closed to foreign investment.
National oil companies own about 50 percent of the world’s proven oil 
reserves. And we are seeing increasing instances of manipulation of resources in 
countries with large resource bases. Examples include: further limiting access to 
resources for commercialization; renegotiating contracts or even outright expro-
priation of assets; renationalizing assets; and cutting off supply.
Because of these factors, prices have increased dramatically since 2002. 
And we do not project much change in this in the near future because the un-
certainties I have mentioned will likely still be with us and demand will most 
certainly increase.
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Fig. 3: Map showing the northern parts of USA, Canada and neighbouring countries in the Arctic.
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using energy more wisely by setting higher standards for automotive efficiency.
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that can be powered by electricity from a wall socket, instead of gasoline. We 
are conducting research on hydrogen-powered vehicles that emit pure water 
instead of exhaust fumes. We are taking steps to make sure these technologies 
reach the market. And we’re setting new mandatory fuel standards that require 
35 billion gallons (830 million barrels) of renewable and alternative fuels by the 
year 2017.
The President’s plan calls for the United States to double the size of our 
strategic petroleum reserves and increase our production of domestic oil supply 
in environmentally sensitive ways. We think doing so will reduce, over time, our 
nation’s dependency on oil imports and increase our energy security. 
The United States’ international energy security strategy seeks to promote 
abroad the President’s vision for energy security at home. It supports:
a greater diversity of energy sources, like alternative fuels (including biofu-
els) and clean coal; 
energy efficiency and conservation through technology, international part-
nerships, and market pricing;
a diversity of secure and reliable energy supply routes, and; 
a diversity of energy suppliers working in an open, competitive, and trans-
parent energy marketplace. 
ChALLENGES
The world community faces an unprecedented set of challenges in global en-
ergy that makes our energy security objectives more difficult to achieve. These 
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Fig. 3: Map showing the northern parts of USA, Canada and neighbouring countries in the Arctic.
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As a result of all these factors, the Arctic region is set to play a major role in 
the world’s future energy security. The United States Geological Survey estimates 
that the Arctic could be home to more than 25 percent of the world’s undiscov-
ered reserves of oil and natural gas. 
That said, most would agree that the question is not whether the world will 
extract those reserves, but instead, “How can we do so in an environmentally 
sustainable and socially responsible way?”
The Arctic poses many difficulties in this regard. Because of the harsh con-
ditions and expense of operations, only 35 wells have been drilled in the Alaskan 
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. This is a small area tested compared to the size of 
the area that has been available to lease. The oil and gas industries are working 
hard to overcome some of the barriers to drilling. 
In shallow waters, for example, industry has developed bottom-founded 
drilling platforms that can facilitate a year-round drilling program.
To address concerns about noise from drilling operations during the short 
open-water season, the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Management 
Service – the federal agency that manages the U.S.’s natural gas, oil and other 
mineral resources on our outer continental shelf – is involved in several studies 
to find ways to lessen the transmission of sound from drilling structures and 
seismic noise.
Arctic projects face technical, environmental, regulatory and legal chal-
lenges because offshore activities are considered new and unproven. There is 
currently only one outer continental shelf development project, called Northstar, 
which took 19 years from discovery to first production. 
Northstar faced several challenges to reach production. It was the first 
stand-alone island production facility in the Alaskan Arctic. It was developed 
with no road support so the staging of material to the island was a scheduling 
and logistical challenge. Moving the oil to market required the design, instal-
lation and operation of the first sub-sea pipeline to be installed in the Arctic. 
Concerns about detecting leaks led to the installation of a leak detection system, 
which was also a first for the Arctic. The Minerals Management Service main-
tains an ongoing research program to address the improvement of safety and the 
development of new technology for use in the Arctic and elsewhere in the ocean 
environment. These research efforts are available to the public on the Service’s 
website.
Future exploration and development activities must be carried out in a 
manner that is responsible and respectful to the rich and diverse ecosystem and 
local native culture. The Minerals Management Service will continue to work 
with industry and local communities to ensure that these issues are taken into 
account, and that local concerns relating to subsistence activities, spill preven-
tion, and clean-up capabilities are addressed in a way that allows operations to 
proceed. 
This effort includes:
providing opportunities for local residents to participate actively in the op-
erations as marine mammal observers to protect against injury to whales in 
the area;
providing for conflict avoidance agreements with subsistence users to allevi-
ate unintended interaction between the operators and the subsistence users; 
and 
ensuring that local concerns regarding oil-spill response and clean-up capa-
bilities are addressed. 
Future development in the near-shore Arctic environment will make use of ultra-
extended reach drilling – drilling where the onshore facility drills down and then 
out horizontally sometimes as much as three to five miles across. BP is currently 
planning the development of the Liberty Field using ultra-extended reach drill-
ing. They propose to extend the reach of this type of drilling to over 40,000 ft 
horizontal departure. 
ARCTIC mONITORING AND ASSESSmENT
The United States will continue to both share and seek best practices with, and 
from, our international partners on these and other projects. In October 2007, 
the United States sponsored the Arctic Energy Summit’s Technology Conference 
to work together with other Arctic Council nations on the best solutions to the 
unique set of environmental, social, and technical challenges of energy extrac-
tion in the region. The conference provided a forum for international, interdisci-
plinary experts to present research and discuss the Arctic as an emerging energy 
province. Topics that were covered at the conference included extractive energy 
development, renewable and rural energy, and environmental, socio-economic 
and sustainability impacts of energy use in the North.
And speaking of the Arctic Council, the United States is pleased to be a 
partner with Norway to lead the Arctic Council’s assessment of the potential 
effects of oil and gas activities in the Arctic. 
At their 2004 ministerial meeting in Reykjavik, the Arctic Council Minis-
ters asked the working group, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, 
to assess the effects and potential effects of oil and gas activities in the Arctic. 
This assessment updates and expands on earlier reports. The assessment was 
completed in early 2008 and includes a comprehensive history and projected 
near-future for oil and gas activities, including:
past practices
modern practices
•
•
•
•
•
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technological developments
regulatory systems
monitoring and research
oil spill response capabilities
and a full inventory of Arctic leasing and licensing, seismic data collection, 
exploration and development drilling, and production volumes. 
In addition, for the first time, such an assessment surveys the socioeconomic ef-
fects of the wide range of oil and gas activities on local and indigenous popula-
tions. We are fortunate to have strong international partnerships through organ-
izations such as the Arctic Council. The Council, and conferences like this one, 
provide opportunities for countries with territory in the Arctic to meet and find 
common solutions and air concerns about the challenges I have mentioned.
CONCLUSION
Let me in concluding raise a few other challenges that affect our search for en-
ergy in the Arctic.
Determining the limits of the continental shelves of the five countries bor-
dering the Arctic Ocean and settling the boundaries between them will be re-
solved through the provisions established under the Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and through bilateral negotiations between neighboring countries. 
The President has long urged U.S. accession to the Convention. And we are 
hopeful that the Senate will finally give approval to it.
In September 2007, the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, the Healy, returned 
from a four-week cruise that had mapped a portion of sea floor on the northern 
Chukchi Cap. The Healy did not encounter a significant ice pack at any point in 
its journey, and the bright blue multi-year ice and former pressure ridges were 
visibly disintegrating. In fact, the Healy was scheduled for an “ice liberty” where 
the ship would stop so those onboard could experience Arctic ice first-hand, but 
the ship never encountered a piece large enough to do so.
On previous trips, the Healy would hit an ice pack too difficult to break 
through, forcing it to try a different route, or in one case to float with the pack 
until it could break free. In 2007 it was unimpeded, and collected more than 
three times the data and ventured much farther north than originally planned. 
These observations by the Healy are consistent with other observations and pre-
dictions of ice melting in the Arctic Ocean. Warming in the Arctic in and of itself 
is a concern. But the loss of ice also opens up previously inaccessible shipping 
lanes, and this raises issues such as:
Navigational rights – ensuring that the Arctic remains open to interna-
tional oil companies. International oil companies are the world’s most efficient 
•
•
•
•
•
producers of oil and gas, and they are the only companies that have the critical 
technological experience needed for this challenging environment.
Promoting contract sanctity – projects have long investment recovery time-
frames, so stable and dependable investment terms and regimes are vital for 
international oil companies. 
The world will soon need the vital resources that the Arctic provides. It is 
important that we work together to provide them efficiently, sustainably, and 
cleanly. It is also critical that we avoid unhelpful sovereignty conflicts and na-
tionalistic policies, and ensure open and transparent investment opportunities 
for all companies.
William Shakespeare wrote: “One touch of nature makes the whole world 
kin.” 
The issues calling for our action today must be solved by a global com-
munity working toward common global interests. This will be our goal and 
challenge in the months and years ahead.
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security
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN ThE ARCTIC: AN OVERVIEW1
Dr Alf Håkon Hoel, Associate Professor, University of Tromsø
introduction
An increasing demand for natural resources and climate change have combined 
to bring the Arctic into the limelight. The expansion northwards of petroleum 
activities, significant fisheries, and the reduction of sea-ice in the central Arctic 
Ocean are among the phenomena that raise questions about the governance of 
the region. 
Here, I shall address the question of jurisdiction in the Arctic – who can 
decide what where? On land this issue has by and large been settled; the ter-
restrial boundaries between the countries in the Arctic region are agreed upon. 
However, there remain jurisdictional issues in the marine realm, as a number of 
maritime boundaries are still unresolved.
The situation in the Arctic region is not special in that regard, however. 
Globally, there are some 400 major marine boundaries, and less than half of 
them have been resolved.2 In other words, not having an agreed marine bound-
ary is more normal than having one.
FACTS AND FIGURES
The central Arctic Ocean – the area to the north of the Eurasian landmass, 
Greenland and North America – is 14 million km2. Less than half of this is high 
seas, beyond the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the five countries border-
ing on the Arctic Ocean: Russia, the USA, Canada, Denmark/Greenland and 
1 I am grateful to Odd Gunnar Skagestad and Douglas Brubaker for comments to an 
earlier version of this paper.
2 D. Anderson, “Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements: A Personal View”, 
in Maritime Delimitation, eds R. Lagoni and D. Vignes (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006).
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Norway. The continental shelf constitutes 37 per cent of the basin. It is widest 
off Russia, and most of it is within the EEZs of the five littoral states. 
With the exception of petroleum activities on the continental shelf to the 
north of Alaska, the Arctic Ocean to the north of the continents is not a major 
arena for economic activities today. Fishing mainly takes place in the seas adja-
cent to the central Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea and the Barents Sea in particular. 
These fisheries are globally significant, accounting for about 10 per cent of the 
global production of fish for human consumption.3 
The bulk of Arctic marine economic value is created in the EEZs of the 
Arctic countries to the south of the Arctic Ocean. The EEZs and high seas in the 
Arctic Ocean are marginal in this regard.
ThE LAW 
International ocean law (“the law of the sea”) lays down the rules for how the 
oceans and the natural resources there are to be administered and used. The ma-
jor body of law in this regard is the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), 
which entered into force in 1994. All Arctic countries except the US have ratified 
it. The 1958 Continental Shelf Convention is also important in this regard. 
The rules of the global oceans regime essentially provide the answers to 
the question posed at the outset: who can decide what where? The single most 
important aspect of the development of the law of the sea during the post World 
War II period, is the extension of coastal state jurisdiction. The Convention 
establishes that coastal states have sovereign rights over natural resources in a 
200 nautical mile (370 kilometers) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), calculated 
from the coastal baseline, and including territorial waters. Here, the coastal 
state can decide how resources are to be managed and used.
Beyond the EEZ are the high seas where the principle of the freedom of the 
highs seas applies, with flag jurisdiction rather than jurisdiction based on terri-
toriality. The mineral resources on and in the deep seabed – the area beyond the 
EEZs and continental shelves – are the common heritage of mankind, under the 
LOSC Part XI regime. Their exploitation, which is very limited, is administered 
by a body set up by the Convention, the International Seabed Authority.
An important distinction exists in the Convention between the water col-
umn and the continental shelf. The latter is the natural extension of the land 
territory beyond the territorial waters. While coastal state jurisdiction ends at 
the 200 nautical mile boundary in the water column, its jurisdiction on the con-
tinental shelf extends to the continental margin, the point where the continental 
slope becomes deep seabed, also beyond 200 nautical miles. 
3 A. H. Hoel and H. Vilhjamsson, “Arctic Fisheries”, in Encyclopedia of the Arctic, M. 
Nutall (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 635–41. 
According to LOSC (article 76), coastal states have to determine the outer 
limits of their shelves utilizing sediment thickness and topography as principles, 
and then submit information about this to the Continental Shelf Commission set 
up by the 1982 Convention. Regarding the delimitation of marine boundaries, 
the basic rule is that delimitations shall be agreed upon between states. This rule 
was established by the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, which also estab-
lished that in situations in which the states fail to reach an agreement, the de-
limitation is to be made according to a principle of equidistance, a line of equal 
distance from the coasts of the countries involved.
The Law of the Sea Convention also specifies rules for this, emphasizing 
that solutions are to be “equitable”. Exactly what “equitable” means is not easy 
to specify, but state practice and cases before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) would indicate that an equidistant line between opposing coasts, modified 
primarily by geographical circumstances, is the rule.
States may also decide to resolve boundary issues through judicial proce-
dures. One option is dispute a resolution at court – the ICJ or the Tribunal on 
the Law of the Sea established by the Convention. Another option is that the 
states involved agree to establish an arbitration panel to suggest solutions. The 
basic rule is, however, that states are to exhaust all avenues for arriving at a 
negotiated solution before resorting to judicial procedures.
ThE CURRENT SITUATION – JURISDICTION IN ThE ARCTIC
The jurisdictional issues in the Arctic marine realm are many and complex. A 
number of boundaries remain unresolved. This is not unique, but rather a reflec-
tion of the global situation. Navigational rights are also contested.
For the purposes of this paper, we can draw a distinction between two sets 
of issues: the bilateral issues between countries in the region regarding bounda-
ries between their marine areas on the one hand, and the issues pertaining to the 
central Arctic Ocean on the other. 
Bilateral issues
If we include Iceland, there are 8 bilateral marine boundary issues between 
countries in the Arctic: Norway´s involvement in a relatively high number of 
issues stems from its sovereignty over two islands in the Arctic, Jan Mayen and 
the Svalbard archipelago. Several of these issues are issue complexes consisting 
of a number of elements, rather than one-dimensional problems. For example, 
different segments of a boundary line may be subject to separate procedures and 
agreements. 
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russia-uS: Bering Sea
Moving east to west, in the Bering Sea and into the Arctic Ocean, the USA and 
Russia (USSR) agreed to a delimitation line in 1990, and the US ratified the 
agreement the following year. Russia has, however, not ratified the treaty, which 
is therefore not in force, though both countries apply the treaty on a provisional 
basis. There is an area beyond the two EEZs where fisheries are regulated by a 
1992 agreement (moratorium on pollock fishing).4 The United States would be 
better off with an equidistant line between the two continents, and the agreed 
line in the 1990 agreement is a compromise between the two. The line runs from 
the Bering Sea into the Arctic Ocean, and is 2,575 kilometers.
uS-canada: Beaufort Sea 
In the Beaufort Sea, the boundary line between Canada and the US has not 
been drawn and no active talks toward that end are being held. The Canadian 
position is that the boundary should run along the sector meridian at 141° W, 
while the US favors a boundary based on the equidistant principle. The resulting 
disputed area is 22,600 km2. Canada and the US also have a disagreement over 
the status of the waters in the Canadian northern archipelago. Canada consid-
ers these waters internal waters, while the US maintains they are international 
straits. This is, however, not so much a boundary delimitation issue as a dispute 
over where baselines should be drawn.
canada-Denmark/greenland: Davis Strait
Canada and Denmark/Greenland agreed to a continental shelf boundary be-
tween Canada and Greenland in 1973. The boundary runs through the Davis 
Strait and Nares Strait into the Arctic Ocean. The agreement draws a line of 
2683 kilometers, broadly based on the equidistant principle. A minor dispute 
remains over a small gap in Kennedy Channel due to disagreement over Hans 
Island. 
Denmark/greenland-Iceland: fram Strait
Denmark/Greenland and Iceland agreed to a continental shelf boundary and 
fisheries zone delimitation in the Denmark Strait in 1997. The agreement is 
based on an equidistant line, and runs from 63° 18´ N to 69° 35´, some 700 
kilometers. 
4 The Russian position on all its Arctic boundary issues is essentially determined by a 
15 April 1926 Decree where the Soviet Union claims all lands and islands in the Arctic 
Ocean sector between 32° 34´ E and 168° 4´ W.
Denmark/greenland-Norway: Jan mayen and 
Denmark/greenland-Norway: Svalbard
Denmark/Greenland and Norway had two boundary issues, which have both 
been resolved. One is the boundary between Greenland and Jan Mayen, which 
was annexed by Norway in 1929; the other is the boundary between Greenland 
and Svalbard, which is under Norwegian sovereignty thanks to an international 
treaty adopted in 1920. The first was resolved by a decision of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in 1993, followed by a bilateral agreement in 1995. The 
boundary takes the equidistant line as the point of departure for delimitation, 
but is adjusted to take geographical circumstances into account. The boundary 
Fig. 4: Map depicting the agreed boundaries between countries (whole line) and unsettled boundaries 
(dotted line). 
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between Greenland and Svalbard was agreed in 2006, based on an equidistant 
principle. The boundary line runs 800 kilometers to 83 43´ N and pertains to the 
continental shelf as well as to the water column. 
Iceland-Norway: Jan mayen
The Norwegian island of Jan Mayen is situated to the northeast of Iceland, 
with 290 nautical miles between the baselines. The fisheries zone of Jan Mayen 
and the Icelandic EEZ therefore overlapped substantially. Iceland and Norway 
negotiated two agreements in 1980–1981. The 1980 agreement contains provi-
sions for fisheries management. Following recommendations from a conciliation 
commission, the 1981 agreement gives Iceland a full EEZ, and defines a seabed 
area of 45,000 km2 (2/3 on the Norwegian side of the boundary), where hydro-
carbons are subject to joint development and the sharing of benefits (1/4 in the 
others zone). 
Norway-russia: Barents Sea
In the Barents Sea, Norway and Russia have held formal talks about the delimi-
tation of a boundary since 1974. Norway´s position is that the boundary line 
is to be drawn according to the equidistant principle, while Russia advocates 
a boundary drawn along a sector line running from the end-point of the land 
boundary to the North Pole (cf: the 1926 Decree). The resulting disputed area 
is 175,000 km2, running from the outer limit of the territorial waters, between 
Svalbard and Novaja Zemlya and into the Arctic Ocean. The continental shelf 
covers the entire Barents Sea, and is believed to harbor significant amounts of 
petroleum. As to the water column, an area of 55,000 km2 is high seas. The 
boundary for the territorial waters in the Barents Sea is agreed. In the disputed 
area, a provisional arrangement clarifying responsibilities for enforcement of 
jurisdiction in fisheries – “the Grey Zone” – was agreed on in 1978. The Grey 
Zone also includes some areas in undisputed Norwegian and Russian waters, 
more so on the Norwegian side.
As regards Svalbard, the conflicting views are not about the extent of boundaries 
or Norway´s sovereignty. Rather, the issue is the geographical scope of the equal 
treatment and tax provisions of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, i.e. how Norway can 
execute it sovereignty in the waters beyond the territorial waters off Svalbard. 
Bilateral boundaries in the Arctic (resolved = final agreement arrived at and 
ratified):
Bilateral boundaries Resolved Unresolved
US-Russia Bering x
US-Canada Beaufort x
Canada-Greenland Davis Strait 1973
Denmark/Greenland - Iceland 1997
Denmark/Greenland - Norway Jan Mayen 1993, 1995 
Denmark/Greenland-Norway Fram Strait 2006
Iceland - Norway Jan Mayen 1980, 1981
Norway - Russia Barents Sea x
ThE CENTRAL ARCTIC OCEAN
As to the areas within national jurisdiction in the Central Arctic Ocean, five 
states (the USA, Russia, Canada, Denmark/Greenland, and Norway) are littoral 
states to the Arctic Ocean and are entitled to EEZs there. 
In their EEZs under the LOSC the coastal states have sovereign rights over 
the natural resources, and are responsible for their management and optimal 
utilization. Currently, economic activity in these areas is limited, as they are 
ice-covered for extended periods of the year. Navigation occurs in some areas, 
mainly in the Northwestern and Northeastern Passages. 
As regards the areas beyond national jurisdiction, the high seas in the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean are ice-covered for most of the year and do not offer much 
opportunity for economic activity. The deep seabed here, subject to the principle 
of the common heritage of mankind, appears to be limited. More than half of 
the sea floor beyond the EEZs is continental shelf and therefore appears to fall 
under the jurisdiction of the littoral states. 
Extensive media coverage was given in the summer of 2007 to a private 
Russian expedition seeking to substantiate a Russian claim to a suboceanic ridge 
northwards to the pole, stated in its 2001 submission to the Continental Shelf 
Commission. The important issue in this context is that Russia appears to be 
following the procedures laid down by international law, and that the other 
countries in the region also appear to be playing by the internationally agreed 
rules in this regard. 
Fisheries on the high seas in the Arctic Ocean are non-existent today, due 
to the ice cover. Should the ice cover continue to reduce, one might speculate 
that we some decades ahead may see high seas fisheries also in the Arctic Ocean. 
The US Congress in August 2007 adopted a resolution urging the administration 
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ice-covered for extended periods of the year. Navigation occurs in some areas, 
mainly in the Northwestern and Northeastern Passages. 
As regards the areas beyond national jurisdiction, the high seas in the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean are ice-covered for most of the year and do not offer much 
opportunity for economic activity. The deep seabed here, subject to the principle 
of the common heritage of mankind, appears to be limited. More than half of 
the sea floor beyond the EEZs is continental shelf and therefore appears to fall 
under the jurisdiction of the littoral states. 
Extensive media coverage was given in the summer of 2007 to a private 
Russian expedition seeking to substantiate a Russian claim to a suboceanic ridge 
northwards to the pole, stated in its 2001 submission to the Continental Shelf 
Commission. The important issue in this context is that Russia appears to be 
following the procedures laid down by international law, and that the other 
countries in the region also appear to be playing by the internationally agreed 
rules in this regard. 
Fisheries on the high seas in the Arctic Ocean are non-existent today, due 
to the ice cover. Should the ice cover continue to reduce, one might speculate 
that we some decades ahead may see high seas fisheries also in the Arctic Ocean. 
The US Congress in August 2007 adopted a resolution urging the administration 
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to address this issue.5 Also in this case the Law of the Sea Convention provides 
the basis for the management of those resources, along with the 1995 UN Fish 
Stocks Convention. Should ice disappear and ecosystems establish themselves, a 
regional high seas fisheries convention, along the lines of the Northeast Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission, may have to be negotiated, in a distant future.
An emerging issue with regard to the high seas in the Arctic is the con-
servation of biodiversity, including the regulation of the use of marine genetic 
resources. The 1992 Biodiversity Convention does not apply beyond the areas 
under national jurisdiction (the EEZs). The Law of the Sea Convention would 
constitute the basis for conservation efforts, but may not be sufficient in this re-
gard. There is an ongoing process in the UN regarding biodiversity conservation 
in the high seas, and this may have a bearing on the situation in the Arctic.
CLImATE ChANGE – SOmE SECURITy ImPLICATIONS 
Climate change has over the last few years emerged as a major challenge to 
the Arctic nations. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment demonstrated that 
temperatures in the Arctic have increased almost twice as much as the global 
average increase. 6 Furthermore, most climate models indicate that the rise in 
temperature in the decades ahead is going to be higher in the Arctic than else-
where.7  
The potential effects are manifold, complex, and possibly enormous in 
scope. Among the most important, having a potential impact on the security 
situation in the Arctic, are the following: 
Larger ice-free areas: satellite surveillance of the distribution of ice started 
in 1979. Since then, we have witnessed a substantial decline in ice-cover in the 
Arctic Ocean. The lowest ice coverage area ever recorded was registered in mid 
September 2007 – at 4.1 million km2. This is 20 per cent below the previous 
2005 “record”. Reductions in the extent of the sea-ice may open up for new 
shipping opportunities. As a potential result, the Northwestern and Northeast-
ern Passages may become less interesting as it becomes possible to sail straight 
across the Arctic Ocean. 
Sea level rise: The melting of sea-ice does not affect the sea level. The Green-
land and Antarctic ice caps do, however, pose major challenges in this regard. 
To put things in perspective, if the Greenland ice cap were to melt completely, it 
would add some six meters to today´s sea level. The corresponding figure for the 
5 S. J. Res. 17, US Senate, 110th Cong., 1st. Sess. (3 August 2007).
6 ACIA, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005).
7 The major reason for this is that warming reduces the area covered by ice and snow. 
And while snow and ice reflects about 80 per cent of the incoming radiation, an open 
ocean absorbs 90 per cent of it.
Antarctic ice cap is 60 meters. In terms of consequences in the Arctic the most 
important effect is the change in baselines that an increase in sea level would 
bring about and the consequences for boundary lines. Another consequence, 
already felt in Alaska, is that infrastructure, for example roads or buildings, is 
vulnerable and may have to be moved or replaced.
Changes to the geographical distribution of living marine resources is one 
of the most significant potential impacts of climate change in the North. Here 
we may witness changes in migratory ranges, the emergence of new species and 
increased production due to warmer waters. Changes in migratory ranges in 
particular may bring about allocation conflicts between countries. In this con-
text it should be noted that the two management regimes adjacent to the Arctic 
Ocean, that for the Bering Sea (US, Russia-US, and regional fisheries manage-
ment organizations) and the one for the Barents Sea (Norway - Russia) appear 
to function relatively well.
Climate change can in the future become important in relation to the ques-
tion addressed here - who can decide what where? The challenges this raises 
have to be dealt with within global framework treaties relating to the oceans 
and climate, respectively. 
CONCLUSIONS
At the outset, I asked who can decide what where in the Arctic. Why is this an 
important question? The underlying assumption is that where it is clear who has 
jurisdiction, the potential for conflict and security-related risks are low. The say-
ing “good fences make good neighbors” is certainly an important point when it 
comes to the ownership and control of natural resources. 
Climate change, however, poses challenges to the Arctic countries that go 
beyond issues of boundaries and boundary delimitations.
I have four conclusions to offer: 
There is a comprehensive international legal framework regulating how 
countries can draw boundary lines in the ocean. 
All countries in the Arctic appear to stick to those rules. In a security per-
spective this is very important. 
In the Arctic, the number of unresolved bilateral marine boundaries is rela-
tively low. We surveyed eight bilateral boundary issues, and found that five 
of these have been settled. Settlement has been reached through negotiation 
as well as judicial procedures. The processes have been peaceful. No war has 
been fought over Arctic boundaries.
Climate change brings new jurisdictional challenges, relating to reduced ice-
cover, a rise in sea level, and changes to the geographical distribution of fish 
stocks. 
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ARCTIC mARINE TRANSPORT AND SECURITy: RESPONSES TO 
ChANGING ARCTIC OCEAN ACCESS
by Dr. Lawson W. Brigham, Deputy Director, U.S. Arctic Research 
Commission
INTRODUCTION
Satellite images taken during September 2007 indicate remarkably large areas of 
the Arctic Ocean to be ice-free. In fact, several September dates mark a historic 
minimum extent of Arctic sea-ice during the era of satellite observations. This 
natural phenomenon coupled with the presence of the global maritime industry 
in Arctic coastal seas (for example, large cruise ships sailing in West Greenlandic 
waters during the summer of 2007) are highly visible reminders that unprec-
edented changes have already come to the maritime Arctic. Substantial increases 
in marine access resulting from climatic changes will continue to present real 
challenges to the existing legal and regulatory structures, which (today) cannot 
begin to meet the needs of the Arctic states. Security issues and law-enforcement 
responses will also likely involve much more attention from the Arctic nations as 
they are forced to address complex marine issues, some without precedent. 
Initially, it is important to review the current situation for Arctic marine 
operations and the current Arctic sea-ice-trends that are highly relevant to ma-
rine transport. These reviews will set the context for why the Arctic Council has 
been proactive and has embarked on conducting a comprehensive Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment. The Assessment has yielded plausible scenarios for future 
Arctic marine transport and a range of uncertainties – all of critical importance 
in determining the future directions for cooperation and engagement by the Arc-
tic states in maritime affairs.
RECENT ARCTIC mARINE OPERATIONS
Access by polar icebreaker to nearly all regions of the Arctic Ocean was attained 
by the end of the twentieth century. Between 1977 and 2007, 72 transits have 
been made to the North Pole by the icebreakers of Russia (60), Sweden (5), the 
United States (3), Germany (2), Canada (1), and Norway (1); one quarter of 
these voyages was in support of scientific research while the remainder is de-
voted to tourist voyages in the central Arctic Ocean. A remarkable 28 voyages 
to the North Pole have been conducted during the most recent four summer 
navigational seasons (2004-07)! Of significance to Arctic marine transport, only 
one North Pole voyage of the 72 was not conducted during summer. During the 
period 8 May to 10 June 1987, the nuclear icebreaker Sibir (USSR) made its cel-
ebrated voyage in support of scientific operations (the North Pole was reached 
25 May 1987). The importance of this expedition is that the Sibir operated suc-
cessfully in near maximum thickness of Arctic sea-ice, the only surface ship to 
do so. Since 1991 seven historic, trans-arctic voyages have been accomplished 
by nuclear and non-nuclear icebreakers (during the summers of 1991, 1994, 
1996 and 2005). A review of these pioneering voyages provides substantial con-
firmation that marine access in summer throughout the Arctic Ocean has been 
achieved by highly capable icebreaking ships. It can also be concluded that it is 
technically and operationally feasible to make full summer transits of the Arc-
tic Ocean provided one’s ship has adequate power, endurance and icebreaking 
capability.
Fig. 5: Passive microwave satellite image for 11 September 2007. This date is very close to the historic 
minimum extent of Arctic sea ice during the satellite era of observations. Note the large, ice-free area 
from Bering Strait nearly halfway across the Arctic Ocean. The major routes of the Northwest Pas-
sage appear to be ice-free.
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Fig. 5: Passive microwave satellite image for 11 September 2007. This date is very close to the historic 
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A challenging figure to obtain with any degree of confidence is the total 
number of ships operating today in the Arctic Ocean. No one has such a holistic 
view of Arctic marine operations, but the Arctic Council is working to obtain 
this primary information from the Arctic states. A snapshot of summer 2004 
Arctic operations indicates a diversity of ships sailing in all regions of the Arctic 
Ocean. Canadian Coast Guard reports indicate approximately 100 voyages by 
large vessels in the Canadian Archipelago; five of these vessels made full transits 
of the Northwestern Passage (no commercial cargo ships, only a handful of ice-
breakers and yachts). In U.S. Arctic waters, 23 large carriers called in summer 
at the Red Dog Mine terminal off the northwest coast of Alaska. There were no 
reported full transits of the Northern sea route in 2004; however, an estimated 
165 voyages (52 vessels) carried 1.75 million tons of cargo along the western 
sector of the Northern sea route primarily between the port of Dudunka on 
the Yenisey River and Murmansk. At least 27 cruise ships and expedition ves-
sels sailed around the coasts of Greenland during summer 2004 (by summer 
2007 there were a reported 150 voyages by tourist ships of all sizes operating in 
Greenlandic waters). During the late summer of 2004 three icebreaking ships – 
the nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz (Russia), the icebreaker Oden (Sweden), 
and the Vidar Viking (Norway) - an icebreaking ship outfitted for drilling - con-
ducted a unique scientific drilling expedition in the most remote reaches of the 
Arctic Ocean. While it is difficult to obtain a complete record of marine activity 
in the entire Barents region, estimates appear to show that something in the 
range of several thousand transits and hundreds of complex marine operations 
were performed throughout the Barents Sea and in the waters around Svalbard. 
A cursory review such as this illustrates a significant number of ships and tran-
sits in all Arctic waters during summer 2004. The lack of full data for an entire 
year and the absence of an adequate Arctic database to analyze year-to-year 
changes in marine traffic highlight the importance of having robust monitoring 
and surveillance systems in the future. Security and law-enforcement responsi-
bilities alone would seemingly justify such systems for the Arctic coastal states as 
a logical response to increasing ship traffic throughout Arctic waters.
ARCTIC SEA ICE RETREAT 
The Arctic sea’s ice-cover is undergoing an extraordinary transformation that 
has significant implications for marine access throughout the Arctic basin. The 
extent of the Arctic sea’s ice has been declining for five decades and these reduc-
tions in extent have been observed in all seasons, with the most prominent re-
treat in summer. Perhaps as significant have been recent satellite observations of 
a rapid decline in the area of thick, multiyear sea-ice in the central Arctic Ocean. 
While Arctic sea-ice thickness changes have been much more difficult to monitor 
and evaluate, a comparison of data performed by submarines (between the late 
1950s and 1990s) has indicated widespread thinning. 
Climate model simulations conducted for the Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment suggests that Arctic sea-ice in summer will retreat further and further 
from most Arctic coasts, potentially increasing marine access and extending the 
navigational season in nearly all Arctic regional seas; one model from the same 
analysis showed it is plausible that during mid-century the entire Arctic Ocean 
could be ice-free for a short period in summer. Recent research has indicated this 
ice-free state of the Arctic sea-ice cover may occur as early as 2040, if not sooner. 
Even a brief ice-free period in summer for the entire Arctic Ocean would mean 
the disappearance of multiyear sea-ice, thicker and usually stronger ice that has 
survived one or more melt seasons. Such an “event” would have enormous im-
plications for the design, construction and operational standards for all future 
Arctic marine activities. Although future sea-ice operating conditions in the Arc-
tic Ocean are uncertain, there is greater marine access in summer throughout 
the basin today and it is highly plausible that longer seasons for access and ship 
navigation will be the norm throughout the twenty-first century. The winter 
Arctic sea-ice cover remains, but it too could be thinner and should consist of 
younger sea-ice that is more navigable.
ARCTIC mARINE ShIPPING ASSESSmENT
The Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum of the eight Arctic nations, 
has responded to these challenges and embarked on an assessment of current 
and future Arctic marine activity. The Council’s technical working group, Pro-
tection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), was tasked by the Arctic 
ministers in November 2004 to conduct the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(AMSA) with Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries. Each of 
the remaining five Arctic nations have key Arctic maritime interests as well as 
significant roles in AMSA: Denmark (for Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and 
as a leading maritime nation), Iceland, Norway (for Svalbard and its expanding 
Arctic offshore energy development), Russia (for the Barents Sea and the entire 
Northern sea route across the top of Eurasia), and Sweden. AMSA has a cir-
cumpolar focus, but is considering regional and local perspectives since regional 
and community levels will experience the bulk of the environmental, social and 
economic impacts of expanded Arctic marine use. The AMSA team is working 
closely with the Council’s expert groups, permanent participants (Arctic indig-
enous groups in the Council), and Council observers including non-Arctic states 
and NGOs. The lead countries also understand that AMSA must be inclusive 
and have sought contributions from the broad, global maritime community. The 
involvement of key stakeholders such as ship designers, shipbuilders, marine 
insurers, ship classification societies, pilots, and Arctic mariners is essential to 
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ensure AMSA’s comprehensiveness. In addition, several international shipping 
firms have contributed to AMSA’s initial data survey and scenario creation ef-
forts.
AMSA is a natural progression from two Arctic Council initiatives: the 
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) and the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan 
(AMSP). Both approved by the Arctic ministers in Reykjavik in November 2004, 
ACIA was widely disseminated and immediately gained global attention. ACIA 
noted that today’s Arctic is: experiencing some of the most rapid and severe 
climate change on the planet; extremely vulnerable to observed and projected 
climate change and its impacts; and, a region where climate change is already 
contributing to major physical, ecological, social and economic changes. ACIA 
also documents the past and ongoing retreat of Arctic sea-ice, and ACIA model 
simulations show increasing ice-free areas in Arctic coastal seas during spring, 
summer and autumn. Of the ten key, ACIA impacts or findings, number six 
addresses a central theme for AMSA: Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase 
marine transport and access to resources. 
The Arctic Council’s vision for the Arctic marine environment is addressed 
in the AMSP: A healthy and productive Arctic Ocean and coasts that support 
environmental, economic, and socio-cultural values for current and future gen-
erations. AMSP is a strategic guide that emphasizes a risk assessment approach 
and the application of ecosystems-based management to the Arctic Ocean. The 
use of the large marine ecosystem (LME) concept in AMSA would be important 
for determining the broad environmental impacts of current and future marine 
activities in select regions of the Arctic Ocean. LMEs – ocean areas characterized 
by distinct bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, and trophic relationships – 
have been developed for the Arctic Ocean based on the best available ecological 
information. An initial attempt in AMSA will be to use the LME concept for 
assessing regional environmental impacts.
The AMSA team has worked to include all ship-based activities and all ship 
types. A data survey of the calendar year 2004 has been conducted with the Arc-
tic states reporting national data for their respective Arctic regions; each Arctic 
state could define the geographical areas or limits to be reported to AMSA. 
AMSA town hall meetings have been held in select Arctic communities, and 
more will be conducted in 2008, to learn of local concerns and issues related 
to future Arctic marine operations. Several significant reviews will be included 
in AMSA: the history of Arctic marine transport, the governance of the Arctic 
Ocean, the environmental impacts of Arctic marine activity, indigenous marine 
use, and, current and anticipated Arctic infrastructure to support expanded 
coastal and offshore marine use. 
AMSA is scheduled for completion in spring 2009 and will yield a host 
of findings and a research agenda of relevance to the Arctic states, indigenous 
groups, and many stakeholders in the global maritime industry. The AMSA team 
and PAME national representatives will work with the Arctic Council’s Senior 
Arctic Officials to develop a set of key recommendations for consideration by 
the Arctic ministers. The AMSA final report will be distributed widely in the 
international maritime community.
SCENARIOS AND UNCERTAINTIES
During 2007, AMSA scenario creation workshops were held in San Francisco 
and Helsinki to create a framework for a set of scenarios, or plausible futures, 
for Arctic marine navigation up to 2050. One main purpose of these strategic 
conversations was to identify the major uncertainties that would be central to 
shaping the future of Arctic marine activity toward 2020 and 2050. While cli-
mate change and Arctic sea-ice retreat provide for greater marine access (and 
potentially longer seasons of navigation), the primary drivers and uncertainties 
in AMSA were determined to be: (1) Resources and Trade: the level of demand 
for Arctic natural resources and trade. This factor incorporates a broad range of 
uncertainties including potential market developments, and global and regional 
instabilities. (2) Governance: the degree of relative stability both within the Arc-
tic and internationally. This factor implies a need for effective and efficient legal 
and regulatory structures.
Four narrative scenarios are being drafted with these two drivers and un-
certainties as the framework elements:
Polar Preserve (low demand and stable governance)
Polar Lows (low demand and unstable governance)
Arctic Race (high demand and unstable governance)
Arctic Saga (high demand and stable governance).
Many would agree that the Arctic Race scenario best fits the current situation 
~ high commodity prices and demand for Arctic natural resources, and a lack 
of a stable, fully developed maritime governance regime in the Arctic Ocean. 
The Arctic Saga scenario is a state of the Arctic where sustainability is a key 
tenet and there are shared political and economic interests in the region, laud-
able goals for a future Arctic Ocean. These scenarios, plausible stories of the 
future, will assist the Arctic states, all Arctic residents, and the global maritime 
industry in shaping the future directions and ultimate governance under which 
multiple uses and sustainable development in the Arctic Ocean can be achieved. 
Other important uncertainties include: major Arctic shipping disasters; the eco-
nomic rise of Asia; global oil prices; marine insurance rates; loss of the Panama 
or Suez canals; escalation of Arctic maritime disputes; conflicts between indig-
enous groups and commercial use; radical changes in global trade patterns; Arc-
tic transit fees; and, many other factors. One of the valuable outcomes of the 
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AMSA scenarios creation effort is an awareness of the great complexity associ-
ated with an Arctic transport system and the multi-faceted factors influencing 
future Arctic marine use.
ARCTIC STATE ChALLENGES
The arrival of the global maritime industry in the Arctic and the rapid growth in 
multiple uses of the Arctic Ocean are bringing many new actors and non-arctic 
stakeholders to the region. Many of these players are experiencing for the first 
time the realities and challenges of the Arctic marine environment, as well as an 
overall lack of support infrastructure normally associated with marine opera-
tions in the lower latitudes. All of these new marine activities require serious, 
sustained investments by the Arctic states in such basic support as hydrography, 
charting, ports, communication systems, sea-ice monitoring, search and rescue, 
and incident response. The list of critical and lacking infrastructure is quite 
lengthy, and these fundamental support issues are being assessed in AMSA. The 
Arctic states will also require significantly enhanced monitoring and surveil-
lance, and improved mechanisms for the sharing of maritime data and informa-
tion. Without these tools and multi-lateral collaboration, it will be very diffi-
cult to improve upon the current situation with regard to marine environmental 
protection, marine safety and sustainable development. In a broader pan-Arctic 
perspective, a greater sharing of maritime information among the Arctic states 
would hopefully result in improved regional security and response. 
The Arctic states must work closely with the International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) to develop refined and potentially mandatory Arctic ship de-
sign and construction standards; a renewed emphasis on regulations to reduce 
and limit discharges and stack emissions in all Arctic waters will also require 
proactive consultation. To further enhance Arctic marine safety and environ-
mental protection, new guidelines and mechanisms for improved mariner train-
ing and certification for navigating in Arctic waters should be addressed in the 
near-term. The establishment of IMO-sanctioned vessel traffic-lanes in Arctic 
coastal waters such as the Bering Strait, a region of increasing, multiple marine 
uses, is a plausible requirement some years in the future. Furthermore, a unique 
Fig. 7: A futures map of the Arctic Ocean showing plausible marine uses and routes to 2040. Fish-
ing is indicated as moving northward. The most intensively developed region is in the Barents 
Sea with significant Norwegian and Russian offshore development during the next three decades. 
Fig. 6: Scenario framework for the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment of the Arctic Council.
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challenge confronts the Arctic coastal states – working out simultaneously the 
above, critical environmental protection and safety issues at IMO, while con-
tinuing to exercise their rights and claims under Article 76 of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (the process of establishing their rights to an extended 
Arctic continental shelf off their shores). The policy implications and possible 
security issues that surface during these unusual circumstances should test Arctic 
diplomacy to its core.
The Arctic states will also require a commitment to a level of maritime en-
forcement that has not previously been needed in the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic 
coastal states, individually and collectively, will require an on-scene capability 
to meet both summer and winter contingencies. Whether this enforcement is 
realized by each of the coastal states operating independently, or by collective 
arrangements and engagement, is one of the key challenges in the circumpolar 
North. 
While there remain significant uncertainties in the timing and levels of fu-
ture Arctic marine activity, more communication and cooperation are surely 
required among the Arctic states to lessen regional disputes and develop a more 
integrated approach to marine issues. Importantly, the Arctic states must also 
engage with an array of non-Arctic states, global institutions and indigenous 
organizations that have expanding roles in the future of Arctic Ocean use. Co-
operation and engagement are more relevant and necessary today than at any 
period in Arctic maritime history. Perhaps the work of the Arctic Council with 
AMSA and the ongoing International Polar Year led by the international scien-
tific community can provide the experience and common efforts that can influ-
ence the evolution of a more secure and safe Arctic Ocean and its people in the 
twenty-first century.
FIShERIES INSPECTION AND ENFORCEmENT                           
– AN INTRODUCTION
by Dr Geir Hønneland, Senior Research Fellow, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute
The issue of fisheries inspection and enforcement can be approached from vari-
ous angles. From a legal point of view, one may ask about the legal basis for 
inspections and other enforcement measures in a certain area of ocean. On a 
practical level, one may ask how inspections best can be performed to detect 
any violations of fisheries regulations. My own background is enforcement in 
fisheries from a social science perspective. Here, the concept of enforcement is 
closely linked to that of compliance. The ultimate question is: how can we make 
fishermen comply with the law? What other mechanisms are at work, and what 
has to be left to enforcement measures? In the following, I shall provide a brief 
overview of how compliance can be understood from a social science point of 
view, focusing on two main compliance mechanisms. Then I shall provide some 
reflections about compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries. I wrote my PhD about 
compliance in the Barents Sea a decade ago based on an investigation of fisher-
men’s behaviour in the early 1990s. Since then, I have followed developments in 
the bilateral fisheries management regime between Norway and Russia closely, 
and I think there have been some changes in fishermen’s attitude to regulations 
in this sea over the last decade.
ThE STUDy OF COmPLIANCE
Compliance and law enforcement have been objects of study mainly within the 
fields of economics, criminology, psychology and sociology. In economics lit-
erature, the theme dates back at least to the work of Adam Smith, who noted 
that individuals acting in the pursuit of self-interest can cause harm on others 
and should thus be restricted in some way. He also made the link between crime 
and economic circumstances, and claimed that individuals most often resort to 
criminal activity when the opportunities of having a lawful income are not good. 
This approach has been adopted by Jeremy Bentham, who argues that criminal 
8 Further reading: Hønneland, Geir, “Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone 
around Svalbard”, Ocean Development & International Law, no. 29, (1998): 
339–360; “A model of compliance in fisheries: theoretical foundations and practical 
application”, Ocean & Coastal Management, no. 42 (1999): 699–716; Coercive 
and discursive compliance mechanisms in the management of natural resources: A 
case study from the Barents Sea fisheries (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000); Kvotekamp 
og kyststatssolidaritet: Norsk-russisk fiskeriforvaltning gjennom 30 år (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2006).
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 572/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
challenge confronts the Arctic coastal states – working out simultaneously the 
above, critical environmental protection and safety issues at IMO, while con-
tinuing to exercise their rights and claims under Article 76 of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (the process of establishing their rights to an extended 
Arctic continental shelf off their shores). The policy implications and possible 
security issues that surface during these unusual circumstances should test Arctic 
diplomacy to its core.
The Arctic states will also require a commitment to a level of maritime en-
forcement that has not previously been needed in the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic 
coastal states, individually and collectively, will require an on-scene capability 
to meet both summer and winter contingencies. Whether this enforcement is 
realized by each of the coastal states operating independently, or by collective 
arrangements and engagement, is one of the key challenges in the circumpolar 
North. 
While there remain significant uncertainties in the timing and levels of fu-
ture Arctic marine activity, more communication and cooperation are surely 
required among the Arctic states to lessen regional disputes and develop a more 
integrated approach to marine issues. Importantly, the Arctic states must also 
engage with an array of non-Arctic states, global institutions and indigenous 
organizations that have expanding roles in the future of Arctic Ocean use. Co-
operation and engagement are more relevant and necessary today than at any 
period in Arctic maritime history. Perhaps the work of the Arctic Council with 
AMSA and the ongoing International Polar Year led by the international scien-
tific community can provide the experience and common efforts that can influ-
ence the evolution of a more secure and safe Arctic Ocean and its people in the 
twenty-first century.
FIShERIES INSPECTION AND ENFORCEmENT                           
– AN INTRODUCTION
by Dr Geir Hønneland, Senior Research Fellow, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute
The issue of fisheries inspection and enforcement can be approached from vari-
ous angles. From a legal point of view, one may ask about the legal basis for 
inspections and other enforcement measures in a certain area of ocean. On a 
practical level, one may ask how inspections best can be performed to detect 
any violations of fisheries regulations. My own background is enforcement in 
fisheries from a social science perspective. Here, the concept of enforcement is 
closely linked to that of compliance. The ultimate question is: how can we make 
fishermen comply with the law? What other mechanisms are at work, and what 
has to be left to enforcement measures? In the following, I shall provide a brief 
overview of how compliance can be understood from a social science point of 
view, focusing on two main compliance mechanisms. Then I shall provide some 
reflections about compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries. I wrote my PhD about 
compliance in the Barents Sea a decade ago based on an investigation of fisher-
men’s behaviour in the early 1990s. Since then, I have followed developments in 
the bilateral fisheries management regime between Norway and Russia closely, 
and I think there have been some changes in fishermen’s attitude to regulations 
in this sea over the last decade.
ThE STUDy OF COmPLIANCE
Compliance and law enforcement have been objects of study mainly within the 
fields of economics, criminology, psychology and sociology. In economics lit-
erature, the theme dates back at least to the work of Adam Smith, who noted 
that individuals acting in the pursuit of self-interest can cause harm on others 
and should thus be restricted in some way. He also made the link between crime 
and economic circumstances, and claimed that individuals most often resort to 
criminal activity when the opportunities of having a lawful income are not good. 
This approach has been adopted by Jeremy Bentham, who argues that criminal 
8 Further reading: Hønneland, Geir, “Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone 
around Svalbard”, Ocean Development & International Law, no. 29, (1998): 
339–360; “A model of compliance in fisheries: theoretical foundations and practical 
application”, Ocean & Coastal Management, no. 42 (1999): 699–716; Coercive 
and discursive compliance mechanisms in the management of natural resources: A 
case study from the Barents Sea fisheries (Dordrecht: Springer, 2000); Kvotekamp 
og kyststatssolidaritet: Norsk-russisk fiskeriforvaltning gjennom 30 år (Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, 2006).
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behaviour is economically rational, and he develops the concept of deterrence 
to reduce crime. 
In the early twentieth century, there were numerous attempts to explore 
the link between crime and economic circumstances, but it was not until the late 
1960s that a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity was 
developed. Following Smith and Bentham, Gary Becker argues that criminals 
behave basically like all other individuals in attempting to maximize personal 
utility. According to the model, an individual commits a crime if the expected 
utility from doing so exceeds the utility from engaging in lawful activities. In 
contrast, recent research in psychology and sociology emphasizes the impor-
tance of factors such as socialization, morality and legitimacy in bringing about 
compliant behaviour. In psychological and sociological literature, compliance 
is linked to both the internal capacities of the individual and the external influ-
ences of the environment; the socialization process is the linkage between the 
individual and society. The two perspectives – the economic on the one hand and 
the psychological and sociological on the other – are often called the instrumen-
tal and normative perspectives. 
SOURCES OF COmPLIANCE AND COmPLIANCE mEChANISmS
In social science literature on fisheries management, various sources of compli-
ance have been singled out: 
First, there is self-interest: Compliance sometimes follows as the preferred 
option of fishermen even in the absence of external influence. Subjects may sim-
ply conclude that the expected value of compliance outweighs that of violation. 
Second, enforcement involves explicit attempts by authorities to manipu-
late the cost/benefit calculations of the subject, primarily through the threat of 
sanctions in the event of detected violation. 
Third, fishermen’s actions may be shaped by social pressure, stemming 
from external actors other than the public authorities. 
Fourth, their choices and actions may be influenced by an explicit sense of 
obligation, of either internal or external origin. 
Fifth, the decisions of subjects concerning compliance vs violation are of-
ten influenced by subconscious or unconscious considerations; the terms habit 
or practice may be used to refer to patterns of behaviour mainly acquired by 
frequent repetition. 
Sixth, conviction refers to situations in which fishermen are convinced by 
the arguments of public authorities. 
In addition, biological conditions and the nature of the regulations can be 
added to the list. 
Some sources of compliance cannot be manipulated by public authorities, 
while others can. This gives rise to the concepts of first-order compliance and 
management-induced compliance. Biological factors and social pressure are not 
easily manipulable by the public authorities. Obligation and habit can be ma-
nipulated, but only over a long period of time. Enforcement and conviction are 
the sources of compliance that are easiest to manipulate. 
Compliance mechanisms are the instruments at hand for the public au-
thorities to encourage compliance. The instrumental perspective of compliance 
tends to view enforcement as the primary source of compliance. While the other 
sources would also be recognized as instrumental in forming decision-making in 
individuals, these are either conceived of as unmanpulative (biological factors 
and social pressure) or basically inefficient (obligation, habit and conviction). 
Coercive measures, i.e. the use or threat of power, is the only reliable mechanism 
to implement management regulations. 
The normative perspective, on the other hand, would claim the effective-
ness of discursive measures to induce compliance. An emphasis on legitimacy is 
a common denominator in this perspective. Individuals feel obligated to comply 
with prescriptions that they perceive as legitimate. They can be convinced of the 
reasonability of the regulations through argumentation. In a long-term perspec-
tive, habit can also be influenced in the same way. 
mANAGEmENT LEVELS AND SUbSySTEmS OF COmPLIANCE
A compliance system consists of three elements: a primary rule system, a compli-
ance information system and a non-compliance response system. The primary 
rule system consists of the actors, rules and processes meant for the regulation 
of subjects’ behaviour. The compliance information system embraces the actors, 
rules and processes that collect and analyze information regarding violations 
and compliance. The non-compliance response system consists of the actors, 
rules and processes which govern the responses undertaken to induce compli-
ance in subjects revealed as violators by the second subsystem. 
In fisheries management, the primary rule system comprises all actors in-
volved in the making of rules regulating the fishery, the regulations themselves 
and the processes through which they are made. Normally, this covers fisheries 
research and the regulatory level. The compliance information system basically 
comprises the level of checks of a fisheries management system. Checks can be 
conducted both at sea (during the fishing) or on shore (when the catch is landed). 
Furthermore, checking measures can be separated into a passive and an active 
part. Passive checks refers to the examination of the information fishermen are 
obliged to submit about their activities at sea; authorities passively receive data 
from the vessels and examine whether they provide evidence of lawful behaviour 
or not. Active checks involve the physical checking by inspectors of this infor-
mation, either at sea or on shore. The non-compliance response system is found 
partly at the level of checks, but primarily at the prosecution level of a fisheries 
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behaviour is economically rational, and he develops the concept of deterrence 
to reduce crime. 
In the early twentieth century, there were numerous attempts to explore 
the link between crime and economic circumstances, but it was not until the late 
1960s that a formal theoretical framework for explaining criminal activity was 
developed. Following Smith and Bentham, Gary Becker argues that criminals 
behave basically like all other individuals in attempting to maximize personal 
utility. According to the model, an individual commits a crime if the expected 
utility from doing so exceeds the utility from engaging in lawful activities. In 
contrast, recent research in psychology and sociology emphasizes the impor-
tance of factors such as socialization, morality and legitimacy in bringing about 
compliant behaviour. In psychological and sociological literature, compliance 
is linked to both the internal capacities of the individual and the external influ-
ences of the environment; the socialization process is the linkage between the 
individual and society. The two perspectives – the economic on the one hand and 
the psychological and sociological on the other – are often called the instrumen-
tal and normative perspectives. 
SOURCES OF COmPLIANCE AND COmPLIANCE mEChANISmS
In social science literature on fisheries management, various sources of compli-
ance have been singled out: 
First, there is self-interest: Compliance sometimes follows as the preferred 
option of fishermen even in the absence of external influence. Subjects may sim-
ply conclude that the expected value of compliance outweighs that of violation. 
Second, enforcement involves explicit attempts by authorities to manipu-
late the cost/benefit calculations of the subject, primarily through the threat of 
sanctions in the event of detected violation. 
Third, fishermen’s actions may be shaped by social pressure, stemming 
from external actors other than the public authorities. 
Fourth, their choices and actions may be influenced by an explicit sense of 
obligation, of either internal or external origin. 
Fifth, the decisions of subjects concerning compliance vs violation are of-
ten influenced by subconscious or unconscious considerations; the terms habit 
or practice may be used to refer to patterns of behaviour mainly acquired by 
frequent repetition. 
Sixth, conviction refers to situations in which fishermen are convinced by 
the arguments of public authorities. 
In addition, biological conditions and the nature of the regulations can be 
added to the list. 
Some sources of compliance cannot be manipulated by public authorities, 
while others can. This gives rise to the concepts of first-order compliance and 
management-induced compliance. Biological factors and social pressure are not 
easily manipulable by the public authorities. Obligation and habit can be ma-
nipulated, but only over a long period of time. Enforcement and conviction are 
the sources of compliance that are easiest to manipulate. 
Compliance mechanisms are the instruments at hand for the public au-
thorities to encourage compliance. The instrumental perspective of compliance 
tends to view enforcement as the primary source of compliance. While the other 
sources would also be recognized as instrumental in forming decision-making in 
individuals, these are either conceived of as unmanpulative (biological factors 
and social pressure) or basically inefficient (obligation, habit and conviction). 
Coercive measures, i.e. the use or threat of power, is the only reliable mechanism 
to implement management regulations. 
The normative perspective, on the other hand, would claim the effective-
ness of discursive measures to induce compliance. An emphasis on legitimacy is 
a common denominator in this perspective. Individuals feel obligated to comply 
with prescriptions that they perceive as legitimate. They can be convinced of the 
reasonability of the regulations through argumentation. In a long-term perspec-
tive, habit can also be influenced in the same way. 
mANAGEmENT LEVELS AND SUbSySTEmS OF COmPLIANCE
A compliance system consists of three elements: a primary rule system, a compli-
ance information system and a non-compliance response system. The primary 
rule system consists of the actors, rules and processes meant for the regulation 
of subjects’ behaviour. The compliance information system embraces the actors, 
rules and processes that collect and analyze information regarding violations 
and compliance. The non-compliance response system consists of the actors, 
rules and processes which govern the responses undertaken to induce compli-
ance in subjects revealed as violators by the second subsystem. 
In fisheries management, the primary rule system comprises all actors in-
volved in the making of rules regulating the fishery, the regulations themselves 
and the processes through which they are made. Normally, this covers fisheries 
research and the regulatory level. The compliance information system basically 
comprises the level of checks of a fisheries management system. Checks can be 
conducted both at sea (during the fishing) or on shore (when the catch is landed). 
Furthermore, checking measures can be separated into a passive and an active 
part. Passive checks refers to the examination of the information fishermen are 
obliged to submit about their activities at sea; authorities passively receive data 
from the vessels and examine whether they provide evidence of lawful behaviour 
or not. Active checks involve the physical checking by inspectors of this infor-
mation, either at sea or on shore. The non-compliance response system is found 
partly at the level of checks, but primarily at the prosecution level of a fisheries 
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management system. It basically involves imposing sanctions on those that have 
been detected to be in violation. 
The coercive measures prescribed by the instrumental perspective on 
compliance are generally found at the lower end of the compliance system, i.e. 
within the compliance information and, most importantly, the non-compliance 
response system. Theorists within this perspective would argue that fishermen 
will comply only if the possible gains to do so outweigh those of violating the 
regulations. This implies that the perceived probability of being detected to be 
in violation is sufficiently high and that sanctions are sufficiently severe to make 
violations unprofitable. The basic coercive measures applied to make detection 
seem probable include extensive surveillance and the use of inspectors that are 
sufficiently competent and willing to reveal violations. If inspectors are not ade-
quately prepared for their task of revealing violations, high frequency of inspec-
tion is of little value. The same is true if inspectors are not motivated to report 
the violations they detect. There might be a conflict between these two objec-
tives. For instance, inspectors who themselves have a background from fisheries 
will often be highly qualified for detecting violations, but also identify with the 
fishermen and understand their need to circumvent the rules occasionally. 
The discursive measures prescribed by the normative perspective include 
efforts at all levels of the management system to increase the legitimacy of regu-
lations, the actors that have produced them, and the procedures through which 
this was carried out. Most studies of fisheries management systems conducted 
from a normative perspective have focused on the primary rule system, i.e. on 
how the participation of fishermen in the bodies that produce the regulations 
can increase the legitimacy of the regulations, the enacting body and the ap-
plied procedure. A growing interest can also be observed in fishermen’s attitude 
to research institutions and procedures. However, in addition it is essential to 
include the discursive elements of the compliance information system and the 
non-compliance response system. The hypothesis is that compliance is increased 
when control and the prosecution authorities are perceived as legitimate by the 
fishermen. 
There is every reason to believe that actual compliance cannot be explained 
by one factor alone. Different sources and mechanisms are activated in different 
situations and sometimes operate simultaneously. One may assume that a com-
bination of obligation, habit and conviction is at work in situations in which dis-
cursive measures prove effective. And the delimitation between first-order and 
management-induced compliance is not always obvious. When fishermen have 
little to gain by violating a certain regulation, when they know that sanctions 
are possible, but not probable, or when they perceive the regulations as neither 
particularly legitimate nor illegitimate, it may be difficult to discern the various 
explanations from each other. 
COmPLIANCE IN ThE bARENTS SEA FIShERIES
In my own investigation of compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries in the early 
1990s – based mainly on violation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard 
– I came to the conclusion that most fishermen comply with most regulations 
most of the time. This is often forgotten since the media tend to focus on the 
exceptions to this main rule. 
Further, I tried through in-depth interviews with Norwegian and Russian 
fishermen and representatives of their organizations to find to what extent the 
observed compliance can be understood as first-order compliance, and to what 
extent as the result of coercive or discursive measures from management and 
enforcement authorities. There is not time to go through the conclusions of the 
study here, but I would like to mention one finding, namely the correlation be-
tween the communicative efforts made by coast guard inspectors in the Fishery 
Protection Zone around Svalbard, where coercive measures were not yet in use 
at the time of the investigation, and the high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by 
the Norwegian Coast Guard from both Norwegian and Russian fishermen. The 
most striking examples were the attempts to avoid killing undersized ground-
fish, such as cod, while fishing for capelin and shrimp, during which small-sized 
nets are used. Normally, coast guard inspectors would board the fishing vessels, 
present the captains with their calculations of how much undersized fish had 
been caught, and attempt to convince them to stop fishing in that particular 
area. Almost always, this strategy succeeded. It might take several days of argu-
mentation, but then the entire Russian fleet, often consisting of a several dozen 
ships, would leave the area. The challenge of coast guard inspectors to induce 
compliance without resorting to coercive measures was facilitated by the fact 
that the coast guard was much more than an enforcement body to the fishermen. 
Above all, coast guard vessels serve as rescue boats in the Barents Sea. They can 
also offer several other services ranging from medical assistance to transporta-
tion and ice breaking. These services are all free of charge to the fishing fleet, 
and they may contribute to a certain feeling of obligation to the control body. 
This may especially be the case in the Svalbard area, where climatic conditions 
are harsh and the presence of other auxiliary bodies more limited than closer to 
the mainland. This may also influence the relationship between fishermen and 
inspectors. Fishermen may be more obedient to the inspectors’ instructions be-
cause they generally want to be on good terms with the coast guard.
However, rather than stressing the fishermen’s possible sense of obligation, 
one may accentuate the spontaneous spirit of community that may arise between 
people who carry out their professions in these remote areas, regardless of their 
functions and roles. The very remoteness along with the extreme climatic condi-
tions can make such roles less important here than in many other situations of 
human interaction. When inspectors and fisherman meet in the polar night and 
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management system. It basically involves imposing sanctions on those that have 
been detected to be in violation. 
The coercive measures prescribed by the instrumental perspective on 
compliance are generally found at the lower end of the compliance system, i.e. 
within the compliance information and, most importantly, the non-compliance 
response system. Theorists within this perspective would argue that fishermen 
will comply only if the possible gains to do so outweigh those of violating the 
regulations. This implies that the perceived probability of being detected to be 
in violation is sufficiently high and that sanctions are sufficiently severe to make 
violations unprofitable. The basic coercive measures applied to make detection 
seem probable include extensive surveillance and the use of inspectors that are 
sufficiently competent and willing to reveal violations. If inspectors are not ade-
quately prepared for their task of revealing violations, high frequency of inspec-
tion is of little value. The same is true if inspectors are not motivated to report 
the violations they detect. There might be a conflict between these two objec-
tives. For instance, inspectors who themselves have a background from fisheries 
will often be highly qualified for detecting violations, but also identify with the 
fishermen and understand their need to circumvent the rules occasionally. 
The discursive measures prescribed by the normative perspective include 
efforts at all levels of the management system to increase the legitimacy of regu-
lations, the actors that have produced them, and the procedures through which 
this was carried out. Most studies of fisheries management systems conducted 
from a normative perspective have focused on the primary rule system, i.e. on 
how the participation of fishermen in the bodies that produce the regulations 
can increase the legitimacy of the regulations, the enacting body and the ap-
plied procedure. A growing interest can also be observed in fishermen’s attitude 
to research institutions and procedures. However, in addition it is essential to 
include the discursive elements of the compliance information system and the 
non-compliance response system. The hypothesis is that compliance is increased 
when control and the prosecution authorities are perceived as legitimate by the 
fishermen. 
There is every reason to believe that actual compliance cannot be explained 
by one factor alone. Different sources and mechanisms are activated in different 
situations and sometimes operate simultaneously. One may assume that a com-
bination of obligation, habit and conviction is at work in situations in which dis-
cursive measures prove effective. And the delimitation between first-order and 
management-induced compliance is not always obvious. When fishermen have 
little to gain by violating a certain regulation, when they know that sanctions 
are possible, but not probable, or when they perceive the regulations as neither 
particularly legitimate nor illegitimate, it may be difficult to discern the various 
explanations from each other. 
COmPLIANCE IN ThE bARENTS SEA FIShERIES
In my own investigation of compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries in the early 
1990s – based mainly on violation statistics from the Norwegian Coast Guard 
– I came to the conclusion that most fishermen comply with most regulations 
most of the time. This is often forgotten since the media tend to focus on the 
exceptions to this main rule. 
Further, I tried through in-depth interviews with Norwegian and Russian 
fishermen and representatives of their organizations to find to what extent the 
observed compliance can be understood as first-order compliance, and to what 
extent as the result of coercive or discursive measures from management and 
enforcement authorities. There is not time to go through the conclusions of the 
study here, but I would like to mention one finding, namely the correlation be-
tween the communicative efforts made by coast guard inspectors in the Fishery 
Protection Zone around Svalbard, where coercive measures were not yet in use 
at the time of the investigation, and the high degree of legitimacy enjoyed by 
the Norwegian Coast Guard from both Norwegian and Russian fishermen. The 
most striking examples were the attempts to avoid killing undersized ground-
fish, such as cod, while fishing for capelin and shrimp, during which small-sized 
nets are used. Normally, coast guard inspectors would board the fishing vessels, 
present the captains with their calculations of how much undersized fish had 
been caught, and attempt to convince them to stop fishing in that particular 
area. Almost always, this strategy succeeded. It might take several days of argu-
mentation, but then the entire Russian fleet, often consisting of a several dozen 
ships, would leave the area. The challenge of coast guard inspectors to induce 
compliance without resorting to coercive measures was facilitated by the fact 
that the coast guard was much more than an enforcement body to the fishermen. 
Above all, coast guard vessels serve as rescue boats in the Barents Sea. They can 
also offer several other services ranging from medical assistance to transporta-
tion and ice breaking. These services are all free of charge to the fishing fleet, 
and they may contribute to a certain feeling of obligation to the control body. 
This may especially be the case in the Svalbard area, where climatic conditions 
are harsh and the presence of other auxiliary bodies more limited than closer to 
the mainland. This may also influence the relationship between fishermen and 
inspectors. Fishermen may be more obedient to the inspectors’ instructions be-
cause they generally want to be on good terms with the coast guard.
However, rather than stressing the fishermen’s possible sense of obligation, 
one may accentuate the spontaneous spirit of community that may arise between 
people who carry out their professions in these remote areas, regardless of their 
functions and roles. The very remoteness along with the extreme climatic condi-
tions can make such roles less important here than in many other situations of 
human interaction. When inspectors and fisherman meet in the polar night and 
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discuss over a cup of coffee when the ice will come in from the east, the situation 
is closer to a meeting between polar sea colleagues than to one between a watch-
dog and a potential criminal. In such a situation, it may be argued, it becomes 
particularly awkward for the captain to be revealed as a violator, or come across 
as non-cooperative by turning down a request from the inspector. 
The situation has probably changed since the early 1990s. In 1994, the first 
arrest was carried out in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard. Icelandic 
vessels had started fishing in the area without having quotas in the Barents Sea. 
This is a far more serious violation than fishing undersized fish or with smaller 
mesh sizes than permitted, and Norway had to react. The first and so far only 
arrest of a Russian vessel in the Svalbard Zone took place in 2001, and the of-
ficial Russian reaction was severe. The arrest was a violation of an old gentle-
men’s agreement between the two countries, was the Russian perception. By the 
late 1990s, the Russians felt that they were being discriminated against by the 
Norwegian Coast Guard. The Norwegian perception was that we are becoming 
better at discovering violations. There is also little doubt that Russian violations 
have increased over the last decade. Norwegian authorities claim they can docu-
ment that Russia has overfished its cod quota in the Barents Sea by some 50 per 
cent almost every year since the early 2000s. In this situation, coercive measures 
cannot by and large be used by the Norwegian authorities. Norway can punish a 
Russian vessel for underreporting if the coast guard discovers that the vessel has 
more fish on board at the time of inspection than it has reported in the catch log. 
But the Norwegian authorities cannot punish a Russian vessel for overfishing its 
annual quota (Russian vessels do not even have quotas, as quotas are distributed 
at company level.) That has to be left to Russian authorities. The Norwegian 
perception is, although it is probably not stated explicitly by the Ministry of 
Fisheries, that the Russians are not that keen on detecting violations. It is also 
problematic that fines are generally low in Russia. The coercive measures simply 
do not work. At the same time, the potential for fruitful discursive measures has 
also been reduced as the relationship between the Norwegian coast guard and 
the Russian fishing fleet has soured. On top of that, the legitimacy of the regula-
tions is diminished in the eyes of Norwegian fishermen when they see that the 
Russians can overfish their quotas by a large margin without being punished. In 
a global context, the Barents Sea fisheries still count among the more well-man-
aged. But reduced compliance is a huge threat at the moment.
FIShERIES INSPECTION AND ENFORCEmENT 
by Rear Admiral Trond Grytting, Commander Regional Headquarters North 
Norway
The Norwegian military is present in the North to support Norwegian policy on 
safety and security. 
My command, Regional Headquarters North Norway, is a “Crisis Re-
sponse Command”. One of my tasks is to survey vigilantly the enormous areas 
in and around Northern Norway that are of profound importance in terms not 
only of Norwegian interests, but also values. The military is ready to support 
the efforts of the Norwegian authorities to meet a whole range of challenges 
emanating from a complex risk picture. This includes civilian catastrophes and 
disasters, danger caused by heavy oil-transport vessels, nuclear accidents, terror-
ism, organized crime, foreign military activity, resource crime, resource conflicts 
and border disputes to mention but some. The environment, oil, gas and fish are 
all defined as strategic resources in the High North. My command has a respon-
sibility to support efforts to protect these resources.
The Norwegian coastline is approximately 2,500 km long, and the mari-
time area under Norwegian jurisdiction represents an area equal to seven times 
mainland Norway. The sea is divided into different zones. In addition to internal 
waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), there is the Fishery Zone sur-
rounding Jan Mayen, and the Fishery Protection Zone surrounding Svalbard. 
When it comes to fisheries, however, these are regulated in the same way and 
have the same legal basis as the EEZ. International waters of specific Norwegian 
interest are the “Loop Hole” between the Norwegian and Russian EEZ, and 
the “Banana Hole” between the Norwegian EEZ and the Fishery Zone of Jan 
Mayen.
In the following, I shall give you a brief historical account of the devel-
opment of fishery enforcement at sea. I shall also give you an overview of the 
organization and practices of Norwegian fisheries inspections and enforcement, 
as well as our challenges and future perspective.
hISTORICAL ACCOUNT
Dramatic confrontation between the Norwegian Coast Guard and pirate fisher-
men started in 1993 when the trawler Zaandam, registered in the Dominican 
Republic, started fishing in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard. Zaan-
dam did not comply with orders to stop fishing, claiming her right to fish by 
referring to the Svalbard treaty. What should the Norwegian reaction be? Arrest 
the trawler and tow it to the mainland for prosecution? Cut the trawl or by 
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discuss over a cup of coffee when the ice will come in from the east, the situation 
is closer to a meeting between polar sea colleagues than to one between a watch-
dog and a potential criminal. In such a situation, it may be argued, it becomes 
particularly awkward for the captain to be revealed as a violator, or come across 
as non-cooperative by turning down a request from the inspector. 
The situation has probably changed since the early 1990s. In 1994, the first 
arrest was carried out in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard. Icelandic 
vessels had started fishing in the area without having quotas in the Barents Sea. 
This is a far more serious violation than fishing undersized fish or with smaller 
mesh sizes than permitted, and Norway had to react. The first and so far only 
arrest of a Russian vessel in the Svalbard Zone took place in 2001, and the of-
ficial Russian reaction was severe. The arrest was a violation of an old gentle-
men’s agreement between the two countries, was the Russian perception. By the 
late 1990s, the Russians felt that they were being discriminated against by the 
Norwegian Coast Guard. The Norwegian perception was that we are becoming 
better at discovering violations. There is also little doubt that Russian violations 
have increased over the last decade. Norwegian authorities claim they can docu-
ment that Russia has overfished its cod quota in the Barents Sea by some 50 per 
cent almost every year since the early 2000s. In this situation, coercive measures 
cannot by and large be used by the Norwegian authorities. Norway can punish a 
Russian vessel for underreporting if the coast guard discovers that the vessel has 
more fish on board at the time of inspection than it has reported in the catch log. 
But the Norwegian authorities cannot punish a Russian vessel for overfishing its 
annual quota (Russian vessels do not even have quotas, as quotas are distributed 
at company level.) That has to be left to Russian authorities. The Norwegian 
perception is, although it is probably not stated explicitly by the Ministry of 
Fisheries, that the Russians are not that keen on detecting violations. It is also 
problematic that fines are generally low in Russia. The coercive measures simply 
do not work. At the same time, the potential for fruitful discursive measures has 
also been reduced as the relationship between the Norwegian coast guard and 
the Russian fishing fleet has soured. On top of that, the legitimacy of the regula-
tions is diminished in the eyes of Norwegian fishermen when they see that the 
Russians can overfish their quotas by a large margin without being punished. In 
a global context, the Barents Sea fisheries still count among the more well-man-
aged. But reduced compliance is a huge threat at the moment.
FIShERIES INSPECTION AND ENFORCEmENT 
by Rear Admiral Trond Grytting, Commander Regional Headquarters North 
Norway
The Norwegian military is present in the North to support Norwegian policy on 
safety and security. 
My command, Regional Headquarters North Norway, is a “Crisis Re-
sponse Command”. One of my tasks is to survey vigilantly the enormous areas 
in and around Northern Norway that are of profound importance in terms not 
only of Norwegian interests, but also values. The military is ready to support 
the efforts of the Norwegian authorities to meet a whole range of challenges 
emanating from a complex risk picture. This includes civilian catastrophes and 
disasters, danger caused by heavy oil-transport vessels, nuclear accidents, terror-
ism, organized crime, foreign military activity, resource crime, resource conflicts 
and border disputes to mention but some. The environment, oil, gas and fish are 
all defined as strategic resources in the High North. My command has a respon-
sibility to support efforts to protect these resources.
The Norwegian coastline is approximately 2,500 km long, and the mari-
time area under Norwegian jurisdiction represents an area equal to seven times 
mainland Norway. The sea is divided into different zones. In addition to internal 
waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), there is the Fishery Zone sur-
rounding Jan Mayen, and the Fishery Protection Zone surrounding Svalbard. 
When it comes to fisheries, however, these are regulated in the same way and 
have the same legal basis as the EEZ. International waters of specific Norwegian 
interest are the “Loop Hole” between the Norwegian and Russian EEZ, and 
the “Banana Hole” between the Norwegian EEZ and the Fishery Zone of Jan 
Mayen.
In the following, I shall give you a brief historical account of the devel-
opment of fishery enforcement at sea. I shall also give you an overview of the 
organization and practices of Norwegian fisheries inspections and enforcement, 
as well as our challenges and future perspective.
hISTORICAL ACCOUNT
Dramatic confrontation between the Norwegian Coast Guard and pirate fisher-
men started in 1993 when the trawler Zaandam, registered in the Dominican 
Republic, started fishing in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard. Zaan-
dam did not comply with orders to stop fishing, claiming her right to fish by 
referring to the Svalbard treaty. What should the Norwegian reaction be? Arrest 
the trawler and tow it to the mainland for prosecution? Cut the trawl or by 
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other means force the trawler to comply with orders to stop fishing and leave 
the Zone? A political decision was issued through the coast guard’s operational 
chain of command. Zaandam did not comply with orders and so Coast Guard 
Vessel Senja fired a warning shot. This was the first shot ever fired in the Fishery 
Protection Zone around Svalbard.
Confrontation between nations and fishery organizations is nothing new. 
On the contrary, the application of various means of force and diplomatic crisis 
management has often proved necessary. Iceland experienced success cutting 
trawler wires during the 1970s. The same success was achieved by Norway in 
the Fishery Pprotection Zone around Svalbard in 1994, when some 25 trawlers 
refused to comply with orders. The 1994 case of a trawler registered in Belize is 
a good example of dramatic Norwegian fishery enforcement. The trawler tried 
to use its door to ram the coast guard. Later the crew on the trawler fired a shot-
gun towards coast guard personnel in a light boat. The trawler did not comply 
even after warning shots had been fired. The situation was not brought under 
control until a cold grenade was fired into the hull of the trawler. 
UNCONTROLLED FIShING AND SUSTAINAbILITy
Today, several coastal states are faced with close to ruined fisheries and a tragic 
situation for the coastal people dependant on the fish. They are the victims of a 
possibly lost battle against uncontrolled fishing. These places had rich fisheries 
until their collapse, mostly in the 1990s. Around the globe we can find many 
examples of overfishing and lost battles against resource crime. I would there-
fore emphasize the importance of strict and firm fishery enforcement. It is in our 
common interest to decrease illegal fishing to preserve fish stocks for the future. 
The consequences of not succeeding will be dramatic. 
Fish is a strategic resource. Some of the most valuable stocks in the world 
are found in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. Scientific research and 
sound management have ensured that these stocks are still sustainable. The most 
serious threat to the fisheries of the North Atlantic today is illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). IUU fishing is not only related to con-
venience flag vessels – a trawler from any nation could be involved. IUU fishing 
could lead to stocks being severely depleted. Estimates indicate that 100,000 
tons of cod are caught illegally in the Barents Sea alone each year. This repre-
sents one fourth of the total allowable cod catch. Quotas for legal fishing have 
thus, to some extent, been reduced as a result of illegal fishing. 
ORGANIzATION
Several Norwegian ministries are actively engaged in meeting these challenges. 
Primarily it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Min-
istry of Fishery and Coastal Affairs to negotiate with other nations and organi-
zations on rules and regulations. The control regime is very complex, ranging 
from agreeing on quotas via inspections at sea to inspections of the landing of 
catches.
The Norwegian Coast Guard is the prime authority for fishery inspections 
at sea, regulated by the Coast Guard Act of 1997. The Norwegian Coast Guard 
has, over recent years, carried out approximately 2,300 fishery inspections every 
year, on average resulting in more than 350 warnings, reports and arrests annu-
ally. The actual crime committed by the captain of a trawler and his company is 
a matter for the Norwegian police and prosecution authorities when the trawler 
has been brought in to a Norwegian port. Our coast guard has police authority 
in accordance with the Coast Guard Act of 1997 and has established coopera-
tion lines with the police and prosecution authorities to ensure that arrests, se-
curing evidence and any handover to the relevant authorities for prosecution is 
properly handled. 
The majority of nations have a coast guard responsible for monitoring 
fishing at sea. However, the coast guards are organized differently. Some na-
tions have a purely civilian coast guard, while others have tasked the regular 
navy with carrying out fishery controls. In Norway, the coast guard is a part of 
the military structure regulated by the Coast Guard Act. The Norwegian Coast 
Guard’s resources are primarily a fleet of vessels which, for the time being, is go-
ing through a considerable modernization programme. In addition, the organic 
helicopters are soon to be replaced by the very capable NH 90 helicopters. The 
maritime P3 Orion aircraft has also proved to be a very important asset support-
ing coast guard operations. The presence of the coast guard is, in itself, very im-
portant. Presence has a preventative effect discouraging illegal activity, including 
illegal fishing. The coast guard is also supported by the general military com-
mand, control and surveillance system. Today, the actual development and com-
petence of the Norwegian Coast Guard is the responsibility of the Commander 
of the Coast Guard and his staff in Oslo. He reports to the Chief of Staff, Royal 
Norwegian Navy. The actual tasking of coast guard vessels in the north is the 
responsibility of the Commander Coast Guard North from his base and head-
quarters in Sortland. The operational control of all operations conducted by the 
coast guard in the north is my responsibility and my crisis response headquar-
ters, Regional Headquarters North Norway, at Reitan outside Bodø. 
PRACTICES
Each coast guard commander operating his ship at sea has the responsibility and 
authority to exercise Norwegian authority in a vast number of areas. When it 
comes to controlling fisheries, primary authority is vested in the commander of 
the coast guard vessel. The actual way the coast guard crew do their job during 
fishery inspections is very important. Fishermen from all countries expect these 
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other means force the trawler to comply with orders to stop fishing and leave 
the Zone? A political decision was issued through the coast guard’s operational 
chain of command. Zaandam did not comply with orders and so Coast Guard 
Vessel Senja fired a warning shot. This was the first shot ever fired in the Fishery 
Protection Zone around Svalbard.
Confrontation between nations and fishery organizations is nothing new. 
On the contrary, the application of various means of force and diplomatic crisis 
management has often proved necessary. Iceland experienced success cutting 
trawler wires during the 1970s. The same success was achieved by Norway in 
the Fishery Pprotection Zone around Svalbard in 1994, when some 25 trawlers 
refused to comply with orders. The 1994 case of a trawler registered in Belize is 
a good example of dramatic Norwegian fishery enforcement. The trawler tried 
to use its door to ram the coast guard. Later the crew on the trawler fired a shot-
gun towards coast guard personnel in a light boat. The trawler did not comply 
even after warning shots had been fired. The situation was not brought under 
control until a cold grenade was fired into the hull of the trawler. 
UNCONTROLLED FIShING AND SUSTAINAbILITy
Today, several coastal states are faced with close to ruined fisheries and a tragic 
situation for the coastal people dependant on the fish. They are the victims of a 
possibly lost battle against uncontrolled fishing. These places had rich fisheries 
until their collapse, mostly in the 1990s. Around the globe we can find many 
examples of overfishing and lost battles against resource crime. I would there-
fore emphasize the importance of strict and firm fishery enforcement. It is in our 
common interest to decrease illegal fishing to preserve fish stocks for the future. 
The consequences of not succeeding will be dramatic. 
Fish is a strategic resource. Some of the most valuable stocks in the world 
are found in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. Scientific research and 
sound management have ensured that these stocks are still sustainable. The most 
serious threat to the fisheries of the North Atlantic today is illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). IUU fishing is not only related to con-
venience flag vessels – a trawler from any nation could be involved. IUU fishing 
could lead to stocks being severely depleted. Estimates indicate that 100,000 
tons of cod are caught illegally in the Barents Sea alone each year. This repre-
sents one fourth of the total allowable cod catch. Quotas for legal fishing have 
thus, to some extent, been reduced as a result of illegal fishing. 
ORGANIzATION
Several Norwegian ministries are actively engaged in meeting these challenges. 
Primarily it is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Min-
istry of Fishery and Coastal Affairs to negotiate with other nations and organi-
zations on rules and regulations. The control regime is very complex, ranging 
from agreeing on quotas via inspections at sea to inspections of the landing of 
catches.
The Norwegian Coast Guard is the prime authority for fishery inspections 
at sea, regulated by the Coast Guard Act of 1997. The Norwegian Coast Guard 
has, over recent years, carried out approximately 2,300 fishery inspections every 
year, on average resulting in more than 350 warnings, reports and arrests annu-
ally. The actual crime committed by the captain of a trawler and his company is 
a matter for the Norwegian police and prosecution authorities when the trawler 
has been brought in to a Norwegian port. Our coast guard has police authority 
in accordance with the Coast Guard Act of 1997 and has established coopera-
tion lines with the police and prosecution authorities to ensure that arrests, se-
curing evidence and any handover to the relevant authorities for prosecution is 
properly handled. 
The majority of nations have a coast guard responsible for monitoring 
fishing at sea. However, the coast guards are organized differently. Some na-
tions have a purely civilian coast guard, while others have tasked the regular 
navy with carrying out fishery controls. In Norway, the coast guard is a part of 
the military structure regulated by the Coast Guard Act. The Norwegian Coast 
Guard’s resources are primarily a fleet of vessels which, for the time being, is go-
ing through a considerable modernization programme. In addition, the organic 
helicopters are soon to be replaced by the very capable NH 90 helicopters. The 
maritime P3 Orion aircraft has also proved to be a very important asset support-
ing coast guard operations. The presence of the coast guard is, in itself, very im-
portant. Presence has a preventative effect discouraging illegal activity, including 
illegal fishing. The coast guard is also supported by the general military com-
mand, control and surveillance system. Today, the actual development and com-
petence of the Norwegian Coast Guard is the responsibility of the Commander 
of the Coast Guard and his staff in Oslo. He reports to the Chief of Staff, Royal 
Norwegian Navy. The actual tasking of coast guard vessels in the north is the 
responsibility of the Commander Coast Guard North from his base and head-
quarters in Sortland. The operational control of all operations conducted by the 
coast guard in the north is my responsibility and my crisis response headquar-
ters, Regional Headquarters North Norway, at Reitan outside Bodø. 
PRACTICES
Each coast guard commander operating his ship at sea has the responsibility and 
authority to exercise Norwegian authority in a vast number of areas. When it 
comes to controlling fisheries, primary authority is vested in the commander of 
the coast guard vessel. The actual way the coast guard crew do their job during 
fishery inspections is very important. Fishermen from all countries expect these 
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inspections to be carried out fairly. The coast guard captain has a responsibility 
to tackle various challenges, including threats from an unwilling trawler crew. 
His greatest responsibility is the application of necessary and proportionate 
force. He will, as required, consult the relevant prosecution authorities as well 
as receive appropriate authorization for the application of force via the coast 
guard operational chain of command.
According to the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, vessels flying a flag 
of convenience involved in IUU fishing have more or less disappeared from the 
Barents Sea. I understand this is mainly due to the efforts of the Norwegian 
fishery administration and organizations, good cooperation between several na-
tions, efforts by international organizations like the North East Atlantic Fisher-
ies Commission (NEAFC) as well as an effect of the operations that the Norwe-
gian Coast Guard has carried out in the Barents Sea.
ChALLENGES
There are still a lot of challenges in fighting IUU activity. Many shipowners con-
duct calculated and organized crime, specializing in illegal fishing. Why? Because 
there is a lot of money involved. How can IUU activity still be possible? This is 
of course a complex question, but I will focus on two main factors: cooperation 
and legal authority. Cooperation has two dimensions – national and interna-
tional. In many countries, including Norway, there are various ministries and 
authorities with overlapping interests and responsibilities. I believe that progress 
can be made if the different national authorities cooperate better. Internationally 
it is necessary for the different nations to cooperate even better. Cooperation has 
improved during the last few years, but it can be yet more efficient.
A good example of this is the operation that the Norwegian Coast Guard 
carried out against the vessel Castor last year. Castor was illegally flying the 
Russian flag in the Russian EEZ and was taking onboard the catch from an-
other Russian trawler. The Russian Coast Guard requested assistance from the 
Norwegian Coast Guard as Castor was in transit westwards through the Nor-
wegian EEZ. Castor was caught and handed over to the Russian Coast Guard. 
This cooperation is a result of good relations on both sides of the border. It is 
also important that the different nations improve the sharing of information on 
fishery-related issues, such as tracking information.
Regarding legal authority, it is important that we fully use the already exist-
ing regulations and that we are able to work together to create new regulations 
and agreements and improve the existing ones. The North East Atlantic Fish-
eries Commission is an important organization, but it still has its weaknesses. 
NEAFC does not regulate all species of fish. Cod is for instance not included, 
despite being the most important species found in the Barents Sea. 
Today’s regulations in many ways protect shipowners. It is almost impos-
sible to gain access to documents that will unveil who is behind the shipping 
companies. They can move on and form new companies. This makes it easier 
for the criminals to hide behind regulations, documents and bureaucracy. We 
have a challenge here. It will be easier to decrease illegal fishing if we are able to 
identify the people behind the companies. 
It is not only the coastal nations that are affected by these problems. If 
fish stocks disappear, this will have a global impact. Therefore, we must aim to 
get even more focus directed on these issues to make people more aware of the 
problem and to act accordingly. 
It is necessary to develop and use the existing rules and regulations. For 
instance, last year we had a case with the trawler Joana. She was fishing in in-
ternational waters inside the “Loop Hole” and not flying any national flag. She 
was boarded, inspected, arrested and handed over to the prosecution authorities 
in East Finnmark. This is the first time a boarding to determine the nationality 
of a vessel followed by an arrest has ever been conducted in international waters 
by Norway. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was the legal 
basis for the boarding. Once it had been determined that the vessel was stateless, 
it fell under Norwegian domestic law, and was prosecuted as a Norwegian. 
I believe that all flag states have to accept that coastal states will take ac-
tion against illegal fishing. On the other hand, coastal states should be more on 
the offence in taking action against illegal activity. We cannot allow ourselves 
to be drawn into a situation in which a coastal state declines to take action 
for fear of the flag state’s reaction. Improved cooperation and better and more 
efficient communication between governmental officials can prevent this. Flag 
states must also improve their efforts when it comes to reacting against its ships 
when, for example, the coastal state provides evidence of a fisheries crime. 
Norway will continue to develop the legal basis for coping with illegal 
fishing activity, both in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction and international 
waters. This is to take advantage of the legal authority granted by the Law of 
the Sea Convention. Moreover, I also believe that Norway will have to turn to 
the Law of the Sea Convention to meet the serious threats to the environment 
the world is facing, both generally and specifically in the North. 
CONCLUSIONS
Having offered these perspectives as I see them, my conclusions are as follows: 
IUU fishing is a strategic challenge; it is much more than “chasing a criminal 
down the road”. It is vital that we give our coast guard optimal working condi-
tions and it is vital that all the various ministries, authorities and organizations, 
both national and international, manage to think and work cross-sectorally. To 
prevent fishery conflicts escalating, it is vital that the coast guard appears strict, 
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inspections to be carried out fairly. The coast guard captain has a responsibility 
to tackle various challenges, including threats from an unwilling trawler crew. 
His greatest responsibility is the application of necessary and proportionate 
force. He will, as required, consult the relevant prosecution authorities as well 
as receive appropriate authorization for the application of force via the coast 
guard operational chain of command.
According to the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, vessels flying a flag 
of convenience involved in IUU fishing have more or less disappeared from the 
Barents Sea. I understand this is mainly due to the efforts of the Norwegian 
fishery administration and organizations, good cooperation between several na-
tions, efforts by international organizations like the North East Atlantic Fisher-
ies Commission (NEAFC) as well as an effect of the operations that the Norwe-
gian Coast Guard has carried out in the Barents Sea.
ChALLENGES
There are still a lot of challenges in fighting IUU activity. Many shipowners con-
duct calculated and organized crime, specializing in illegal fishing. Why? Because 
there is a lot of money involved. How can IUU activity still be possible? This is 
of course a complex question, but I will focus on two main factors: cooperation 
and legal authority. Cooperation has two dimensions – national and interna-
tional. In many countries, including Norway, there are various ministries and 
authorities with overlapping interests and responsibilities. I believe that progress 
can be made if the different national authorities cooperate better. Internationally 
it is necessary for the different nations to cooperate even better. Cooperation has 
improved during the last few years, but it can be yet more efficient.
A good example of this is the operation that the Norwegian Coast Guard 
carried out against the vessel Castor last year. Castor was illegally flying the 
Russian flag in the Russian EEZ and was taking onboard the catch from an-
other Russian trawler. The Russian Coast Guard requested assistance from the 
Norwegian Coast Guard as Castor was in transit westwards through the Nor-
wegian EEZ. Castor was caught and handed over to the Russian Coast Guard. 
This cooperation is a result of good relations on both sides of the border. It is 
also important that the different nations improve the sharing of information on 
fishery-related issues, such as tracking information.
Regarding legal authority, it is important that we fully use the already exist-
ing regulations and that we are able to work together to create new regulations 
and agreements and improve the existing ones. The North East Atlantic Fish-
eries Commission is an important organization, but it still has its weaknesses. 
NEAFC does not regulate all species of fish. Cod is for instance not included, 
despite being the most important species found in the Barents Sea. 
Today’s regulations in many ways protect shipowners. It is almost impos-
sible to gain access to documents that will unveil who is behind the shipping 
companies. They can move on and form new companies. This makes it easier 
for the criminals to hide behind regulations, documents and bureaucracy. We 
have a challenge here. It will be easier to decrease illegal fishing if we are able to 
identify the people behind the companies. 
It is not only the coastal nations that are affected by these problems. If 
fish stocks disappear, this will have a global impact. Therefore, we must aim to 
get even more focus directed on these issues to make people more aware of the 
problem and to act accordingly. 
It is necessary to develop and use the existing rules and regulations. For 
instance, last year we had a case with the trawler Joana. She was fishing in in-
ternational waters inside the “Loop Hole” and not flying any national flag. She 
was boarded, inspected, arrested and handed over to the prosecution authorities 
in East Finnmark. This is the first time a boarding to determine the nationality 
of a vessel followed by an arrest has ever been conducted in international waters 
by Norway. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was the legal 
basis for the boarding. Once it had been determined that the vessel was stateless, 
it fell under Norwegian domestic law, and was prosecuted as a Norwegian. 
I believe that all flag states have to accept that coastal states will take ac-
tion against illegal fishing. On the other hand, coastal states should be more on 
the offence in taking action against illegal activity. We cannot allow ourselves 
to be drawn into a situation in which a coastal state declines to take action 
for fear of the flag state’s reaction. Improved cooperation and better and more 
efficient communication between governmental officials can prevent this. Flag 
states must also improve their efforts when it comes to reacting against its ships 
when, for example, the coastal state provides evidence of a fisheries crime. 
Norway will continue to develop the legal basis for coping with illegal 
fishing activity, both in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction and international 
waters. This is to take advantage of the legal authority granted by the Law of 
the Sea Convention. Moreover, I also believe that Norway will have to turn to 
the Law of the Sea Convention to meet the serious threats to the environment 
the world is facing, both generally and specifically in the North. 
CONCLUSIONS
Having offered these perspectives as I see them, my conclusions are as follows: 
IUU fishing is a strategic challenge; it is much more than “chasing a criminal 
down the road”. It is vital that we give our coast guard optimal working condi-
tions and it is vital that all the various ministries, authorities and organizations, 
both national and international, manage to think and work cross-sectorally. To 
prevent fishery conflicts escalating, it is vital that the coast guard appears strict, 
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firm and just. The coastal and flag states must stand firm in terms of the rights 
and obligations that they have and avoid escalation. However, fundamentally 
and ideally, good results in the Barents Sea should be achieved through coopera-
tion and mutual respect between nations complying with international agree-
ments and law.
The Norwegian military is present in the north to maintain sovereignty, 
protect interests and the rights and responsibilities of Norway as a coastal state. 
The vast areas of the north are watched over every day to maintain situational 
awareness. The foremost aim of the military is to secure interests and prevent 
war. On a daily basis numerous peacetime tasks are conducted ranging from 
tracking oil tankers to developing much needed relations with Russia to safe-
guard the rich fisheries that remain a strategic resource.
 
energy security in the Arctic region
by Evgeniy Kozhokin, Director, Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies
INTRODUCTION
Energy security is a short-hand term that embraces the political and policy im-
plications associated with regional and global energy markets, as well as the 
more ordinary business aspects of the energy sector such as increasing energy 
supply, managing demand, fostering technological development, raising capital, 
managing risk, increasing return on investment, establishing environmental and 
fiscal regulatory frameworks, and responding to price volatility. Pursuing energy 
security has implications for a variety of policy areas, including economic and 
environmental sustainability, the free flow of investment, robust research, the 
development and deployment of technology, energy efficiency and conservation, 
the physical security of energy infrastructure and transit corridors, and even 
poverty reduction through economic development.
Nowadays we do not treat the problem of energy security as one purely of 
resources. The other key dimensions – technological, social, and even humani-
tarian – have also appeared on the agenda.
Energy security is not just about securing supply. In this context a model 
of sharing risks is becoming an efficient tool for future development. One of the 
implementation options for such a model could be cross stock-holding in the 
upstream companies of supply countries, and in the midstream and downstream 
companies of customers.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), current reserves levels 
and related investment financing are considered sufficient to meet oil and natu-
ral gas needs until 2030. The IEA is openly concerned, however, that projected 
future energy trends may not be sustainable in terms of both energy resources 
and environmental impacts.
A GROWING ROLE OF POLITICS
There are claims that the role of politics is growing in energy-related issues. I 
doubt this is the case. The mass media continues to debate the interruptions 
of gas supplies to the Ukraine and Belarus. But everyone may remember the 
fact that on 21 May 2004, the EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and the 
Russian minister of economic development and trade, German Gref, signed the 
agreement concluding the bilateral market access negotiations for the accession 
of the Russian Federation to the WTO. The agreement, which was never made 
public, has solved a range of issues related to energy trade, in particular the one 
concerning the domestic price for industrial gas users. The agreement contains 
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firm and just. The coastal and flag states must stand firm in terms of the rights 
and obligations that they have and avoid escalation. However, fundamentally 
and ideally, good results in the Barents Sea should be achieved through coopera-
tion and mutual respect between nations complying with international agree-
ments and law.
The Norwegian military is present in the north to maintain sovereignty, 
protect interests and the rights and responsibilities of Norway as a coastal state. 
The vast areas of the north are watched over every day to maintain situational 
awareness. The foremost aim of the military is to secure interests and prevent 
war. On a daily basis numerous peacetime tasks are conducted ranging from 
tracking oil tankers to developing much needed relations with Russia to safe-
guard the rich fisheries that remain a strategic resource.
 
energy security in the Arctic region
by Evgeniy Kozhokin, Director, Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies
INTRODUCTION
Energy security is a short-hand term that embraces the political and policy im-
plications associated with regional and global energy markets, as well as the 
more ordinary business aspects of the energy sector such as increasing energy 
supply, managing demand, fostering technological development, raising capital, 
managing risk, increasing return on investment, establishing environmental and 
fiscal regulatory frameworks, and responding to price volatility. Pursuing energy 
security has implications for a variety of policy areas, including economic and 
environmental sustainability, the free flow of investment, robust research, the 
development and deployment of technology, energy efficiency and conservation, 
the physical security of energy infrastructure and transit corridors, and even 
poverty reduction through economic development.
Nowadays we do not treat the problem of energy security as one purely of 
resources. The other key dimensions – technological, social, and even humani-
tarian – have also appeared on the agenda.
Energy security is not just about securing supply. In this context a model 
of sharing risks is becoming an efficient tool for future development. One of the 
implementation options for such a model could be cross stock-holding in the 
upstream companies of supply countries, and in the midstream and downstream 
companies of customers.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), current reserves levels 
and related investment financing are considered sufficient to meet oil and natu-
ral gas needs until 2030. The IEA is openly concerned, however, that projected 
future energy trends may not be sustainable in terms of both energy resources 
and environmental impacts.
A GROWING ROLE OF POLITICS
There are claims that the role of politics is growing in energy-related issues. I 
doubt this is the case. The mass media continues to debate the interruptions 
of gas supplies to the Ukraine and Belarus. But everyone may remember the 
fact that on 21 May 2004, the EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy and the 
Russian minister of economic development and trade, German Gref, signed the 
agreement concluding the bilateral market access negotiations for the accession 
of the Russian Federation to the WTO. The agreement, which was never made 
public, has solved a range of issues related to energy trade, in particular the one 
concerning the domestic price for industrial gas users. The agreement contains 
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a commitment that the price of gas for industrial users should cover the costs, 
profits and investments required for development of new fields. Russian gas 
prices for industrial users, fixed before, will be increased gradually from the 
current level (as of mid 2004) of $27–28 per mcm, to between $37–42 per mcm 
by 2006 and $49–57 per mcm by 2010. Increased domestic energy prices will 
encourage the more efficient use of energy resources in Russia and thus also sup-
port the Kyoto goals.
Gazprom and its subsidiaries sold about 307 bcm of gas to Russian cus-
tomers in 2005. In Russia, prices for gas produced and sold by Gazprom and 
its subsidiaries are set annually by the State Federal Tariffs Service (FTS). Gas 
tariffs are different for different price regions. There were seven price regions 
before 2005, and there are 13 of them since 1 January of 2006. Wholesale gas 
prices increased by an average of 23 per cent in 2005. Therefore the average 
sales price of Gasprom gas became 1014.1 RUR per mcm ($35.5/mcm) (exclud-
ing VAT). This price increase had been reflected in both federal and regional 
budgets. The increase in wholesale gas prices in 2006 was on average 11.9 per 
cent. The 2007 prices were introduced by FTS order no. 338 – э/1 of 5 Dec 2006. 
They increased 15 per cent compared to 2006 prices.
Here we can talk about the planned and systematic policy of gas price 
increase on the domestic market. An increased gas price on the domestic mar-
ket in Russia unavoidably entailed price increases for gas sold to partners in 
the CIS. This is well known in Kiev and Minsk. Nevertheless the leadership of 
Belarus and Ukraine tried to achieve the unachievable by continuing to believe 
that for Moscow political considerations would be stronger than economic fun-
damentals, and that Russia would dump its gas. In this case Russia had selected 
economic pragmatism instead of a political clientele approach. It is thus strange 
that the West seems to prefer the latter approach and severely criticized Russia 
for refusing to adopt a political clientele policy. This is particularly odd given 
that the EU so clearly insisted on an increase of gas prices in Russia.
ARCTIC RESOURCES
The issue of huge untapped reserves in the Arctic is on the top of the oil and gas 
development agenda. Significant technical and exploration efforts, supported 
by sufficient funding, are required to transfer potential reserves to proven and 
probable categories. Despite the continuous media discussion about the Arctic 
shelf’s huge petroleum potential, we should not forget that most of the Arctic re-
mains unexplored, untested, and unevaluated. Enormous hurdles must be over-
come to produce oil and gas in the Arctic. It is important, for instance, that safe 
and efficient subsea technology, which can be implemented underneath pack ice, 
be further developed to operate safely.
A reasonable, overall approach and technically feasible programmes still 
need to be developed for the exploration of the East Arctic continental shelf, 
especially in the Chukchi and East-Siberian seas. These are among the least ex-
plored parts of the Russian continental shelf, and of the world as such. Geologi-
cal models of this part of the Russian Arctic are still not well developed and can-
not produce precise evaluations of reserves. Moreover, the climatic conditions 
on the East Arctic shelf are extremely difficult for exploration. For example, the 
ice-free period is very short.
New oil and gas production centers will be built on the basis of future ex-
plorative drilling. A licensing programme in this part of the Arctic shelf is now 
being implemented. Geological licenses are of particular importance to start the 
search for, and prove the existence of, petroleum deposits on a scale that makes 
it economical to develop them further.
The main characteristics of the allocation of hydrocarbons on the Russian 
Arctic shelf can be described based on available research: gas prevails in the 
resources of the Barents Sea itself (not including the Pechora Sea); oil fields can 
be found on the peripheries of the Eastern Barents, which includes the largest, 
eastern part of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea, and perhaps the South 
Kara zones. This last conclusion is based on a theoretical model and has yet to 
be proved by exploratative drilling.
The remainder of Russia’s extensive part of the Arctic shelf, including the 
northern regions of the Kara Sea, has not been covered by extensive geological 
or geophysical research. This sector requires more research, including the drill-
ing of deep wells, to update the existing model of its geological structure and 
re-estimate the oil and gas potential of this huge region.
It is worth noting that even the area of the Barents Sea has white spots. 
According to the former Norwegian minister of petroleum and energy, Mr Odd 
Roger Enoksen, the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea is the least developed 
part of the Norwegian continental shelf.9 By the spring of 2006 only 63 wells 
had been drilled. The first commercial fields are the gas field Snow White and 
the oil field Goliath. 
In general, we need to be very cautious when listening to the assessments 
of Arctic resources used by the media and politicians. Currently these have not 
yet been confirmed by full-scale geological exploration efforts. 
VULNERAbILITy
One of the major concerns linked to the development of the petroleum sector in 
the Arctic is the extreme vulnerability of the Arctic’s unique ecological systems. 
There are fears that severe local environmental impacts will inevitably result 
9 Oil of Russia, no. 4 (2006): 109.
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eastern part of the Russian sector of the Barents Sea, and perhaps the South 
Kara zones. This last conclusion is based on a theoretical model and has yet to 
be proved by exploratative drilling.
The remainder of Russia’s extensive part of the Arctic shelf, including the 
northern regions of the Kara Sea, has not been covered by extensive geological 
or geophysical research. This sector requires more research, including the drill-
ing of deep wells, to update the existing model of its geological structure and 
re-estimate the oil and gas potential of this huge region.
It is worth noting that even the area of the Barents Sea has white spots. 
According to the former Norwegian minister of petroleum and energy, Mr Odd 
Roger Enoksen, the Norwegian sector of the Barents Sea is the least developed 
part of the Norwegian continental shelf.9 By the spring of 2006 only 63 wells 
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9 Oil of Russia, no. 4 (2006): 109.
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from a massive expansion of the oil and gas industry. To date, the world does 
not have absolutely safe technologies for gas and oil extraction. 
Norway has one of the world’s best safety records with no big accidents in 
two decades. However, a 1977 blowout spewed out 12,700 cubic yards of oil at 
the Ekofisk field. In 1980, 123 people died when a floating hotel for oil workers 
capsized. Norway uses the safest technology for developing oil and gas industry 
under the extreme conditions of the North. It seems to be efficient for Russia to 
use this experience to decrease the risk of accidents during the development of 
oil and gas deposits in the Arctic.
The US Arctic oil experience has worse statistics. Less than a year after a 
corroded pipeline ruptured causing the largest oil spill in Alaskan history, BP has 
continued to implement severe cost-cutting measures at its North Slope facili-
ties, making it vulnerable to another environmental disaster.10 In March 2006, 
the worst spill in the history of oil development in Alaska’s North Slope forced 
the closure of five oil-processing centers in the region. Alaskan state officials said 
that as much as 260,000 gallons (6,100 barrels) of crude oil had leaked from a 
pipeline in an oil field jointly owned by Exxon Mobil, BP, and Conoco-Philips. 
The spill blanketed two acres of frozen tundra near Prudhoe Bay – just a short 
distance from where President Bush has proposed opening up the Arctic Wildlife 
Refuge to drilling. The oil spill in March 2006 went undetected for about five 
days before a BP oilfield worker noticed the scent of oil while driving through 
the area, which led him to believe there was a spill from one of the facilities. BP 
officials blamed the spill on a corroded transit pipeline.
In this context Frederic Hauge, the president of the Oslo-based environ-
mental organization Bellona, said that “keeping oil and gas out of the Arctic 
is the single most important thing we can do”. This seems reasonable until the 
world has developed oil and gas production technologies that are friendly to the 
fragile Arctic environment.
Now more European banks are signing up to the Equator principles, a set 
of environmental and social standards for project finance developed by some 
large US and European banks. This provides a kind of promise that big oil and 
gas projects will be implemented under strict environmental standards.
RUSSIAN POLICy AND REGULATIONS
The Russian regulatory framework covering the preservation and exploitation 
of the Russian Arctic resources is being developed. It now includes the Law on 
Subsoil, the Law on the Continental Shelf, the Law on the Exclusive Economic 
Zone of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, the Strategy on Research and 
Development of the Oil and Gas Potential of the Continental Shelf of the Rus-
10 Jason Leopold, 25 February 2007, URL: http://scoop.co.nz/stories/HLO702/S00226.
sian Federation until 2020 had been adopted. Under discussion are the Concept 
of Sustainable Development of the Russian Federation’s Arctic Zone, the State 
Strategy of the Development of the North, and the draft of the law On the Arc-
tic Zone of the Russian Federation.
Today’s Arctic is one of the ecologically cleanest areas of the world. Con-
sequently, as we consider the security of energy supplies and the rising costs of 
energy resources development, we should all be concerned about the delicate 
environment of this region. 
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ThE ExTENDED CONCEPT OF ENERGy SECURITy
by Geir Westgaard, Special Adviser, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
In the traditional sense, energy security is about making supplies available, reli-
able and affordable – and I shall say something about both the availability and 
the reliability of Norwegian energy supplies. However, much like there is an 
extended concept of security encompassing both “hard”/military and “soft”/
civilian aspects, there is also an extended concept of energy security. 
In the globalized world of the twenty-first century, therefore, “old” ques-
tions about the availability and reliability of petroleum are interlinked with 
“new” questions about the acceptability of petroleum due to the costs incurred 
in both the production and the consumption of oil and natural gas. This affects 
both security of supply and security of demand. As a consequence, calculations 
of energy security encompass not only geopolitical factors such as the cohesion 
of OPEC, the stability of the Middle East and the policies of major players 
such as Russia, the United States, the European Union, China, India, France 
and Germany; they also include broader environmental issues, not least climate 
change and global warming. 
But first a note on oil price, whose explanatory power is sometimes over-
looked. Take developments in Russia, for example. A low oil price contributed 
greatly to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Low oil price also helps 
explain why Russia hit rock bottom and defaulted on its debt in August 1998. 
Conversely, a high oil price accounts for much of Russia’s economic turnaround 
and political comeback over the last seven years.
The reason we are discussing energy security, I believe, is that the high oil 
price has caused a power shift in international politics. Over the last few years, 
power has shifted from petroleum importing to petroleum exporting countries. 
Energy diplomacy aimed at locking in supplies from as many diverse sources as 
possible has once again become a prominent feature of the foreign-policy scene. 
For Norway – the world’s third largest exporter of oil and natural gas – this 
renewed attention to energy is not entirely unwelcome.
ThE AVAILAbILITy OF SUPPLy
As to the availability of supply, my key messages are as follows: 
First, fossil fuels will remain dominant in the energy mix for the foreseeable 
future. The International Energy Agency estimates that oil, natural gas and coal 
will account for 81 per cent of overall energy demand in 2030, compared to 80 
per cent in 2004. According to the conventional wisdom, moreover, the world 
is not about to run out of petroleum anytime soon. There is plenty more oil and 
gas around, although it is becoming increasingly difficult to access and exploit 
the remaining resources.
Against this background, it becomes rather illusory to talk about quick 
fixes to kick the fossil fuel habit or shake the petroleum addiction. The world 
neither can nor should go “cold turkey” on fossil fuels. Turning off the fossil 
fuel tap or leaving recoverable resources in the ground is not an option for an 
energy hungry world, at least not in the short to medium term. If anything, the 
search for additional petroleum reserves appears to be intensifying.
Second, the importance of Arctic waters in terms of petroleum production 
is likely to increase. There is considerable optimism about the resource potential 
of this area, despite the fact that it is relatively unexplored. Some of the opti-
mism is based on estimates, admittedly uncertain, by the US Geological Survey 
that the Arctic may hold up to a quarter of the world’s remaining hydrocarbons. 
However, the optimism is also based on actual discoveries and development 
projects in the Barents, Pechora and Kara seas, such as the Snow White and 
Shtokman gas fields and the Prirazlomnoye oil field. It is the combined resource 
potential of Norway and Russia, and the prospects for international coopera-
tion in bringing these resources to world markets, that create excitement about 
the Barents Sea as an emerging petroleum province.
From a Norwegian perspective, the development of petroleum resources in 
the Barents Sea also has the potential to transform our relationship with Russia 
into the kind of strategic energy partnership that President Putin has called for.
Third, Norway will continue to play a significant role in global energy 
markets. While the North Sea today is considered a mature petroleum province 
and oil production may have peaked, the resource potential of other parts of the 
Norwegian continental shelf is still significant. It is estimated that the remain-
ing hydrocarbon resources almost equal what has been produced in Norway 
over the last 35 years. According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, these 
resources are split fairly evenly between the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and 
the Barents Sea. 
Norway today has an oil production of nearly three million barrels per day 
and an annual gas production of 85 billion cubic meters. Early in the next dec-
ade, our gas exports will have risen by 50 per cent to 130 billion cubic meters. 
This means that exports from Norway will soon account for nearly a third of 
natural gas consumption in France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
For over 30 years, oil from the Norwegian continental shelf has found its 
way to US markets. As shipments of LNG from the Snow White field in the Bar-
ents Sea to the Cove Point terminal in Maryland have now commenced, there is 
also a natural gas link between our two countries. This reflects how a combina-
tion of technological breakthroughs and high prices is making natural gas more 
of a global commodity.
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ThE RELIAbILITy OF SUPPLy
Serious supply disruptions are most likely to be caused by accidents, natural 
disasters or spillover from social turmoil and political volatility in petroleum 
producing countries. According to some estimates, more than 50 per cent of 
global oil demand will in 2020 be met by countries that face a high risk of do-
mestic instability. It is not difficult to understand the uncertainty and discomfort 
that this causes in many world capitals, from Washington to Brussels, Beijing to 
New Delhi.
Managing this uncertainty is a question of increasing security of supply 
through diversification, slowing the growth in demand through the promotion 
of conservation, fuel substitution and energy efficiency, and relying on strategic 
oil inventory holdings to provide a cushion against possible disruptions in im-
ports or unexpected surges in demand.
In their attempts to diversify supply and mitigate energy security risks, 
countries of the European Union are looking to Norway because there is both 
a natural complementarity and strong convergence between us in the field of 
energy. This sets Norway apart from other suppliers of energy to Europe. 
By virtue of being fully integrated into the internal energy market through 
the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, Norway is an “indigenous” 
producer directly linked to the European gas and electricity grids. We have im-
plemented all the EU acquis regulating this market and contribute actively to the 
development of new policies and legislation.
To help stabilize global energy markets, Norway participates actively in the 
producer/consumer dialogues under the auspices of both the International Ener-
gy Agency (IEA) and the International Energy Forum (IEF). We would maintain 
some of the key stabilizing elements to be:
increased transparency and predictability in energy markets;
predictable and non-discriminatory investment regimes;
facilitation of secure and affordable access to energy transport networks.
As we see it, the relationship between producer and consumer is often one of in-
terdependence. Energy security is a two-way street. While the consumer is look-
ing for security of supplies, the producer is seeking security of deliveries. The 
interests of both parties must be taken into account for a stable energy relation-
ship to emerge. This means, for example, that long-term contracts will continue 
to play an important role in facilitating large upstream investments. Together 
with short-term, spot and swap contracts to interlock producer and consumer 
markets, they constitute the backbone of international gas supply security. 
The reality of interdependence generally tends to work against producer 
countries deliberately using energy to exert political pressure on one of their 
customers. Norway has always resisted the temptation to turn energy into more 
•
•
•
of a political or strategic commodity than it already is. We believe that this has 
served our interests well, solidifying our reputation in global energy markets as 
a predictable and reliable supplier of both oil and gas.
ThE ACCEPTAbILITy OF PETROLEUm
Turning to the acceptability of petroleum and, in particular, the environmen-
tal costs incurred in the production and consumption of oil and natural gas, I 
would like to remind you that the Norwegian petroleum industry was born at 
the time of the first UN conference on the environment in Stockholm 35 years 
ago and has been well schooled in sustainable development. 
Norway introduced a CO2 tax on petroleum production back in the early 
1990s, and today the Norwegian continental shelf is the most energy-efficient 
petroleum producing region in the world, with CO2 emissions that amount to 
less than a third of the global average per unit produced. 
One of the challenges we face as petroleum exploration and production ex-
pand in Arctic waters is how to maintain the Barents Sea as one of the cleanest, 
richest and most productive marine areas in the world and a pantry of fish for 
most of Europe. Norway subscribes to the highest possible standards of health, 
safety, and the environment (HSE), and has adopted an Integrated Management 
Plan for the area. The plan takes a measured, step-by-step approach to the de-
velopment of petroleum resources in the High North. The plan seeks to preserve 
the ecosystems of northern waters within a framework that allows for coexist-
ence with other economic activities such as fisheries and maritime transport. 
The plan provides for ecosystem-based management and both presupposes and 
requires extensive knowledge about the marine environment of the Barents Sea. 
It is therefore being followed up by large-scale scientific research programs.
There is no denying, however, that while Norway’s production of oil and 
natural gas is relatively clean, it does still contribute to the global climate crisis. 
With the emergence of climate change as an urgent global political priority, the 
Norwegian government has signalled that it will lead the charge to mitigate 
the negative effects of oil and gas production. We have set a double ambition: 
to strengthen Norway’s role as a provider of both energy security and climate 
security. 
On the one hand, we are striving to produce more of the fossil fuels that 
the world will need in the decades to come. On the other hand, we are seeking 
to be among the most advanced and committed nations when it comes to mini-
mizing the greenhouse gas emissions from the production and consumption of 
fossil fuels. Speaking in Oslo in February 2007, EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson said that Norway’s approach to energy and climate “sounds like a 
paradox, but is in fact profound insight.” 
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producing countries. According to some estimates, more than 50 per cent of 
global oil demand will in 2020 be met by countries that face a high risk of do-
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ports or unexpected surges in demand.
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By virtue of being fully integrated into the internal energy market through 
the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, Norway is an “indigenous” 
producer directly linked to the European gas and electricity grids. We have im-
plemented all the EU acquis regulating this market and contribute actively to the 
development of new policies and legislation.
To help stabilize global energy markets, Norway participates actively in the 
producer/consumer dialogues under the auspices of both the International Ener-
gy Agency (IEA) and the International Energy Forum (IEF). We would maintain 
some of the key stabilizing elements to be:
increased transparency and predictability in energy markets;
predictable and non-discriminatory investment regimes;
facilitation of secure and affordable access to energy transport networks.
As we see it, the relationship between producer and consumer is often one of in-
terdependence. Energy security is a two-way street. While the consumer is look-
ing for security of supplies, the producer is seeking security of deliveries. The 
interests of both parties must be taken into account for a stable energy relation-
ship to emerge. This means, for example, that long-term contracts will continue 
to play an important role in facilitating large upstream investments. Together 
with short-term, spot and swap contracts to interlock producer and consumer 
markets, they constitute the backbone of international gas supply security. 
The reality of interdependence generally tends to work against producer 
countries deliberately using energy to exert political pressure on one of their 
customers. Norway has always resisted the temptation to turn energy into more 
•
•
•
of a political or strategic commodity than it already is. We believe that this has 
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ThE ACCEPTAbILITy OF PETROLEUm
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would like to remind you that the Norwegian petroleum industry was born at 
the time of the first UN conference on the environment in Stockholm 35 years 
ago and has been well schooled in sustainable development. 
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1990s, and today the Norwegian continental shelf is the most energy-efficient 
petroleum producing region in the world, with CO2 emissions that amount to 
less than a third of the global average per unit produced. 
One of the challenges we face as petroleum exploration and production ex-
pand in Arctic waters is how to maintain the Barents Sea as one of the cleanest, 
richest and most productive marine areas in the world and a pantry of fish for 
most of Europe. Norway subscribes to the highest possible standards of health, 
safety, and the environment (HSE), and has adopted an Integrated Management 
Plan for the area. The plan takes a measured, step-by-step approach to the de-
velopment of petroleum resources in the High North. The plan seeks to preserve 
the ecosystems of northern waters within a framework that allows for coexist-
ence with other economic activities such as fisheries and maritime transport. 
The plan provides for ecosystem-based management and both presupposes and 
requires extensive knowledge about the marine environment of the Barents Sea. 
It is therefore being followed up by large-scale scientific research programs.
There is no denying, however, that while Norway’s production of oil and 
natural gas is relatively clean, it does still contribute to the global climate crisis. 
With the emergence of climate change as an urgent global political priority, the 
Norwegian government has signalled that it will lead the charge to mitigate 
the negative effects of oil and gas production. We have set a double ambition: 
to strengthen Norway’s role as a provider of both energy security and climate 
security. 
On the one hand, we are striving to produce more of the fossil fuels that 
the world will need in the decades to come. On the other hand, we are seeking 
to be among the most advanced and committed nations when it comes to mini-
mizing the greenhouse gas emissions from the production and consumption of 
fossil fuels. Speaking in Oslo in February 2007, EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson said that Norway’s approach to energy and climate “sounds like a 
paradox, but is in fact profound insight.” 
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Paradox or profound insight? It is certainly a dilemma. But Norway’s di-
lemma is also the world’s dilemma, and it must be dealt with as such. The rel-
evant questions are not whether measures should be taken, but rather what type, 
how much and when.
Moving beyond the Kyoto Protocol, we need a framework – internation-
ally agreed upon – within which developing nations can grow, wealthy countries 
can maintain their standard of living, and the environment can be protected 
from disaster. We must craft the next climate agreement so that it includes the 
developing world. To do so, however, we – the industrialized countries – must 
meet the twin challenges of cutting our own emissions while providing assist-
ance to developing countries so that they can grow without increasing their 
emissions. We must do so by limiting our own emissions and by developing 
new technologies that can serve that purpose on a global scale. Norway wants 
to play a leading role in the international effort to “bend the trends” that are 
changing the global climate.
Let me sum up the three targets we have set for ourselves:
First, we aim for a 30 per cent reduction of carbon emissions by 2020. Second, 
by 2012 – the end date of the Kyoto obligations – we have set the target of re-
ducing our emissions by an additional 10 per cent on top of our initial Kyoto 
Protocol commitments. Third, looking further ahead, our goal is to make Nor-
way carbon neutral by 2050.
A broad set of measures – political, economic and technological – will be 
needed to reach these goals. The Norwegian experience shows that environmen-
tal regulations and taxation can spur technological innovation and make busi-
ness more, not less, competitive in world markets. 
The Norwegian oil industry has demonstrated the ability to integrate new 
technology that ensures cleaner or more sustainable production and will have 
to continue on this path if we are to succeed at the Mongstad oil refinery in 
developing a full scale Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) project and make a 
contribution towards “decarbonizing” the global energy mix. 
When it comes to climate change, developments in the High North entail 
both a serious warning and a call to action. Climate change is happening twice 
as fast here than elsewhere on the globe, leaving no doubt that it is man-made, 
serious and accelerating, and can only be halted if we act swiftly. To use a meta-
phor from the fossil fuel business, the Arctic is the canary in the coalmine, and 
the world must heed its call as broadcast by both the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). 
The Arctic is getting warmer and wetter; snow, ice and permafrost are 
melting; the ocean level is rising and seawater is becoming less saline and more 
acidic; the ozone layer is thinning and ultraviolet (UV) radiation is increasing. 
This could have a series of consequences on people’s lives and livelihoods in this 
part of the world.
 
Climate change will alter the flora and fauna of the Arctic. This could make 
it more difficult to sustain traditional reindeer herding and the living condi-
tions of indigenous peoples.
Climate change will impact on the location, distribution and migration of 
fish stocks. This could have significant effects on commercial fisheries. Stocks 
may move from the coastal jurisdiction of one state to that of another. Other 
stocks may move outside the jurisdiction of any state, which could compli-
cate sound fisheries management and lead to uncontrolled harvesting.
Less sea-ice will also increase maritime transport in the Arctic and could 
open new areas for the development of petroleum and other natural re-
sources.
However, it is the global South that will be most adversely affected by climate 
change. Hundreds of millions of people could suffer water shortages, hunger 
and coastal flooding as the world warms up. The fact that the costs of global 
warming will fall heaviest on those who bear the least responsibility for the 
current state of affairs also makes climate change a central issue of justice and 
morality in world politics today. All of which goes to show that the extended 
concept of energy security – my point of departure here today – can, indeed, be 
quite extensive.
•
•
•
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ICELAND’S SECURITy POLICy AND GEOPOLITICS IN ThE 
NORTh 
by Dr. Valur Ingimundarson, Professor, University of Iceland
INTRODUCTION
After the abrupt and unexpected U.S. military withdrawal from Iceland in 2006, 
Iceland has been facing a new geopolitical reality. Though deeply offended by 
U.S. unilateralism, the Icelandic government decided against cutting its contrac-
tual ties with the United States. The U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement, which 
was concluded in 1951, is still in force, even though it was made to legalize 
and institutionalize a U.S. troop presence in Iceland. However, Iceland’s NATO 
membership, not the Defense Agreement, is now seen as the cornerstone of the 
country’s security policy. NATO has decided to offer Iceland a limited air po-
licing arrangement from 2008 until 2011, with countries such as France, the 
United States, Spain, Norway and Denmark offering to contribute to it. At the 
same time, Iceland has come to formal, though open-ended and non-commit-
tal, bilateral agreements with Norway and Denmark on security cooperation. 
These arrangements are meant to serve peacetime security needs, involving – in 
the Norwegian case – some temporary military presence and occasional military 
exercises, search and rescue operations, police training, and the exchange of 
information. They are mostly about “soft security”, political symbolism, and 
cooperation between the Nordic NATO members following the U.S. departure. 
Nonetheless, these steps – which also include formal security discussions with 
other countries such as Britain, Canada, and Germany – show that Iceland has 
been forced to rethink its security role independently of the United States. An 
informal Russian approach to enter into some sort of security dialogue with 
Iceland along the lines conducted with its Western allies – an approach that the 
Icelandic government – rather tellingly – chose not to answer – would have been 
unthinkable before the U.S. withdrawal.11  
The U.S. decision to terminate its military presence in Iceland was made 
before the media spectacle surrounding the “Scramble for the Arctic” had begun 
in earnest and before the debate about climate change had spilled over into the 
geopolitics of the High North. Indeed, hot topics such as climate change, ice-
melting, access to Arctic natural resources, claims under the Law of the Sea, and 
11 Interviews with unnamed Icelandic officials, 7 and 10 September 2007; see also 
Icelandic Radio Broadcasting Service, RÚV, 8 September 2007, URL: http://www.ruv.
is/heim/frettir/frett/store64/item169099/.
the prospect of new sea lines of communications in the North – with their poten-
tial military ramifications – played no role whatsoever in the bilateral negotia-
tions about the future of the Keflavik base in 2005–2006. One year after the last 
American soldiers left Iceland after a 55-year old presence, there is a renewed 
interest in the High North – futuristic in some respects, but with contemporary 
relevance in others – from some of the same players that made Iceland strategi-
cally important during the Cold War. 
The key issues, however, have currently as much to do with the ownership 
and management of natural resources and energy and maritime security as they 
do with military balance. Yet recycled Cold War discourses are hard to ignore 
in this context. The recent resumption of an old practice – Russian strategic 
military aviation – has not only evoked Icelandic Cold War memories of military 
posturing during the 1980s; it has also added a new twist to the longest running 
and serious dispute in U.S.-Icelandic relations in the post-Cold War period. A 
key U.S. rationale for rejecting the Icelandic demand for the retention of F-15 
fighter jets in Iceland was that they were a Cold War relic because the Russians 
were no longer engaged in long-range patrol flights. The Russian bombers have 
not violated Iceland’s airspace and, for this reason, the flights have not been 
viewed as a military threat. There is, however, uneasiness about them because 
the bombers have encircled Iceland very close to its airspace. To be sure, in line 
with standard Western Cold War practices, they have been monitored in the 
airspace patrolled by NATO. Instead of the Americans, the British, with Norwe-
gian assistance, have sent fighter jets from Britain to shadow them. They have, 
however, never come near Iceland before returning to their bases, because the 
Russian bombers have left the area. Whatever the Russian motive, the flights 
underscore the interplay between symbolic military posturing and the politics 
of natural resources. Iceland is certainly not on the verge of regaining its former 
role as a military prize any time soon. But with the huge growth in oil and gas 
transportation in Icelandic waters in the near future, it is bound to play an in-
creasingly important role in energy and maritime security in the North. 
ICELANDIC-NORWEGIAN SECURITy COOPERATION 
Of the Nordic countries, the Norwegians have traditionally shown most inter-
est in Icelandic security affairs. During the Cold War, they wanted a strong 
U.S. presence in Iceland as part of the defense of Norway in wartime and to 
avoid pressure for the peacetime establishment of American military bases in 
Norway. The Norwegian government has, of course, made the case that that 
the High North is regaining strategic importance, less because of state-centered 
military activity than because of energy shipments from Norway and Russia to 
the United States. Such transport would pass Iceland and possibly require coop-
eration within surveillance flights, radar stations, and air defenses. The immedi-
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 12/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
ICELAND’S SECURITy POLICy AND GEOPOLITICS IN ThE 
NORTh 
by Dr. Valur Ingimundarson, Professor, University of Iceland
INTRODUCTION
After the abrupt and unexpected U.S. military withdrawal from Iceland in 2006, 
Iceland has been facing a new geopolitical reality. Though deeply offended by 
U.S. unilateralism, the Icelandic government decided against cutting its contrac-
tual ties with the United States. The U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement, which 
was concluded in 1951, is still in force, even though it was made to legalize 
and institutionalize a U.S. troop presence in Iceland. However, Iceland’s NATO 
membership, not the Defense Agreement, is now seen as the cornerstone of the 
country’s security policy. NATO has decided to offer Iceland a limited air po-
licing arrangement from 2008 until 2011, with countries such as France, the 
United States, Spain, Norway and Denmark offering to contribute to it. At the 
same time, Iceland has come to formal, though open-ended and non-commit-
tal, bilateral agreements with Norway and Denmark on security cooperation. 
These arrangements are meant to serve peacetime security needs, involving – in 
the Norwegian case – some temporary military presence and occasional military 
exercises, search and rescue operations, police training, and the exchange of 
information. They are mostly about “soft security”, political symbolism, and 
cooperation between the Nordic NATO members following the U.S. departure. 
Nonetheless, these steps – which also include formal security discussions with 
other countries such as Britain, Canada, and Germany – show that Iceland has 
been forced to rethink its security role independently of the United States. An 
informal Russian approach to enter into some sort of security dialogue with 
Iceland along the lines conducted with its Western allies – an approach that the 
Icelandic government – rather tellingly – chose not to answer – would have been 
unthinkable before the U.S. withdrawal.11  
The U.S. decision to terminate its military presence in Iceland was made 
before the media spectacle surrounding the “Scramble for the Arctic” had begun 
in earnest and before the debate about climate change had spilled over into the 
geopolitics of the High North. Indeed, hot topics such as climate change, ice-
melting, access to Arctic natural resources, claims under the Law of the Sea, and 
11 Interviews with unnamed Icelandic officials, 7 and 10 September 2007; see also 
Icelandic Radio Broadcasting Service, RÚV, 8 September 2007, URL: http://www.ruv.
is/heim/frettir/frett/store64/item169099/.
the prospect of new sea lines of communications in the North – with their poten-
tial military ramifications – played no role whatsoever in the bilateral negotia-
tions about the future of the Keflavik base in 2005–2006. One year after the last 
American soldiers left Iceland after a 55-year old presence, there is a renewed 
interest in the High North – futuristic in some respects, but with contemporary 
relevance in others – from some of the same players that made Iceland strategi-
cally important during the Cold War. 
The key issues, however, have currently as much to do with the ownership 
and management of natural resources and energy and maritime security as they 
do with military balance. Yet recycled Cold War discourses are hard to ignore 
in this context. The recent resumption of an old practice – Russian strategic 
military aviation – has not only evoked Icelandic Cold War memories of military 
posturing during the 1980s; it has also added a new twist to the longest running 
and serious dispute in U.S.-Icelandic relations in the post-Cold War period. A 
key U.S. rationale for rejecting the Icelandic demand for the retention of F-15 
fighter jets in Iceland was that they were a Cold War relic because the Russians 
were no longer engaged in long-range patrol flights. The Russian bombers have 
not violated Iceland’s airspace and, for this reason, the flights have not been 
viewed as a military threat. There is, however, uneasiness about them because 
the bombers have encircled Iceland very close to its airspace. To be sure, in line 
with standard Western Cold War practices, they have been monitored in the 
airspace patrolled by NATO. Instead of the Americans, the British, with Norwe-
gian assistance, have sent fighter jets from Britain to shadow them. They have, 
however, never come near Iceland before returning to their bases, because the 
Russian bombers have left the area. Whatever the Russian motive, the flights 
underscore the interplay between symbolic military posturing and the politics 
of natural resources. Iceland is certainly not on the verge of regaining its former 
role as a military prize any time soon. But with the huge growth in oil and gas 
transportation in Icelandic waters in the near future, it is bound to play an in-
creasingly important role in energy and maritime security in the North. 
ICELANDIC-NORWEGIAN SECURITy COOPERATION 
Of the Nordic countries, the Norwegians have traditionally shown most inter-
est in Icelandic security affairs. During the Cold War, they wanted a strong 
U.S. presence in Iceland as part of the defense of Norway in wartime and to 
avoid pressure for the peacetime establishment of American military bases in 
Norway. The Norwegian government has, of course, made the case that that 
the High North is regaining strategic importance, less because of state-centered 
military activity than because of energy shipments from Norway and Russia to 
the United States. Such transport would pass Iceland and possibly require coop-
eration within surveillance flights, radar stations, and air defenses. The immedi-
2 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 2/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
ate Norwegian readiness to enter into bilateral security cooperation with Iceland 
following the U.S. withdrawal was clearly a part of this strategic thinking. 
To be sure, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Iceland 
and Norway – which was signed in May 2007 – is a distinctly Nordic prod-
uct: a cautious, “non-threatening,” and generally worded document. It does 
not exceed Norway or Iceland’s NATO obligations and has no bearing on the 
U.S.-Icelandic Defense Agreement. What is more, it specifically spells out that it 
entails no security guarantee of any sort. Indeed, it says as much about what it 
is not than what it is.12 Yet despite its modesty, there is no reason to dismiss its 
symbolic significance. It has serious undertones because it has to be seen within 
the framework of the U.S. military withdrawal from the region.  
The Norwegians have stated publicly that the MOU is tied to Norway’s 
High North Strategy – announced in Tromsø in 2006.13 According to the Nor-
wegian foreign minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, the main impetus behind this strategy 
is energy, climate change, and relations with Russia. This policy has also been 
framed and shaped through interaction with other players and in close coopera-
tion with the other Nordic countries, the EU, and the United States.14  Thus, one 
motive for security cooperation with Iceland was to address concerns related to 
the environment, transport, and resource management. In general, this policy 
fits well with the Icelandic government’s efforts to emphasize maritime security 
in the North Atlantic. Yet the two countries approach this cooperation from dif-
ferent angles: Norway is primarily concerned with its contemporary and future 
oil and gas interests.15 Energy security serves the purpose of ensuring safe energy 
transport to destinations in the United States and Europe. To Iceland, however, 
the vast increase in such shipments presents not only future economic oppor-
tunities. Far more important is the question of environmental risks, especially 
the danger of oil spills which could – in a worst case scenario – result in what 
the German sociologist Ulrich Beck aptly termed “environmental destruction by 
affluence.”16 
12 Press Release, “Iceland and Norway sign MOU on security policy cooperation”, 7 
April 2007, URL: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Press-Contacts/News/2007/
mou-2.html. 
13 A speech by Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, “Perspectives on the 
Government’s High North Policy”, Bodø University College, 15 March 2007, URL: 
http://regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/.  
14 See Jonas Gahr Støre, “Common opportunities and challenges in the North”, speech in 
Helsinki, 5 June 2007.
15 See Nina Graeger, “Norway between NATO, the EU, and the US: A Case Study of 
Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 2005): 88.
16 On Ulrich Beck’s theory on risk societies see Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New 
Modernity (New York: Sage, 1992); and idem, Ecological enlightenment: essays on the 
politics of the risk society (London: Humanities, 1995).
Thus, Norway and Iceland have shared interests in maritime safety in the 
North, but these are based on different national premises. What could upset this 
relationship is if a gap developed between those who are disproportionately af-
flicted by risks and those who disproportionately profit from them. The Icelan-
dic political elite – apart from the opposition’s Left-Greens – has been broadly 
in favor of increased security cooperation with Norway and Denmark.17 In fact, 
the argument has been proposed – ironically by both the hard right and left, 
though for different reasons – that Iceland is being implicated in a new geopoliti-
cal power game.18 According to the right, Iceland should not pander to Norwe-
gian imperial interests in the High North and continue to rely on the hegemony 
of the United States and/or NATO as security guarantors.19 In a post-national 
age, by the left and to a lesser extent from the right, only half-serious historical 
references have been made to what was portrayed for a long time in Icelandic 
history books as Iceland’s most humiliating and traumatic experience: the loss of 
independence by submitting to the Norwegian King in 1262!20 
These counter-discourses – one based to some extent on a nostalgic Cold 
War faith in U.S. military protection and the other on a nationalist reading of 
a mediaeval foundational myth mixed with contemporary anti-militarist senti-
ments – do not pose a threat to government policy. Yet, some skepticism has 
been voiced about Norway’s reliability as a security partner and about its natural 
resource policies, especially when it comes to fisheries management. The same 
argument can, of course, be made about Iceland from a Norwegian perspective. 
Iceland’s demilitarization does not generate much confidence in mutuality in 
terms of security contributions (the notion of an Icelandic military or a national 
guard is still a domestic political taboo). And its fishery policies are certainly not 
beyond criticism. 
Whatever the merits of such arguments, however, the Icelandic government 
has made it clear that this security cooperation will have no bearing on its posi-
tion on fisheries and territorial disputes in the High North. This is not to say that 
Norway and Iceland have been unwilling to settle such disputes in the past. In 
2006, the two sides – together with the Faroe Islands/Denmark came to an in-
17 The Independence Party, the largest party in Iceland, and the much smaller Progressive 
Party initiated this cooperation as part of a government coalition policy in the 
winter and spring of 2006–2007. When the Social Democratic Alliance replaced the 
Progressive Party as the coalition partner of the Independence Party following the 
parliamentary elections in May 2007, it reaffirmed its support for this policy. 
18 See, for example, Ögmundur Jónasson, „Mislukkuð Samfylking“ [The Failure of the 
Social Democratic Alliance], Morgunblaðið, 1 September 2007. 
19 See, for example, Steinþór Ólafsson: „Innrás Noregs í Ísland“[Norway’s Invasion of 
Iceland], Morgunblaðið, 29 December 2006.
20 Árni Þór Sigurðsson: „Sjálfstæð utanríkisstefna“ [An Independent Foreign Policy], 
Fréttablaðið, 29 April 2007; Daníel Sigurðsson, “Norwegian Expansionism”, 
Morgunblaðið, 1 December 2006. 
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affluence.”16 
12 Press Release, “Iceland and Norway sign MOU on security policy cooperation”, 7 
April 2007, URL: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Press-Contacts/News/2007/
mou-2.html. 
13 A speech by Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, “Perspectives on the 
Government’s High North Policy”, Bodø University College, 15 March 2007, URL: 
http://regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/.  
14 See Jonas Gahr Støre, “Common opportunities and challenges in the North”, speech in 
Helsinki, 5 June 2007.
15 See Nina Graeger, “Norway between NATO, the EU, and the US: A Case Study of 
Post-Cold War Security and Defence Discourse”, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1 (April 2005): 88.
16 On Ulrich Beck’s theory on risk societies see Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New 
Modernity (New York: Sage, 1992); and idem, Ecological enlightenment: essays on the 
politics of the risk society (London: Humanities, 1995).
Thus, Norway and Iceland have shared interests in maritime safety in the 
North, but these are based on different national premises. What could upset this 
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flicted by risks and those who disproportionately profit from them. The Icelan-
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Iceland’s demilitarization does not generate much confidence in mutuality in 
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Whatever the merits of such arguments, however, the Icelandic government 
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17 The Independence Party, the largest party in Iceland, and the much smaller Progressive 
Party initiated this cooperation as part of a government coalition policy in the 
winter and spring of 2006–2007. When the Social Democratic Alliance replaced the 
Progressive Party as the coalition partner of the Independence Party following the 
parliamentary elections in May 2007, it reaffirmed its support for this policy. 
18 See, for example, Ögmundur Jónasson, „Mislukkuð Samfylking“ [The Failure of the 
Social Democratic Alliance], Morgunblaðið, 1 September 2007. 
19 See, for example, Steinþór Ólafsson: „Innrás Noregs í Ísland“[Norway’s Invasion of 
Iceland], Morgunblaðið, 29 December 2006.
20 Árni Þór Sigurðsson: „Sjálfstæð utanríkisstefna“ [An Independent Foreign Policy], 
Fréttablaðið, 29 April 2007; Daníel Sigurðsson, “Norwegian Expansionism”, 
Morgunblaðið, 1 December 2006. 
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terim agreement on the northern continental shelf boundaries beyond 200 miles 
as part of their efforts to influence the recommendation of the UN Commission 
on Limits of the Continental Shelf. And by 1980, Norway and Iceland had al-
ready resolved the boundaries issue of Jan Mayen and set up a joint fisheries 
commission. Yet Iceland has vocally rejected Norway’s unilateral assumption of 
a 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone around Spitzbergen, arguing that the non-
discriminatory rights to practice peaceful economic activities of the parties to 
the Spitzbergen Treaty apply.21 And the Icelandic government has not formally 
abandoned its preparations to proceed against Norway before the International 
Court because of its unilateral interference with herring fisheries in the waters 
surrounding Spitzbergen.22 
Thus, future disputes over the exploitation of natural resources could spill 
over into the security relationship and disturb it. But for the moment, the con-
vergence of security interests in the North Atlantic – the will to highlight the 
geopolitical importance of the High North within and outside NATO and to 
address maritime security, commercial interests, and environmental protection 
– easily outweighs the irritants in Icelandic-Norwegian relations. 
CLImATE ChANGE AND ARCTIC GEOPOLITICS
In Iceland, increasing attention is now being given to future scenarios in the 
High North, the Arctic sea-ice vanishing and the opening of a circular polar 
route. In the early twentieth century, the explorer Vilhjálmur Stefánsson coined 
the term “Arctic Mediterranean” to describe the sea links between the Atlantic 
and Pacific Oceans.23 This phrase has admittedly become a cliché. But Stefáns-
son’s early twentieth century vision of all-year commercial sea routes around the 
Arctic – with ports, naval stations, and weather stations on strategically placed 
islands – is now being reformulated, reproduced and repackaged in the early 
twenty-first century. For one thing, it has been pointed out that as a result of 
climate change, Iceland could become a hub for transarctic trade – a commercial 
center for the reception, distribution and transshipment of goods. After all, the 
shortest route between the North Atlantic and North Pacific oceans is a crossing 
over the North Pole between the Bering and Fram Straits (between Greenland 
and Spitzbergen). If readily navigable, this route would shorten transport dis-
tances between Far Eastern and European ports by 40 per cent. It could become 
economically attractive as an alternative to global maritime trade routes that 
21 Lárus Jónsson,„Hafréttarmál: Deilur Íslendinga og Noðrmanna um ‘Smuguveiðar’ og 
fiskverndunarsvæði Norðmanna við Svalbarða“ [Law of the Sea: Icelandic-Norwegian 
disputes over the Loophole and the Norwegian Fishery Protection Zone around 
Spitzbergen], Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla, vol. 2, no. 2 (2006): 46–50. 
22 See the comments by Prime Minister, Geir Haarde, in Morgunblaðið, 6 April 2006
23 Carina Keskitalo: “International Region-Building: Development of the Arctic as an 
International Region,” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 42, no. 2 (2007): 187, 200-201.
utilize the Suez and Panama canals. While transarctic shipping will not replace 
present transportation routes, it is bound to supplement them by providing more 
capacity for increased transportation volume.24 
A more pressing contemporary question for Iceland, however, relates to the 
rapidly expanding volume of energy shipments from Russia and Norway to the 
United States through the Icelandic Economic Zone. This development is an ad-
dition to the increase in the traffic of cargo vessels in Icelandic waters due to new 
aluminum smelter operations in Iceland. In 2006, the number of tankers tran-
siting was about 225 vessels. Soon many LNG tankers with natural gas from 
Norway’s Snow White field will transit through Icelandic waters to the United 
States. In 2015, the expected transit of oil through the area will be around 50 
million tons and include up to 500 passages of fully loaded tankers per year.25 
This transportation is likely to set the stage in Iceland for a polarizing 
debate between those who stress the potential economic benefits and those who 
point to the environmental drawbacks. So far only limited public discussion 
about this issue has taken place. The prospects of Iceland becoming a center 
for energy transshipments, possibly with oil and gas refineries, may renew Ice-
land’s strategic importance and boost its economy. Yet, such ideas conflict with 
Icelandic purist self-conceptions as a natural haven and devalue it as a tourist 
destination. Indeed, the opposition to the construction of aluminum smelter fac-
tories in Iceland is a tell-tell sign that there may be a domestic saturation point 
with respect to energy-intensive industries. If other types of polluting activities 
– involving oil and gas – are added to this mix, this will likely generate resist-
ance. The recently revived idea of constructing a Russian-financed oil refinery in 
the western part of Iceland has, for example, been met with a decidedly mixed 
response, even though there is little disagreement over the need to revive the 
region’s declining economy.26 
Icelanders are, of course, no environmental saints. Like other nations, they 
are constantly trying to balance economic interests with environmental con-
cerns. Nonetheless, the question of environmental safety in Northern waters 
is bound to be a major issue in the near future. Both Norway and Iceland are 
beginning to address environmental risks, having, among other things, signed 
an agreement on a mutual automatic identification system data exchange and 
on other types of safe sea net collaboration. Denmark is also monitoring ship 
traffic around Greenland and has set its sights on the strait between Greenland 
24 Opening address by Valgerður Sverrisdóttir, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a report, 
“Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation. Prospects of the 
Transarctic Route – Impact and Opportunities”, 27–28 March 2008, p. 5.
25 Ibid., p. 15. 
26 See, for example, the debate in Morgunblaðið, 18 April, 23 May, 10 June, 16 August, 
8 September 2007. 
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destination. Indeed, the opposition to the construction of aluminum smelter fac-
tories in Iceland is a tell-tell sign that there may be a domestic saturation point 
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the western part of Iceland has, for example, been met with a decidedly mixed 
response, even though there is little disagreement over the need to revive the 
region’s declining economy.26 
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25 Ibid., p. 15. 
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and Iceland. Yet, there is an urgent need to do more, to undertake risk analyses 
and develop strategies to deal with the hazards and insecurities involved here. 
The growth in oil and gas transportation in the North requires a coordinated 
regional effort to ensure safety. In addition, while terrorism or piracy against 
shipping is not a current threat in this area, such risks will increase in the future 
if trade and shipping patterns undergo fundamental changes.  
Averting and managing risks usually includes the reorganization of power 
and authority. This raises the question of who is to be responsible and finan-
cially accountable for energy and maritime security in this area. The Norwe-
gian government has, apart from promoting bilateral security cooperation, been 
pushing for a NATO role. The proposal has received a rather cool response 
from some NATO members because it has been seen as too self-interested.27 The 
Norwegians have argued that NATO’s activities cannot indefinitely be limited 
to out-of-area missions such as the one in Afghanistan. To maintain its cred-
ibility in Europe, the Alliance will have to pay attention to security issues on its 
home turf. The Icelandic government has fully supported the idea of expanding 
NATO’s mission to include energy security and of paying more attention to 
what Prime Minister Geir Haarde has termed the Alliance’s backyard. The gov-
ernment has, however, made it clear that it does not want to weaken its support 
for NATO’s current order of priorities, especially the mission in Afghanistan.28 
The recent NATO decision to provide Iceland with a scaled-down version of air 
policing, compared to that in the Baltic states and Slovenia, has been welcomed 
by the government, even though it is limited in scope and does not involve any 
permanent military presence of NATO member states. The most surprising ele-
ment is the willingness of the French to play a considerable role (it will be the 
first NATO member to send fighter jets to Iceland for several weeks in 2008), for 
they have historically not shown much interest in this area. 
 Perhaps a Northern grouping in NATO – encompassing those states who 
have interests in the region – will give the Alliance a bigger profile in the North 
Atlantic along the lines of its Mediterranean Dialogue. The NATO-Russia Coun-
cil could also serve as an extended forum for discussions of energy and maritime 
security in the area. In any case, it is not enough just to put the issues of the High 
North on the agenda; the question of closer regional coordination and the im-
plementation of maritime security has to be addressed far more systematically.  
27 Interviews with NATO officials, 15 January and 4 September 2007. 
28 An Address by Prime Minister Geir Haarde on the occasion of the visit of NATO’s 
Military Committee, 2 April 2007, http://forsaetisraduneyt.is/radherra/raedurGHH/nr. 
/2582.
conclusion
Iceland is poised to gain more geostrategic importance as a result of climate 
change, increasing energy transport, and new state-run and commercial activi-
ties in the North. It is, of course, far too early to define Iceland’s exact role in 
future transatlantic and transarctic trade. While some powers see the exploita-
tion of the natural resources of the Arctic as a positive, utopian venture, others 
are more likely to view these changes in negative, even dystopian, terms. Iceland 
will be torn between the potential benefits offered by oil and gas exploitation 
and transport, and the detrimental impact. That there will be domestic conflicts 
over future compromises in this area is certain.
Transnational issues will also become more important because the only 
way to deal with the future developments in the High North – in the field of 
energy and maritime security – is through regional and transregional coopera-
tion. Since the Arctic and Barents Sea will soon supply a significant share of the 
world’s future energy needs, this will have much bearing on security concerns 
in the region. Instead of being a key military outpost for the United States – as 
was the case during the Cold War – Iceland could, ironically, become tied to U.S. 
energy security due to oil and gas transport from Russia and Norway. Whether 
this leads to a future request for a renewed military presence in Iceland remains 
to be seen. Far less certain is whether the historian Geir Lundestad’s Empire by 
Invitation thesis29 will be given a new lease of life – that is, whether the United 
States will be welcomed back to Iceland. 
When politicians highlight the potential impact of future economic devel-
opments in the High North, they usually speak of “opportunities” and “chal-
lenges.” A more fitting description would be “opportunities” and “risks.” Eco-
logical problems ignore the borders of nations and regions. The Arctic question 
– when stripped of its romanticism and geopolitical gamesmanship – is not only 
about the exploitation of natural resources but also about the management of 
risk.
29 See, Geir Lundestad, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 
1945-1952”, in Charles Maier (ed.), The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided 
Continent (New York: Markus Wiener, Publishers, 1991), pp. 143–165.
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Part IV
military implications
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON mILITARy POWER IN ThE ARCTIC
by General Sverre Diesen, Norwegian Chief of Defence
INTRODUCTION
I shall take as my point of departure the strategic parameters of the Northern 
Region of today, look at where they differ from those of the Cold War, and 
then try to deduce from that what constraints and possibilities – if any – today’s 
circumstances offer for the application of military force in support of political 
objectives. What I am trying to do, in other words, is to develop an idea of the 
space – in terms of force levels and types of operation – within which military 
force could be applied in our part of the world today, without actually violating 
its political purpose. Since we all seem to agree that there is a role for the mili-
tary as far as the tasks at the very bottom of the conflict spectrum are concerned 
– such as maintaining situational awareness and looking after national sover-
eignty – I would like to go into the as yet unexplored question of whether there 
is still a role beyond that: is open military conflict possible in the Arctic region 
in our time, and if so – what would it be like? Is there a margin for the more tra-
ditional use of force at all, given at least a minimum of Clausewitzian logic and 
proportion between political ends and military means? Finally, having tried to 
answer that, I shall try to derive from this what consequences it should have for 
force design and force posture, particularly for a small country like my own.
ThE STRATEGIC PARAmETERS OF yESTERDAy
During the 1990s, when NATO started to adjust to the confrontations of the 
post Cold War era, Norway in many ways resisted the urge to reform its mili-
tary – essentially because this would have implied casting off the long-standing 
tradition of a militia-type of mobilization force. The excuse for clinging to the 
military institutions of the past comprised pointing to a still unstable Russia and 
saying “the Soviet Union may still come back” – not because we particularly 
believed it ourselves, but because we were resisting the idea of dramatic change, 
fearing that the traditional mobilization force was the only type of military ac-
ceptable to Norwegian society. 
Part IV
military implications
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON mILITARy POWER IN ThE ARCTIC
by General Sverre Diesen, Norwegian Chief of Defence
INTRODUCTION
I shall take as my point of departure the strategic parameters of the Northern 
Region of today, look at where they differ from those of the Cold War, and 
then try to deduce from that what constraints and possibilities – if any – today’s 
circumstances offer for the application of military force in support of political 
objectives. What I am trying to do, in other words, is to develop an idea of the 
space – in terms of force levels and types of operation – within which military 
force could be applied in our part of the world today, without actually violating 
its political purpose. Since we all seem to agree that there is a role for the mili-
tary as far as the tasks at the very bottom of the conflict spectrum are concerned 
– such as maintaining situational awareness and looking after national sover-
eignty – I would like to go into the as yet unexplored question of whether there 
is still a role beyond that: is open military conflict possible in the Arctic region 
in our time, and if so – what would it be like? Is there a margin for the more tra-
ditional use of force at all, given at least a minimum of Clausewitzian logic and 
proportion between political ends and military means? Finally, having tried to 
answer that, I shall try to derive from this what consequences it should have for 
force design and force posture, particularly for a small country like my own.
ThE STRATEGIC PARAmETERS OF yESTERDAy
During the 1990s, when NATO started to adjust to the confrontations of the 
post Cold War era, Norway in many ways resisted the urge to reform its mili-
tary – essentially because this would have implied casting off the long-standing 
tradition of a militia-type of mobilization force. The excuse for clinging to the 
military institutions of the past comprised pointing to a still unstable Russia and 
saying “the Soviet Union may still come back” – not because we particularly 
believed it ourselves, but because we were resisting the idea of dramatic change, 
fearing that the traditional mobilization force was the only type of military ac-
ceptable to Norwegian society. 
90 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 2/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
So, when we start beating the drum again about the Northern Region, I 
am at great pains to emphasize that this is not a renewed attempt to flog a dead 
Soviet horse, to make it do one more lap around the circuit for the benefit of 
any Cold War warriors that might still be around. We can see the geopolitical 
challenges and their military strategic implications today as being fundamentally 
different from those of the Cold War period. It is certainly not the old threat, 
only with a lower probability – nor is it a scaled-down version of the same threat 
with the same probability. The old challenge was inextricably linked to the pos-
sibility of a nuclear exchange across the polar region, and the naval campaign to 
contain the Soviet Northern Fleet before it could erupt into the North Atlantic 
and sever the SLOCs between North America and Europe in an all-out Euro-
pean war. 
The new military challenge is radically different, first of all because today’s 
armed forces serve fundamentally different political interests and ambitions, and 
consequently – in accordance with Clausewitz’s most famous dictum – the ap-
plication of military force in the Arctic today, to be consistent with its political 
justification, would have to be different in kind from that for which we were 
prepared during the Cold War. The fundamental difference is that today we see 
no threat, in the conventional military meaning of the word. Thus, what we are 
talking about here is a number of strategic factors that under certain circum-
stances could develop in a way which might be said to constitute certain risks.
ThE NEW STRATEGIC PARAmETERS OF ThE NORThERN REGION
What, then, are the new strategic parameters of the Arctic, and what are their 
implied consequences in terms of the potential for military conflict? The param-
eters themselves are obviously reflected in the different themes of the four ses-
sions of this seminar: energy, food, jurisdiction and transportation. 
To clarify, we are dealing with the security implications of scarce – and 
hence strategic – resources, either directly or indirectly. Directly in the sense that 
energy resources as well as food supplies of significant importance are acquired 
in this region – indirectly in the sense that global warming is opening up new sea 
lines of communication through the Northwestern and Northeastern Passages 
respectively, through which these and other goods may be transported in the 
future. In addition to these new realities, there is of course still a residual mili-
tary side to the equation, since the region is also home to the submarine-based 
nuclear deterrent of a great power and its associated conventional capabilities. 
Even though all these factors are obviously security-related, they are also 
very different from the strategic parameters of the Cold War period, and con-
sequently also different in terms of their potential for military conflict. By ‘po-
tential for conflict’ in this context, I mean both the probability of these new pa-
rameters leading to military confrontation and – if a conflict does happen – how 
its political origin will influence the scope and pattern of the use of force. What 
we need to do, therefore, is try to find a formula that translates or transforms 
the political requirements into military means consistent with and conducive to 
these policies.
A PARADIGm FOR ThE APPLICATION OF LImITED FORCE
The first aspect we should consider to arrive at a rational answer to this is the 
military paradigm in which we operate. To explain that, I will refer to General 
Sir Rupert Smith’s trendsetting book The Utility of Force, which differentiates 
between industrial or total war, or “war between the peoples” – i.e. the sort of 
major conflict associated with the twentieth century, primarily the two World 
Wars and the potential third – and “war amongst the people”, i.e. the coun-
terinsurgencies and counterrevolutionary wars of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century.
Sir Rupert, along with several other military historians and analysts, has 
pointed out that inter-state, industrial war between developed nations has been 
relegated to the scrapheap of history, because of its utter lack of political useful-
ness, and has been replaced by small intra-state wars and campaigns not unlike 
those experienced by Britain and other European colonial powers during the 
retreat from empire during the second half of the twentieth century. This, to 
my mind, is an excellent analysis, and one which many conservatively inclined 
defence analysts in this country would be well advised to study. 
That being said, however, what is interesting about the sort of conflict un-
der consideration here is that it fits neither category. Although one can envisage 
a non-state actor – for example a sophisticated terrorist organization – as one 
of the parties in a scenario in the Arctic, the question before us is really whether 
a military conflict stemming from a clash of interests and wills between two or 
more states could still happen. If so, this would obviously feature regular, con-
ventional forces, as opposed to the guerrilla-type of insurgency force of the ‘war 
amongst the people’, which will substitute technological sophistication with en-
durance and strength of will. On the other hand, since it would be a conflict of 
limited political issues – at least in terms of their significance for national sur-
vival – the use of force would have to be similarly constrained. In other words, 
the application of force would have to be limited in terms of time, space and 
force levels so as not to separate itself from its political origin.
If we accept that this rules out a campaign of territorial conquest and ex-
pansion, we are left first of all with the task of deciding – within the framework 
of these strategic parameters – if it is possible to find rational political objectives 
in support of which force could possibly be applied. Having established that 
such a margin is actually there, we would then have to derive from the politi-
cal objectives what the military objectives of such a venture could be, and from 
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different from those of the Cold War period. It is certainly not the old threat, 
only with a lower probability – nor is it a scaled-down version of the same threat 
with the same probability. The old challenge was inextricably linked to the pos-
sibility of a nuclear exchange across the polar region, and the naval campaign to 
contain the Soviet Northern Fleet before it could erupt into the North Atlantic 
and sever the SLOCs between North America and Europe in an all-out Euro-
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The new military challenge is radically different, first of all because today’s 
armed forces serve fundamentally different political interests and ambitions, and 
consequently – in accordance with Clausewitz’s most famous dictum – the ap-
plication of military force in the Arctic today, to be consistent with its political 
justification, would have to be different in kind from that for which we were 
prepared during the Cold War. The fundamental difference is that today we see 
no threat, in the conventional military meaning of the word. Thus, what we are 
talking about here is a number of strategic factors that under certain circum-
stances could develop in a way which might be said to constitute certain risks.
ThE NEW STRATEGIC PARAmETERS OF ThE NORThERN REGION
What, then, are the new strategic parameters of the Arctic, and what are their 
implied consequences in terms of the potential for military conflict? The param-
eters themselves are obviously reflected in the different themes of the four ses-
sions of this seminar: energy, food, jurisdiction and transportation. 
To clarify, we are dealing with the security implications of scarce – and 
hence strategic – resources, either directly or indirectly. Directly in the sense that 
energy resources as well as food supplies of significant importance are acquired 
in this region – indirectly in the sense that global warming is opening up new sea 
lines of communication through the Northwestern and Northeastern Passages 
respectively, through which these and other goods may be transported in the 
future. In addition to these new realities, there is of course still a residual mili-
tary side to the equation, since the region is also home to the submarine-based 
nuclear deterrent of a great power and its associated conventional capabilities. 
Even though all these factors are obviously security-related, they are also 
very different from the strategic parameters of the Cold War period, and con-
sequently also different in terms of their potential for military conflict. By ‘po-
tential for conflict’ in this context, I mean both the probability of these new pa-
rameters leading to military confrontation and – if a conflict does happen – how 
its political origin will influence the scope and pattern of the use of force. What 
we need to do, therefore, is try to find a formula that translates or transforms 
the political requirements into military means consistent with and conducive to 
these policies.
A PARADIGm FOR ThE APPLICATION OF LImITED FORCE
The first aspect we should consider to arrive at a rational answer to this is the 
military paradigm in which we operate. To explain that, I will refer to General 
Sir Rupert Smith’s trendsetting book The Utility of Force, which differentiates 
between industrial or total war, or “war between the peoples” – i.e. the sort of 
major conflict associated with the twentieth century, primarily the two World 
Wars and the potential third – and “war amongst the people”, i.e. the coun-
terinsurgencies and counterrevolutionary wars of the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century.
Sir Rupert, along with several other military historians and analysts, has 
pointed out that inter-state, industrial war between developed nations has been 
relegated to the scrapheap of history, because of its utter lack of political useful-
ness, and has been replaced by small intra-state wars and campaigns not unlike 
those experienced by Britain and other European colonial powers during the 
retreat from empire during the second half of the twentieth century. This, to 
my mind, is an excellent analysis, and one which many conservatively inclined 
defence analysts in this country would be well advised to study. 
That being said, however, what is interesting about the sort of conflict un-
der consideration here is that it fits neither category. Although one can envisage 
a non-state actor – for example a sophisticated terrorist organization – as one 
of the parties in a scenario in the Arctic, the question before us is really whether 
a military conflict stemming from a clash of interests and wills between two or 
more states could still happen. If so, this would obviously feature regular, con-
ventional forces, as opposed to the guerrilla-type of insurgency force of the ‘war 
amongst the people’, which will substitute technological sophistication with en-
durance and strength of will. On the other hand, since it would be a conflict of 
limited political issues – at least in terms of their significance for national sur-
vival – the use of force would have to be similarly constrained. In other words, 
the application of force would have to be limited in terms of time, space and 
force levels so as not to separate itself from its political origin.
If we accept that this rules out a campaign of territorial conquest and ex-
pansion, we are left first of all with the task of deciding – within the framework 
of these strategic parameters – if it is possible to find rational political objectives 
in support of which force could possibly be applied. Having established that 
such a margin is actually there, we would then have to derive from the politi-
cal objectives what the military objectives of such a venture could be, and from 
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that the ways and means of a campaign designed to achieve these objectives. 
The starting point, therefore, must be the assumption that a confrontation in 
the Arctic in all probability would somehow be about the right to collect and 
exploit the riches in international waters and on the seabed of the polar region, 
be they energy or food resources – or about the command of the SLOCs to and 
from this region. 
That means ruling out the use of force to expand into the land territory 
of other countries, since that would lead to the sort of major war we have dis-
carded as being disproportionate to its political purpose. Instead, I will go back 
to Rupert Smith’s very useful analytical tool of confrontation and conflict – i.e. 
assuming that there is a permanent state of competition for strategic resources 
in and access to the region which can be seen as a confrontation with an at least 
theoretical possibility of spilling over into conflict. 
ThE NORmAL CONDITION – STAbILITy AND STRATEGIC COmPETITION
The normal or baseline condition in such a strategic environment would be one 
of sustained military presence – more as a visible expression of national interests 
and claims than as a traditional military deterrent – and on this we all seem to 
agree. That being said, the credibility – and hence the political effect – of any 
military force anywhere ultimately lies with the will and ability to use it, if the 
political interests they are there to support were put to the test. It follows, there-
fore – to digress for a moment – that “military presence” in the form of training 
camps for recruits or redundant military bases do not represent any additional 
political value in this context, although they may have other merits.
To conclude about what would be the normal situation – that of a strategic 
but peaceful competition with but a limited scope for escalation to conflict – all 
powers with a stake will be best served by maintaining a certain military pres-
ence in the region. This would be in keeping with a long-standing role of mili-
tary forces as a political messenger – sending a signal about a nation’s interests 
and ambitions in a given area. Here we have a common interest in maintaining 
a sensible balance between on the one hand the sort of low-key but sustained 
military presence which is both a condition for and a token of stability, and any 
excessive militarization of the region on the other. 
However, there is a caveat here, and I think we should be very clear about 
the difference between state agencies employed specifically for resource jurisdic-
tion and conventional military forces. coast guards, border guards and similar 
organizations and agencies operate within a different political, strategic and 
judicial framework than military forces, which means that there is no credible 
– or for that matter desirable – link between using a coast guard vessel and de-
ploying a frigate to exercise resource jurisdiction, should the coast guard vessel 
prove insufficient. This will only serve to lower the threshold of legitimate in-
tervention by military forces and would consequently play into the hands of the 
militarily stronger power – instead of referring the matter to be brokered in the 
proper international bodies and organizations. That is hardly a clever strategy 
– at least not for a small country. Conventional military forces should therefore 
be used with extreme caution or preferably not at all for resource management 
and jurisdictional purposes. 
ESCALATION – FROm CONFRONTATION TO CONFLICT, OR ThE LImITS OF FORCE
Turning now to the at least theoretical possibility of a competition or confron-
tation over scarce strategic resources escalating to conflict, what would be the 
characteristics of such use of force and what might this lead to? I would like to 
emphasize at this point that I am not speculating about the actual probability 
of such a contingency, but am sticking to the question of what it would be like 
and what the consequences would be if it happened. And I would be the first to 
admit that – fortunately – this looks like pure theory at the moment. But that 
is precisely why we should consider it – because understanding why and how it 
could happen will in itself contribute to keeping it just that – a theoretical pos-
sibility. 
First of all, I think we need to remind ourselves of what I have already 
briefly touched upon - that the resources we are dealing with here, although im-
portant, are not critical to the survival of our nations and peoples. Both energy 
and food are available from other sources and regions. It follows from this that 
a confrontation escalating to conflict would be limited and essentially about 
economic interests. The political objective, therefore, would not be comparable 
to the objectives of a total war – such as the acquisition of new provinces or the 
spreading of religious and political beliefs – but rather about forcing a change in 
the policies of another state or compliance with specific demands. 
That, in its turn, implies that the use of force – as already pointed out – in 
all probability would have to be limited in terms of space, time and force levels, 
in order not to violate the limited nature of its political purpose. In concrete 
military terms, that means engagements which would probably not go beyond 
the tactical level – i.e. they would involve a limited number of planes, ships or 
army units, and would have to be terminated within a limited timeframe. By the 
same token, the air and maritime domains would be rather more suitable for 
this kind of military demonstration, since violating the land territory of another 
country is a politically rather more serious thing to do, and at the same time 
militarily far more irreversible – at least it takes longer time to reverse the situ-
ation, once you commit land forces to a military campaign. Indeed, the genius 
of air and sea power is precisely the fact that they operate in an international 
space, and by virtue of their speed and flexibility can deliver their effects and 
then withdraw quickly to de-escalate the situation. From that perspective, air 
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a sensible balance between on the one hand the sort of low-key but sustained 
military presence which is both a condition for and a token of stability, and any 
excessive militarization of the region on the other. 
However, there is a caveat here, and I think we should be very clear about 
the difference between state agencies employed specifically for resource jurisdic-
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– or for that matter desirable – link between using a coast guard vessel and de-
ploying a frigate to exercise resource jurisdiction, should the coast guard vessel 
prove insufficient. This will only serve to lower the threshold of legitimate in-
tervention by military forces and would consequently play into the hands of the 
militarily stronger power – instead of referring the matter to be brokered in the 
proper international bodies and organizations. That is hardly a clever strategy 
– at least not for a small country. Conventional military forces should therefore 
be used with extreme caution or preferably not at all for resource management 
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Turning now to the at least theoretical possibility of a competition or confron-
tation over scarce strategic resources escalating to conflict, what would be the 
characteristics of such use of force and what might this lead to? I would like to 
emphasize at this point that I am not speculating about the actual probability 
of such a contingency, but am sticking to the question of what it would be like 
and what the consequences would be if it happened. And I would be the first to 
admit that – fortunately – this looks like pure theory at the moment. But that 
is precisely why we should consider it – because understanding why and how it 
could happen will in itself contribute to keeping it just that – a theoretical pos-
sibility. 
First of all, I think we need to remind ourselves of what I have already 
briefly touched upon - that the resources we are dealing with here, although im-
portant, are not critical to the survival of our nations and peoples. Both energy 
and food are available from other sources and regions. It follows from this that 
a confrontation escalating to conflict would be limited and essentially about 
economic interests. The political objective, therefore, would not be comparable 
to the objectives of a total war – such as the acquisition of new provinces or the 
spreading of religious and political beliefs – but rather about forcing a change in 
the policies of another state or compliance with specific demands. 
That, in its turn, implies that the use of force – as already pointed out – in 
all probability would have to be limited in terms of space, time and force levels, 
in order not to violate the limited nature of its political purpose. In concrete 
military terms, that means engagements which would probably not go beyond 
the tactical level – i.e. they would involve a limited number of planes, ships or 
army units, and would have to be terminated within a limited timeframe. By the 
same token, the air and maritime domains would be rather more suitable for 
this kind of military demonstration, since violating the land territory of another 
country is a politically rather more serious thing to do, and at the same time 
militarily far more irreversible – at least it takes longer time to reverse the situ-
ation, once you commit land forces to a military campaign. Indeed, the genius 
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space, and by virtue of their speed and flexibility can deliver their effects and 
then withdraw quickly to de-escalate the situation. From that perspective, air 
94 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurIty 2/2008 emergINg frOm the frOSt
and sea engagements in international – as opposed to territorial – air space and 
waters are infinitely more probable than land operations of any significance in 
such a scenario.
To be specific, I would say that the upper limit of land operations in this 
political context would be an air- or sea-launched raid, possibly against an ob-
jective of military or economic value, but with extraction of the force as soon as 
the desired effect had been achieved – precisely because there would be a need 
to avoid the hugely and largely uncontrollable escalating effect of a land force 
– however small – remaining on foreign territory. 
As for the more probable air and maritime operations one could possibly 
envisage – and I emphasize that I use the word “probable” in relative terms 
here – they would presumably also target military and economic objectives and 
infrastructure. But, again, this would have to be done with a view to restricting 
collateral damage in terms of casualties and negative environmental effects. The 
reason for this is simply that since the political cause and reason for resorting to 
force is of an economic and therefore limited nature, excessive damage and loss 
of life would automatically mean the loss of the moral high ground and with 
that the loss of political credibility and support from the international commu-
nity. It would, in other words, be tantamount to paying a strategic price for a 
tactical gain, or rather for little or no gain at all. 
This is quite simply because the real purpose of force application in a con-
text like this does not lie with the amount of destruction it will produce as an 
end in itself, within the larger operational or theatre-level picture – but has as its 
reason to demonstrate that the government in question is willing and able to use 
force in the first place. It is in other words the use of force as an expression and 
a measure of political determination that is important, rather than the actual 
damage it causes. 
I would also like to emphasize at this point that even if we cannot rule out 
the possibility of a conflict being triggered more by accident than by design, it 
does not follow from this that it will be pursued in an irrational manner, once it 
breaks out. There is no reason, in other words, to assume that total war might 
eventually happen as the end result of botched crisis management.
Thus we can see that an amount of force which must be described as purely 
tactical in military terms would take on a strategic role and significance in the 
larger political scheme of things. This insight – that the utility of military force 
in this region has been reduced to a level where military strategic objectives 
would be served by tactical level engagements – is in my opinion one of the most 
fundamental lessons we should take away from this analysis. Not, mind you, in 
the same way tactical engagements take on strategic importance in Afghanistan, 
with the conflict dragging on for years as a counterinsurgency campaign, but as 
short, sharp and in essence punitive military actions, orchestrated in extremely 
close interaction with political initiatives and diplomacy.
ImPLICATIONS FOR DEFENCE POLICy AND FORCE DESIGN
What should be the consequences of this analysis for the design of our armed 
forces, and their posture, particularly for the small countries in the region which 
are still struggling to come to terms with the changes brought about by the end 
of the Cold War?
First of all we should recognize that the strategic situation – as well as eco-
nomic trends – have put the relevance of large, untrained mobilization forces in 
grave doubt, as they have become neither useful nor affordable. With forces of 
lower readiness, the mobilization of reserves or the accelerated training of insuf-
ficiently trained units in a tense situation would probably be unavoidable. Since 
this could easily be either interpreted or construed as an escalation by the other 
side, it follows that it would be destabilizing and consequently undesirable. 
The emphasis should therefore be on highly trained, standing forces ca-
pable of delivering the necessary and stabilizing military presence – while re-
maining able to react at short notice in support of political crisis management, 
and prevent episodes from gravitating towards a higher level of confrontation. 
Standing regular forces also have the merit – precisely because they are trained 
and ready at all times – to give our politicians the luxury of choice, either react-
ing immediately or waiting to avoid premature escalation if that is required.
The situation also influences the balance between the different services, 
compared to the situation during the Cold War. Since the threat then was essen-
tially a large-scale invasion of national territory and a war for national survival, 
it followed that large land forces were pre-eminent, supported by the other serv-
ices. Now, however, we regard the air and sea domain as being the more suitable 
for the application of politically relevant military force, hence the need for a 
shift in the balance in favour of maritime and air forces. That being said, certain 
minimal force levels in all three domains need to be maintained, as a matter of 
sustaining competency at a certain level – what we call the problem of critical 
mass. 
Finally, all this must be achieved within the constraints of the budget and 
the ever-increasing cost of military capabilities. This, I would suggest, will force 
small and medium sized countries into the sort of defence cooperation scheme 
that we are about to launch with Sweden, with small and medium sized countries 
being forced to coordinate their defence and security efforts, and to a certain 
extent integrate their force structures. The concept of multinational, mutually 
reinforcing defence structures, I think, is one that will be increasingly discussed 
and implemented over the next decades, as the increase in costs in the defence 
sector keep eating into today’s essentially national forces.
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and sea engagements in international – as opposed to territorial – air space and 
waters are infinitely more probable than land operations of any significance in 
such a scenario.
To be specific, I would say that the upper limit of land operations in this 
political context would be an air- or sea-launched raid, possibly against an ob-
jective of military or economic value, but with extraction of the force as soon as 
the desired effect had been achieved – precisely because there would be a need 
to avoid the hugely and largely uncontrollable escalating effect of a land force 
– however small – remaining on foreign territory. 
As for the more probable air and maritime operations one could possibly 
envisage – and I emphasize that I use the word “probable” in relative terms 
here – they would presumably also target military and economic objectives and 
infrastructure. But, again, this would have to be done with a view to restricting 
collateral damage in terms of casualties and negative environmental effects. The 
reason for this is simply that since the political cause and reason for resorting to 
force is of an economic and therefore limited nature, excessive damage and loss 
of life would automatically mean the loss of the moral high ground and with 
that the loss of political credibility and support from the international commu-
nity. It would, in other words, be tantamount to paying a strategic price for a 
tactical gain, or rather for little or no gain at all. 
This is quite simply because the real purpose of force application in a con-
text like this does not lie with the amount of destruction it will produce as an 
end in itself, within the larger operational or theatre-level picture – but has as its 
reason to demonstrate that the government in question is willing and able to use 
force in the first place. It is in other words the use of force as an expression and 
a measure of political determination that is important, rather than the actual 
damage it causes. 
I would also like to emphasize at this point that even if we cannot rule out 
the possibility of a conflict being triggered more by accident than by design, it 
does not follow from this that it will be pursued in an irrational manner, once it 
breaks out. There is no reason, in other words, to assume that total war might 
eventually happen as the end result of botched crisis management.
Thus we can see that an amount of force which must be described as purely 
tactical in military terms would take on a strategic role and significance in the 
larger political scheme of things. This insight – that the utility of military force 
in this region has been reduced to a level where military strategic objectives 
would be served by tactical level engagements – is in my opinion one of the most 
fundamental lessons we should take away from this analysis. Not, mind you, in 
the same way tactical engagements take on strategic importance in Afghanistan, 
with the conflict dragging on for years as a counterinsurgency campaign, but as 
short, sharp and in essence punitive military actions, orchestrated in extremely 
close interaction with political initiatives and diplomacy.
ImPLICATIONS FOR DEFENCE POLICy AND FORCE DESIGN
What should be the consequences of this analysis for the design of our armed 
forces, and their posture, particularly for the small countries in the region which 
are still struggling to come to terms with the changes brought about by the end 
of the Cold War?
First of all we should recognize that the strategic situation – as well as eco-
nomic trends – have put the relevance of large, untrained mobilization forces in 
grave doubt, as they have become neither useful nor affordable. With forces of 
lower readiness, the mobilization of reserves or the accelerated training of insuf-
ficiently trained units in a tense situation would probably be unavoidable. Since 
this could easily be either interpreted or construed as an escalation by the other 
side, it follows that it would be destabilizing and consequently undesirable. 
The emphasis should therefore be on highly trained, standing forces ca-
pable of delivering the necessary and stabilizing military presence – while re-
maining able to react at short notice in support of political crisis management, 
and prevent episodes from gravitating towards a higher level of confrontation. 
Standing regular forces also have the merit – precisely because they are trained 
and ready at all times – to give our politicians the luxury of choice, either react-
ing immediately or waiting to avoid premature escalation if that is required.
The situation also influences the balance between the different services, 
compared to the situation during the Cold War. Since the threat then was essen-
tially a large-scale invasion of national territory and a war for national survival, 
it followed that large land forces were pre-eminent, supported by the other serv-
ices. Now, however, we regard the air and sea domain as being the more suitable 
for the application of politically relevant military force, hence the need for a 
shift in the balance in favour of maritime and air forces. That being said, certain 
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CONTRIbUTORS
mINISTER OF JUSTICE AND ECCLESIASTICAL AFFAIRS bJöRN bJARNASON
Björn Bjarnason was appointed Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs in 
May 2003. Prior to that, he read law  (cand. jur.) at the University of Iceland, 
graduating in 1971. He was Editor at Almenna bókafélagið (a publisher’s) from 
1971 to 1974. He was Foreign News Editor at Vísir from February to October 
1974. In addition, he was Division Chief at the Prime Minister’s Office from 
October 1974, and Deputy Secretary General from September 1975 to October 
1979. Between 1979 and 1984, he was a journalist at Morgunblaðið, and As-
sistant Editor from 1984–1991. He has been MP for Reykjavik since 1991 for 
the Independence Party (right of centre). He served as Minister of Education, 
Science and Culture from April 1995 until March 2002, and was elected to Rey-
kjavik City Council in May 2002.
DR LAWSON W. bRIGhAm
Dr Lawson Brigham is Deputy Director and Alaska Office Director of the U.S. 
Arctic Research Commission in Anchorage. He is currently Chair of the Arctic 
Marine Shipping Assessment of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental fo-
rum of the eight Arctic nations. He is also Vice Chair of the Council’s Working 
Group on Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) and was a con-
tributing author to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. After graduating in 
1970 from the US Coast Guard Academy, he then served as a career U.S.Coast 
Guard officer from 1970–1995 and commanded the patrol cutter Point Steele, 
the Great Lakes icebreaker Mobile Bay, the enforcement cutter Escanbana and 
the polar icebreaker Polar Sea. At the end of his career, he served as Chief of 
the Coast Guard’s Strategic Planning Staff and Director of the Coast Guard 
Work-Life Study (1990–1993); from 1993–1995 he was Commanding Officer 
of the USCGC Polar Sea, sailing on four polar deployments including the Arctic 
Ocean Section ’94 Expedition across the Arctic Ocean from the Bering Strait 
to the North Pole and Fram Strait. He has also served as a Researcher at the 
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and at the U.S. Naval War College, and 
as a Faculty Member of the Naval Postgraduate School. He was awarded a PhD 
in polar oceanography from Cambridge University and an MS in management 
from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Dr Brigham is also a distinguished gradu-
ate of the U.S. Naval War College.
GENERAL SVERRE DIESEN
General Sverre Diesen was appointed Norwegian Chief of Defence 1 April 2005. 
Prior to that, he was appointed to the Ministry of Defence in 2003, when the 
CONCLUSION
It is evident to the point of being glaringly obvious that the changes we see in 
the Arctic will have an impact on security affairs. Were it not so, it would after 
all be the first time in recorded history that the presence of scarce resources in a 
region, or the opening of new lines of communication through that region, had 
not affected strategic and security questions. 
At the same time, I think we should be absolutely clear in our minds that 
the end of the Cold War marked a shift in the military paradigm, and that the 
concept of industrial war between developed countries is a thing of the past. A 
large-scale conventional conflict between countries with economic or other in-
terests in the Arctic over these scarce resources would obviously be an exercise 
in political and economic futility, defeating its own purpose, since the cost of 
such a war would exceed any possible gains by at least one order of magnitude, 
if not several.
On the other hand, it would be unwise to leave the Arctic completely de-
void of military presence, since a military vacuum can be misinterpreted as a 
lack of national interest and priority. The challenge, therefore, is to maintain 
a military presence that is sufficient to act as a stabilizing factor – but without 
confusing this with the sort of presence and posture we maintained as a deter-
rent against aggression during the Cold War.
In that regard, it is of particular importance that we distinguish between 
resource jurisdiction and conventional military presence, delineating their sepa-
rate tasks and responsibilities to prevent two branches of state power that need 
to be separate from becoming a continuum. That, in a given situation could have 
the most disastrous effect on crisis management and prevention.
However, should military force be applied in support of political objectives 
in the Arctic, either deliberately or as a result of failed crisis management, we 
need to realize that this is not a case of a Cold War scenario trying to break its 
way out of the coffin. It would most likely be a very limited affair, with tactical 
military engagements being used to provide strategic leverage for certain politi-
cal claims. Consequently, we should not let this become an excuse to revive the 
military structures and institutions of the past, but design our military forces to 
serve current and future strategic requirements and purposes.
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top-level civil and military leadership was integrated at the reorganized Ministry 
of Defence. In 2002–2003 General Diesen served as Command Land Forces at 
the Joint Operations Headquarters in Stavanger. In 2001–2002 he was Land 
Forces Commander at Defence Command North Norway and Commander of 
the District Command North Norway in Harstad. Over the period 1998–2001 
he led the Strategic and Long-Term Planning Department at Headquarters De-
fence Command Norway where he also led the work to prepare Defence Study 
2000. General Diesen’s other postings have included Chief of Staff with 6th Di-
vision in North Norway, CO of H.M. the King’s Guards, Project Officer at the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Principal Lecturer in tactics 
at the Norwegian Military Academy, and Instructor at the School of Infantry 
and Winter Warfare. In 1981 he served as Second-in-Command of a British 
mechanized rifle company with the British Army of the Rhine in Germany. He is 
a graduate of the Officer Candidate School, Cavalry (1970); Master of Science, 
Civil Engineering, Norwegian University of Technology and Science, Trondheim 
(1976); Norwegian Military Academy (1979); Norwegian Army Staff College I 
and II (1986–1988), Staff College Camberley, UK (1990).
REAR ADmIRAL TROND GRyTTING
Rear Admiral Trond Grytting is Commander Regional Headquarters North-
Norway (RHQNN). He graduated from the Norwegian Naval Academy in Ber-
gen in 1980 and attended the Marine Ortungschule Operations and Warfare at 
Bremerhaven in Germany in 1985. Trond Grytting attended the Royal Norwe-
gian Naval Staff College in 1986, Staff College 2 at the Defence Academy in 
Copenhagen in 1994 and the Joint Staff College total defence course no. 26 in 
2000. Besides 14 years of warfare officer and command experience on board 
support ships, fast patrol boats and frigates, he has the following service experi-
ence: Instructor at Radar School KNM Tordenskjold, Inspecting Officer at the 
Naval Academy, Exercise Officer for Defence Command North Norway, assist-
ant main teacher at the Naval Department Defence Staff College/Joint Division, 
Chief of Staff Standing Naval Forces North Atlantic, and Commander Norwe-
gian surface flotilla. He was appointed Commodore on 20 Jun 2002 and was 
posted as Commander Norwegian fleet/Commander Norwegian Task Group at 
the same time. Rear Admiral Trond Grytting assumed command as Commander 
Regional Headquarters North Norway on 19 August 2005.
PROFESSOR ALF håKON hOEL
Alf Håkon Hoel is Associate Professor of political science at the University of 
Tromsø and Professor II at the Norwegian Polar Institute. His research is con-
cerned with international oceans management in general, and resource man-
agement issues in the polar areas in particular. He has participated in major 
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research programmes under the Arctic Council, the Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment and the AMAP Oil and Gas Assessment. Recent publications deal with 
the impact of climate change, Norway’s ocean policy, and the legal and political 
framework for resource management in the Barents Sea. He currently leads an 
Arctic Council project on Best Practices in Oceans Management in the Arctic.
PROFESSOR GEIR høNNELAND
Geir Hønneland is Research Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Lysaker, 
Norway) and Adjunct Professor of political science at the University of Tromsø. 
He has a PhD in political science from the University of Oslo, and wrote his 
dissertation about compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries. Lately, he has mainly 
been involved in studies of Russian politics in the field of environmental protec-
tion and fisheries management. Among his books are Implementing Internation-
al Environmental Agreements in Russia (Manchester University Press, 2003), 
and Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict (Routledge, 
2003). He is Project Manager of the project Post-Agreement Bargaining in the 
Barents Sea Fisheries, financed by “Havet og Kysten”, the Ocean and Coastal 
Areas Programme of the Norwegian Research Council. Before embarking on his 
academic career, he worked as a Russian interpreter for the Norwegian coast-
guard and the Directorate of Fisheries for several years.
PROFESSOR VALUR INGImUNDARSON
Valur Ingimundarson is Professor of Contemporary History at the University 
of Iceland. He is also an Associate Fellow at the London-based Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI). He received his PhD from Columbia University, New 
York. He has written extensively about US-Icelandic relations, European politi-
cal/security relations and post-war developments and peacekeeping operations 
in the Balkans. Ingimundarson has published several books. He is co-editor of 
Redefining Icelandic Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War (Reykjavik: 
The Icelandic Literary Society, 2007 [forthcoming]), and the author of A Time 
of Reckoning with the Outside World: Icelandic Nationalism, Western Integra-
tion, and the Cold War, 1961–1974 (Reykjavik: Vaka-Helgafell, 2001). He has 
also published a number of articles and book chapters on US/NATO-Icelandic 
relations, US-European relations, US-German Relations, and post-war politics 
in the Balkans.
DIRECTOR EVGENyI m. KOzhOKIN
Evgenyi M. Kozhokin was born in Moscow and was awarded a PhD in history 
from Moscow University in 1981, In 2000, he became a Doctor of Science (his-
tory). Between 1980 and 1990, he worked as a Researcher at the Institutes of 
the International Working Class Movement of the Academy of Sciences of the 
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USSR. In 1990, he was elected a People’s Deputy of the Russian Federation, 
where he served as Chairman of the Subcommittee for International Relations 
of the Committee for Foreign Relations and International Economic relations 
1990–June 1992. In April 1992 he was elected Member of the Supreme Soviet of 
the Russian Federation (dissolved in October 1993), and served as Chairman of 
the Subcommittee on International Security and Intelligence of the Committee 
of Defence and security Issues from June 1992 to October 1993. Between Octo-
ber and November 1991, he was Chief of the Working Group of Observers from 
the Russian Federation in Nagorny Karabakh. In October 1993–April 1994, he 
worked in the Government as Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Na-
tionalities and Federation Issues (at that time, the post was equivalent to that of 
a Deputy Minister). In April 1994, he was appointed to his current position as 
the Director of Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies. Kozhokin is the author of 
more than 100 scientific publications concerning the history of Western Europe, 
and international key problems and national conditions of political develop-
ment in Russia and the CIS countries.
ASSISTANT SECRETARy CLAUDIA A. mCmURRAy
Claudia A. McMurray currently serves at the United States Department of State 
as Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment, and Science. She is responsible 
for a broad portfolio of global issues related to: environmental protection and 
climate change; conservation of natural resources; health; and cooperation with 
other nations concerning science, technology, bioterrorism and the use of outer 
space. From 2003 to 2006, Ms McMurray served as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Environment. Prior to joining the State Department, Ms McMur-
ray served as Associate Deputy Administrator and Chief of Staff to the Deputy 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. From 1996 to 2000, Ms 
McMurray worked as a Vice President at Van Scoyoc Associates, Inc. (VSA), 
a leading government relations firm in Washington D.C., and as the head of 
McMurray & Associates, a strategic counselling firm. During the 1990s, Ms 
McMurray served as Republican Counsel to the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee. Also during that time, she served as a senior policy advi-
sor and counsel to Senator John Warner and Senator Fred Thompson. Prior to 
working on Capitol Hill, Ms McMurray practiced law at two national law firms 
in Washington, D.C. She holds a Juris Doctorate from Georgetown University.
DR KJETIL SKOGRAND
Kjetil Skogrand is Senior Fellow and Head of the Department of Norwegian 
Security Policy at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. He is dr.philos. 
from the University of Oslo. In 1994–1995 he was a Research Fellow at the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. In 1995 he was an Assistant Pro-
fessor at the history department at the University of Oslo. He then served for 
two years as Head of Secretariat for the World Congress of Historical Sciences, 
before joining the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in 1997. In 2005–
2006 he served as State Secretary (Deputy Foreign Minister) at the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is head of the Government’s Advisory Com-
mittee on Security and Disarmament. Skogrand has published extensively on 
Norwegian foreign and defence policy, NATO, disarmament, and contemporary 
history. His last major work is Norsk forsvarshistorie, bind 4, Alliert i krig og 
fred, 1940–1970 [The History of Norwegian Defence, vol. 4, Allied in War and 
Peace, 1940–1970] (Bergen: Eide, 2004).
DEFENCE mINISTER ANNE-GRETE STRøm-ERIChSEN
Defence Minister Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen (Labour Party) was appointed 
Defence Minister on 17 October 2005. She is a computer engineer, and has 
twenty years private and public sector experience in computers and information 
technology in the fields of system development and management. She has held a 
series of political positions, and from 2003 she was Commissioner of the City of 
Bergen. From 1991 till 2005 she was a Member of Bergen City Council, and in 
the period 1991–2005 she was a Member of the Executive Board of the Bergen 
City Council. From 1997 to 1999 she was Leader of Hordaland Labour Party. 
She was Deputy Mayor in the City of Bergen from 1998 to 1999, and from 1999 
to 2003 she was the Mayor/Chief Commissioner of Bergen. In 2001 she became 
a Member of the Labour Party Central Council.
SPECIAL ADVISER GEIR WESTGAARD
Geir Westgaard is Special Adviser to and head of the High North Project at the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He led the inter-agency process that 
produced the Norwegian government’s strategy for the High North last Decem-
ber and is charged with policy development and coordination in this area. Mr 
Westgaard is a career Foreign Service Officer who has been posted to Moscow, 
Vilnius and Washington D.C. He has also served as Foreign Policy Adviser at 
the Norwegian Prime Minister’s Office. Prior to taking up his current position, 
Mr Westgaard worked in the private sector for eight years, both as an oil in-
dustry executive and as a business consultant. He has been Vice President of 
Statoil ASA in charge of country risk analysis and social responsibility, and Vice 
President for strategy and communications at San Francisco-based Business for 
Social Responsibility. Geir Westgaard has a BA from the University of Oslo and 
a Master of International Affairs from the Columbia University. In 1997–1998 
he was a Fellow at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs.
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